The Waning of “Therapeutic” Politics: A Psycho-Cultural Analysis of Populist-Authoritarianism in Taiwan’s Democratization Process

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Democracy is liable to change from the older and more moderate forms to a new and extreme type..... i.e., changes from democracy to oligarchy due to the action of the demagogues.


The politician displaces his private motives upon public objects, and rationalizes the displacement in terms of public advantage. When this emotional and symbolic adjustment occurs in combination with facility in the acquisition of manipulative skill, the effective politician emerges.

Harold D. Lasswell, “On Political Personality.”

The process of democratic transition from one party domination to multi-party competition in Taiwan has been a focus of investigation by political scientists. Various paradigms developed in the West have been applied to the analysis of Taiwan’s development process including theories on elite recruitment and competition, party transformation, the role of the state, dependency theory, bureaucratic authoritarianism, public choice, illiberal democracy, and the more conventional theories linking socio-economic development and political participation.

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Yet in the voluminous studies on Taiwan, two things are largely lacking: one is the development of explanatory theories or models to analyze and predict political development on the Island; another is the application of critical but academic investigations to the explication of political events and process on Taiwan. This situation might have been created by two major factors: the first being a habitual tendency for Taiwan scholars to “fit” data on Taiwan politics to the existing sciences-sciences models and theories already developed in the Western world; another being the eagerness for the scholars sympathetic to Taiwan’s difficulties in international relations and cross-Strait relations to provide a positive account of the political process on the Island polity as a means to enhance international support and security.

With the above observations in mind, the author of this paper has decided to conduct an exploratory study on an area of Taiwan politics that has yet been fully examined, i.e., a psycho-cultural analysis of the interaction between the head of state and the people of Taiwan and its multi-facet impacts on the politics and policy-making process on the Island. In the process of investigation, the idea of direct democracy, the psycho-cultural makeup of both the President and various provincial (ethnic) groups on

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Taiwan, the emergence of “therapeutic politics” amidst populistic authoritarianism, and the “policies of advocacy” will be tackled one after another. Finally, explanatory models will be developed to be used as heuristic devices to analyze and predict political developments on Taiwan.

1. Lee Teng-hui and Political Development on Taiwan: Two Opposing Views

Despite the fact that most of the important steps toward democratization in Taiwan were initiated by the late President Chiang Ching-kuo of the Republic of China, (henceforth the ROC), most political analysts of Taiwan’s democratization process focus on the ten-year period under the leadership of President Lee Teng-hui. Dependent upon the analyst’s orientation, assessment of the achievements or failures of Taiwan’s development process under the ten-year Lee Teng-hui era can vary to a quite large extent. For those who are close to or supportive of President Lee, Lee represents the best among the indigenous Taiwanese political leaders. He is viewed as a political reformer leading the ROC on Taiwan through various stages of economic and political developments. Lee is also regarded as a brave statesman standing firm against the pressure from across the Taiwan Strait and trying hard to maintain Taiwan’s international status. Above all, Lee is pictured as a spiritual leader who fully understands the innermost feeling of the people of Taiwan, thus is able to lead the Taiwanese society toward a future of autonomy and dignity.4

For the individuals who are critical of President Lee Teng-hui, however, Lee is viewed as a political leader who is basically against pluralistic democracy and has a strong tendency toward autocratic control of the decision-making process. He is considered being too close to Japan, the former colonial ruler in Taiwan, and not identified enough with the Chinese nation and national goal of reunification. His efforts toward diplomatic breakthrough have been viewed as being too adventurous and counter-productive to cross-Taiwan-Strait relations. Even President Lee’s endeavor in the area of political democratization are tarnished by the

observation that President Lee has permitted, or at least tolerated, the inclusion of money politics and even underground elements in the KMT, the ruling party, and in the electoral political process.⁵

However, despite different assessments of President Lee’s performance as a political leader, one thing is certain, he will be remembered as one of the most influential and dominant leaders in Taiwan’s development process, particularly in the political arena in the past ten years. What are the most prominent features of President Lee’s leadership style? What is his attitude toward democracy and the idea of due process? What has been the leading factors which enables President Lee to gain support from the Taiwanese people and to fend off the challenges of his political opponents? What are the reasons for President Lee to push for rather radical constitutional changes and for rather aggressive attempts toward breaking ROC’s diplomatic isolationism?

Furthermore, given the fact that almost none of President Lee’s diplomatic efforts has brought about concrete beneficial results, why has he been so steadfast in pursuing these seemingly untenable goals? Why President Lee paid such a high price in pushing for constitutional changes? What really is in his mind in regard to long term political development in the ROC on Taiwan and in cross-Strait relations? Finally, what will be the theoretical construct we may develop and build to analyze President Lee’s behavior on the one hand and those of the people of Taiwan on the other? These are but a few of the questions that this author shall try to answer in this paper.

2. Direct Democracy and Populist Leadership Style: Searching for the Philosophical and Historical Roots of the Lee Teng-hui Phenomenon

The emergence of the Lee Teng-hui Phenomenon, or even “Lee Teng-hui Shock,” ⁶ has been analyzed by a variety of reasons and frameworks. Some attributed Lee’s meteoric rise to power to the

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⁵ Kwei-miao Chen, “The Doer will fail; the Holder will lose,” in Yang-sun Chou, The Ten Years of Lee Teng-hui Rule (Taipei: Fong Yun Publisher, 1998), pp. 7-14; Julian J. Kuo, op. cit.; Kuan-kuo Huang, The Fall of Taiwan by Populism (Taipei: Commercial Culture Publisher Co., 1995).

⁶ Julian J. Kuo, op. cit., p. 7.
extraordinary recruitment and patronage from Chiang Ching-kuo, the late President of the ROC. Other explained Lee’s political success to his skillful management or manipulation of intra-party elite competition within the KMT. Still others focused their attention to Lee’s sophisticated and almost Machiavellian handling of his relations with the Democratic Progressive Party so as to become a bi-partisan leaders of all the people of Taiwan.7

Yet, all these analyses have missed a very important factor of Lee’s rise to power, i.e., the interaction between the President Lee’s own psychological orientation with the mental state of the local Taiwanese population. The inherent demagogical and populist aspects of the democratic processes and institutions as well as the delicate and intricate relationship between the psychic makeup of President Lee and those of the indigenous Taiwanese who happen to share Lee’s orientation and value system may be the most effective and potent explanatory variable to Lee’s success in gaining political power and in defeating his political opponents at various stage of power struggle within and outside of the KMT.

First of all, it was President Lee’s firm belief in populist democracy which has contributed a great deal to his handling of intra-party conflict in the KMT, the operation of the ROC government, and the handling of international affairs. In order to fully appreciate President Lee’s idea on democracy, a brief discussion on the nature of democratic form of government and the relationship between the elite and the mass is necessary. Ever since the days of Greek States, the shortcomings and pitfalls of democratic system has been fully recognized by the political philosophers and practitioners. Aristotle, for instance, was one of the first philosophers to point out the agitative aspect of the democratic process. He said in Politics, that “Democracy is liable to change from the older and more moderate forms to a new and extreme type. This is largely due to the courting of the people by eager candidates for office;” he further added; “In democracies changes are chiefly due to the wanton license of demagogues.”8

7 Ibid., p. 6.
8 Ernest Burker, op. cit.
Other than the demagogical and manipulative aspects, another undesirable facet of democracy is the tendency toward populist appeal and decision-making process—a shortcoming fully recognized by the founding fathers of the United States. In *The federalist*, No. 10 and other relevant treatises, James Madison times and again expressed his concern over the danger of the tyranny of majority expounded by the advocates of “pure” democratic government. He pointedly stated in No. 47 of *The federalist* that “the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." To James Madison, the best form of government was not direct suffrage or referendum by people, but representative democracy though deliberation and debate in the Congress or Parliament. Hence, James Madison regarded the United State as a “republic,” meaning “representative democracy” as opposed to direct democracy or “non-representative” democracy.

At first glance, all the above mentioned concerns and discussions by Aristotle and James Madison may look remote or exotic for the investigation on Taiwan politics or the nature of Lee Teng-hui’s rule. Yet a deeper probe will reveal what the Greek philosophers and American founding father were most concerned with have been the elements which have contributed to repetitive debates and conflicts in Taiwan politics. Here one finds that President Lee’s strong conviction and commitment to “direct democracy” has propelled his political ambitions and has contributed to his ascendancy. It was the same fixation and obstinacy, however, that led Lee into serious conflicts with his political opponents, both within and outside of the KMT. President Lee’s firm belief in populist democracy and his resistance, and sometimes even hostility, against representative democracy have led to serious differences and confrontations between President and his critiques in the ruling party, the parliament, and the academic community in regard to

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the power of the leader of a state in a democracy, the role of the Parliament, the merits and demerits of direct democracy, and the importance of check-and-balance to the development as well as perseveration of pluralistic democracy.12


Having presented a brief review of the historical and philosophical roots of the populist aspect of President Lee’s leadership style, I would argue that the orientation and mode of Lee’s leadership actually is not unique both in historical and comparative perspective. In fact, one can easily find rather similar personality traits, methods of political mobilization and control, and attitudes toward internal as well as external challenges in other political leaders who are caught in similar circumstances like President Lee’s.

Several sets of variable seem to have working in an interconnected fashion to produce what I would coin “therapeutic politics.” For lacking a better and more precise adjective to accurately describe the phenomenon, “therapeutic politics” is used to refer to the kind of political process in which both the leaders and the followers are looking not for concrete policy results but for the psychic satisfaction in response to either the feeling of the individual actor or the general sentiment of the population as a whole. In other words, in “therapeutic politics,” people are not looking for tangible results from the decisions and actions of the government or political leaders, but for sentimental satisfaction deriving from the release or relief of inner psychic tensions embedded in the accumulated past frustrations or the seemingly insurmountable current difficulties in the internal as well external environments of the political system.13

12 For a fuller discussion of this point, see Yung Wei, Tu Pô (Breakthrough: Toward a Greater Framework for Taiwan’s future), (Taipei: Shang-Chou Wen Hua [Business Weekly Publishing Company], 1995).
Of all the political scientists dealing with the problem of interaction between the inner psychic needs of the political actors and their behavior in politics, the works of Harold D. Lasswell is of particular relevance. Focusing on the frustration suffered by political leaders early in life and the projection of private motives onto public objects and stands, Lasswell tries to analyze the aggressive and sometimes almost pathological behavior of political leaders such as Napoleon, Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and Hitler. The result is a quite insightful, though not conclusive, probing into the conscious or even unconscious mental state of political leaders and their extraordinary pursuit as well as use of political power.\(^{14}\)

What I would like to stress here, however, is that private frustration of the leader alone is not the sufficient condition for the emergence of men of power. It takes the psychic need of both the leader and the followers, i.e., that of the elite and the mass, to create the conditions for a conscious or unconscious merger of the two emotional forces which in turn provides the foundation for “therapeutic politics.” In what I call “therapeutic politics,” the foremost concern of political leaders is not focused on the formation and implementation of politics which will bring about concrete and beneficial result to the people and the society, but to satisfy consciously or subconsciously the psychic need of the population. Consequently, the process of decision-making is not aimed at a rational aggregation of the educated opinion of the citizens for the formation of policy through an open and pluralistic procedure, but to stress and manipulate the emotional need of the general public so as to mobilize popular support. Under such circumstance, the political leaders can enjoy almost unlimited power in the decision-making process. The end product of this process is the so-called “populist authoritarianism”\(^ {15}\) in which one often finds the leader of a

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\(^{15}\) For the meaning of “populist authoritarianism,” see Yung Wei, *Tu Pô (Breakthrough: Toward a Greater*
country enjoying autocratic power in the decision making process by mobilizing the people through advocating certain positions to satisfy the psychic needs either of the leader or of the people — a phenomenon which we shall deal within more details which we come to the discussion of the National Development Conference. (See Figure 1)

4. Provincial and Ethnic Differences: An Enduring Theme in Taiwan’s Political Culture

Having discussed the psycho-cultural variables which have contributed to therapeutic politics and populist authoritarianism, and having built a heuristic model on the relationship among various sets of variables, we may move onto an examination of the Taiwan situation in accordance with this model to the analysis of the Taiwan situation. First of all, it must be pointed out that the consecutive colonial rules by the Dutch, Spanish, and Japanese in Taiwan since the Seventeenth Century, the conquest and control of Taiwanese by the Manchu Dynasty from 1688 to 1895; and the restoration of Taiwan to China in 1945, all added to the complexity of the attitude of the population of Taiwan toward “outside” rulers. The method of “divide and rule” between the Min-nan and Hakka population by the colonial governments and the Manchu rulers further complicated the relations among different provincial and ethnic groups in Taiwan. Above all, the most unfortunate incident of February 28, 1947-- an incident which almost led an all-out insurrection against the provincial authority-- has sowed the seed of long lasting grievances of many Taiwanese residents against the authority.

Much of the problems spreading across the issue of “unification vs. Separation” spectrum can be traced to the feeling of alienation and “marginality” of the pre-1949 immigrants and their offsprings as well as the post-1949 newer migrants to Taiwan from Mainland China. The division of China into two competing political systems across the Taiwan Strait created further complication in cultural as well as political identities of the various provincial and ethnic groups in Taiwan. Scholars studying the political personality of the population of Taiwan have noticed that the cultural and political value of various outside rulers all having an impact on the formation of the norms and values of the various provincial and ethnic groups in Taiwan.

While study on the political culture of Mainland China has been a major subject of study among the western social scientists, the political culture of

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16 On the psychological and cultural makeup of the immigrant society in Taiwan, see Hsu Tsun-mou, *Taiwan Jen Lun (on Taiwanese)* (Taipei: China Times Publishers, 1993); also see Julian C. L. Kuo, *op. cit.*


19 There are four distinguishable provincial and ethnic groups on Taiwan. The three major population groups are of the Chinese Han origin; they can be furthered grouped into two categories; those who migrated to Taiwan before 1949, i.e., the Min-nan (southern Fukien) group which constitutes about 58% of the total population, and the Hakka (eastern Kwantung) group which constitute about 16%. The mainlanders, meaning those who came to Taiwan after 1949 constitutes about 14%, while the aborigines constitute about 2%. All the figure are based upon the combined results of various opinion surveys in which ethnic background usually used “self-identification” as the basis of response and measurement.

the society of Taiwan has not received as much attention. Except some studies on the process of political socialization of college and elementary school students, no major work has been done on the political culture of the Taiwanese polity as a whole. Yet from the limited studies on the political orientation of the various groups in Taiwan, one senses a strong sentiment of alienation, displacement, and anxiety among all the groups in Taiwan.

First of all, for the Taiwanese group, the February 28 (1947) Incident probably has had the greatest impact on their political perception and attitude. This incident was caused initially by the expulsion of street cigarette peddlers which led to an island wide anti-government riot and which also led to violence between different provincial groups. Eventually, the central government in Nanking had to send troops over to suppress the “rebellion.” Thousands of people lost their lives in the process. Despite later efforts toward rectification and reconciliation, this incident has left a deep scar on the relations between the local Taiwanese population and the KMT government and between the different provincial groups on the Island.

Other than the February 28 Incident, another factor which has had extensive influence on the political culture of the Taiwanese population is the fifty years of Japanese colonial rule. Despite the fact that the Japanese ruled the Island with an iron hand and had severely limited Taiwanese participation in politics on the Island, the Japanese colonial government did try very hard to incorporate Taiwan into an unalienable part of the

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Japanese Empire. While Japanese rule had left very limited impact on the Chinese cultural pattern on average Taiwanese, it did have more influence on the gentry class, particularly those who collaborated with the Japanese colonizers. The Japanese introduced modern educational system, legal institution, agricultural innovations, light industries and census system, into Taiwan and brought about a standard of living in Taiwan which was considerably higher than that of Mainland China. While Min-nan and Hakka dialects were still the languages spoken by ordinary Taiwanese, Japanese was the lingua franca of Taiwan, particularly among the educated class.

In addition to the spread of the Japanese language, intermarriage between the Japanese and the upper class Taiwanese was another factor which has contributed to closer ties with Japan. Although the exact figure of the intermarriage is not known, dispersed accounts are available in scattered biographical writing of established families in the Japan era. The integration-oriented Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan, coupled with the introduction of modern institutions into Taiwan and intermarriage between the Japanese and upper-class Taiwanese, created a unique pro-Japanese sentiment in certain elite sector of Taiwanese population which differ rather distinctly from the more prevalent anti-Japanese attitudes of Korea, Philippines, and other southeast Asian countries which had been under Japanese colonial rule. So much so was this pro-Japanese feeling among leaders of the opposition movement in Taiwan that Annette Hsieh-Lien Lu, magistrate of the Taoyuan County and a former member of the Legislative Yuan, led a delegation to Japan in 1995 to pay tribute to the One-Hundred-Year Anniversary of the Signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki—a treaty ceding Taiwan to Japan after the defeat of China by Japan in 1895.

The mainlanders, as newly arrived immigrants, can be further divided

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26 For example, see Heng-dao Lin, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-59.
into two major sub-groups. The upper-layer are the government official, scholars, teachers, and professionals who have enjoyed high socio-economic status in Taiwan. The vast majority of mainlanders, however, are in one way or another related to the military. Even today, the retired service men and their offsprings constituted the largest subgroups mainlander population in Taiwan. The older generation mainlanders strongly identify with the ruling KMT and the national goal of reunification. The younger generation of mainlanders, however, are increasingly identified with the island of Taiwan. Yet with the accelerated “Taiwanization” of the Island polity, both the older as well as the younger generation of mainlanders feel left out in the socio-political process of Taiwan which has contributed to the appeal of the New Party, a party split from the KMT. The increasing practice by both the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the establishment KMT in redefining the history of Taiwan not along the nationalist line but from the perspective of an Island republic has added to the increasing alienation of the mainlander population from the ruling elite.

The afore-mentioned different experience between the Mainlander and Taiwanese have created different psycho-cultural orientation between the two groups which have had significant impact on the political orientation of the population on Taiwan. To put in a nutshell, while the mainlanders use the history of Mainland China as the point of reference in making judgement on things political, many Taiwanese use the history of Taiwan and even the Japanese colonial rule as the basis of evaluation. As a result, conflicting interpretations and attitudes toward political events become unavoidable. Hence while the Mainlanders have become increasingly alienated by the new political attitudes of the ruling elite in Taiwan, who increasingly have used the Island of Taiwan as the focus and foundation of policy planning, the Taiwanese population, especially the older generations, have become more alienated from the political posture of Mainland China which in the mind of the Island-centered Taiwanese, has been too China centric and failed to take

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28 For rather interesting analysis on the dilemma of the mainlanders in regard to national identification, see Kuang-chin Li, “Ethnic Groups, Nation-State, and Collective Memory: Preliminary Thoughts on the 1995 ‘Chung-chan Shih-chien [End of the (Second World War) Incident]’ in Taipei,” (paper delivered at the First Taiwan Colonial and Historical Symposium, Austin, Texas, August 9-12, 1996).
into account the history and experience of the Taiwanese society.\textsuperscript{29} Despite increasing intermarriage between the Taiwanese and Mainlanders and the resultant decline of provincial feeling between the two groups, there remains hidden provincial feelings, especially in the political arena. This may partially explain why President Lee quite frequently emphasizes “Taiwan Ben Wei (Taiwan Primacy)” in his policy statements.\textsuperscript{30}

5. The Coming of Lee Teng-hui Era and the Emergence of “Therapeutic Politics”

Having presented a brief account on “ethnic” relations in Taiwan, we may move onto an analysis of “therapeutic politics” in Taiwan. From 1950s to 1980s, under the leadership of President Chiang Kai-shek, President Yen Chia-Kan, and President Chiang Ching-kuo, Taiwan was ruled by one-party dominant KMT Government. In what Edwin Winkler described “soft authoritarianism,” Taiwan has been able to develop from a rural economy with some light industry into a industrial and commercial society moving toward high-technology. Toward the end of President Chiang Ching-kuo’s rule, a series of political reforms were carried out, including the removal of martial law, the permission of the formation of new political parties, the rejuvenation of the membership of the Parliament, the issuance license for the publication of new newspapers, and finally, the lifting of the ban of travel to Mainland China. All these measures contributed to a genuine opening up of the Taiwanese political process. It also created, nevertheless, the condition for an unprecedented competition between the ruling party and opposition parties which although has enhanced the level of democracy in Taiwan policies on the one hand but also has contributed to the dismantling of the political ethos upon which political stability in Taiwan had been rested.

On January 13, 1988, President Chiang Ching-kuo passed away and the

\textsuperscript{29} For a discussion on ethnic (provincial) relations on Taiwan, see Mao-Kwei Chang, et. at., \textit{Ethnic Relations and National Identity} (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1993).

Vice President, Dr. Lee Teng-hui, sworn in as the President. Since then, President Lee has been the President of the ROC for more than ten years. President Lee’s ten years of presidency can be further divided into two parts. In the first five years, he basically adhered to the original KMT policy of national re-unification, upheld the principle of “One China,” rejected the idea of fundamental changes of the Constitution of the Republic of China, and resisted the idea of trying to obtain UN membership again—only to agree returning to some of the UN specialized agencies.

Yet since 1994, in the latter half of President Lee’s ten-year presidency, particularly after he was elected to the presidency through popular vote in the Taiwan Region, President Lee started making drastic and fundamental changes on both external and domestic policies. On the international front, President Lee started the push toward regaining membership in the United Nations, despite it was a major policy position of the DPP having strong flavor of separatism. President Lee also initiated a series of head-of-state visit to countries wherein the ROC had no formal ties, cumulating in his visiting to the Cornell University, his alma mater, in the United States which in one way or another, led to the Beijing’s decision to conduct missile tests against Taiwan.

On domestic front, the Government of the Republic of China started using “The ROC on Taiwan,” “The ROC as an independent sovereign state” to call itself. “One China” gradually was de-emphasized by government official until it almost completely disappeared in official statements. A series of fundamental constitutional amendments were made which included: the removal of right of the National Assembly to elect the President, ending the right of members of the provincial assembly and city councilmen to elect members of the Control Yuan as well as the right of the members of the Control Yuan to vote for approval of the nominees for the seats to the Council of Grand Justice.

None of the afore-mentioned policies produce as significant and concrete benefits to the functioning of the political system on Taiwan as their proponents had claimed. This was especially true to the external policies of President Lee which have brought very little substantive benefit to the people of Taiwan. And in the cases of UN Membership and Lee’s
visit to Cornell, they even brought about serious crises in the Taiwan Strait. Yet these policies were resolutely carried out not because President Lee or the ROC Government failed to see the futility and negative consequences of the policy measures but because they served as an important therapeutic value to meet the psychological need of the people of Taiwan “to go out.”


Among all the populist and therapeutic policy measures, none has had as much impact as the National Development Conference. After President Lee was re-elected by the popular vote as the President of the ROC in May, 1996, he declared that he would push forward for the second stage constitutional reform. A National Development Conference (NDC) was called with participants from all political parties. In the opinion of many constitution scholars, both the process and the contents of the constitutional amendments initiated by President Lee were in conflict of democratic principles. First of all, the content of the so called “constitutional reform” was determined by a small group of advisors under President Lee’s aegis. No extensive discussion or debates was made either through various political parties or among members of the academic community. The original plan of the constitutional amendments included:

1. Depriving the people of Taiwan to participate in five important elections, including: elections of Governor of Taiwan; members of Provincial assembly; town mayors; village heads; and members of town meetings and village councils;

2. Depriving the power of the Legislators to exercise approval on the nomination of premiership;

3. Expanding the power of the President, giving him the right to dissolve

the Legislative Yuan (Parliament) and to appoint the Prime Minister without approval of the Legislative Yuan;

4. Reducing the stature of the Premier and making him almost a “chief of Staff” of the President; and

5. Abolishing the Provincial as well as town and village governments.

All the above so-called “resolutions” on constitutional amendments did not go through the deliberation or decision-making process of either the two constitutional bodies--the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan-- or the internal decision-making process of either ruling party or the major opposition political parties.

The above-mentioned “constitutional amendments,” if completely adopted, would have made the President of the Republic of China an autocratic ruler with almost no effective checks and balance over his unprecedented power in any constitutional system. Fortunately, owing to exceedingly strong opposition within the KMT, the suggestion to stop elections at the village and township levels was dropped. Also, a system of “non confidence vote” as well as a provision for the President to have the power to dissolve the Parliament were introduced.

Except a few scholars who participated in the drafting of the constitutional-amendment package, no major constitutional scholars agree with this “reform”. On the contrary, many political scientists and constitutional scholars openly voiced their strong objections. Over a thousand scholars, including leading professors in various universities and colleges in Taiwan, have signed an open letter to the President, advising him not to push for this undemocratic change.32

Against the advice of the scholars, President Lee and the KMT made an all-out effort to mobilize public support for the above move. The general public was pictured by pro-government media as being supportive of this sweeping constitutional change, but quite a number of public opinion polls

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32 For the signing of a petition by more than twelve hundred scholars against unreasonable constitutional change, see “Twelve Hundred Scholars Signing Petition against Constitutional Amendment,” reported in United Daily News (June 19, 1998), p. 4.
clearly showed that the majority of the people in Taiwan opposed both the expansion of the power of the President and the abolishment of the Taiwan government as well as the stopping of five important elections.  

In the opinion of many leading constitutional scholars, the process of decision-making in the above mentioned constitutional amendments was a clear violation of both the decision-making process of the democratic countries and the constitutional process of the Republic of China. It is a stereotype of populist-authoritarian operation in manipulating the public opinion, the media to force the National Assembly to accept a pre-determined scheme of constitutional change handed down by the President.  

(See Figure 2 and 3)

For President Lee and the people concurring the holding of the NDC, the proposed constitutional changes reflected the will of the people and was a necessity to increase the competitive edge of the ROC. Yet the fact is, the abolition of the provincial government does not need the amending of the Constitution at all. A mere minor revision of relevant laws dealing with the Provincial Government would have fulfilled the purpose. As for the argument that efforts toward constitutional change reflected the “will of the people,” it was clearly refuted by public opinion polls. Finally, two large unprecedented popular demonstrations of more than fifty thousand people in Taipei fully shattered the myth that the constitutional change was supported by the will of the people.

The May 4 and 18, 1997, mass demonstrations which “cut across different segments of society and which are independent from political

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33 Opinion poll conducted on December 29, 1996 revealed that 55% the people in Taiwan opposed depriving the right of the Legislative Yuan to exercise the power of approval over the Premier nominated by the President; 58% opposed giving the power to president to dissolve the Legislative Yuan (Parliament). In both cases, only 21% endorsed the ideas. Also, 38% opposed the cessation of election at the provincial level; 55% opposed the termination of election at township and village level. See “The Majority of the People opposed the Expansion of Power of the President, Result of Opinion Survey,” United Daily News (Taipei: December 30, 1996), p. 2.

34 A “Protect-Constitution” night vigil was staged at the entrance of National Taiwan University on July 6, 1997. Many leading political scientists and constitutional scholars spoke to the rally. The appeal of scholars, however, was totally ignored by the ROC central government. See Bing-nan Lee and Chun-yuan Tseng, op. cit., pp. 47-48.

intervention” occurred in Taipei. 36 Participated by people of all walks of life and across party boundaries, the demonstration was caused by the murder of a teenage girl, Pai Hsiao-yen, daughter of a renowned entertainer and TV personality Pai Ping-ping. The brutal murder of the kidnapped girl served as the catalyst leading to an unprecedented outburst of dissatisfaction against the government headed by President Lee. During the demonstration, leaders of the demonstrators called for President Lee to pay attention to domestic situation, particularly to the maintenance of law and order, and not to spend too much time on external affairs unrelated to people’s immediate concerns. Pai Ping-ping and other leaders also criticized the ROC government for spending too much energy and time in constitutional amendment and not enough effort was made to improve the livelihood of the people. The demonstrators used a laser beam to project two huge Chinese characters “jên tsou (Admit faults)” onto the wall of the central tower of the Presidential office which made it to the front pages of all newspapers, domestic and international. Not until President Lee openly issued a mea culpa that this outburst of dissatisfaction against President Lee’s leadership gradually subsided. 37

As a result, owing to people’s negative response to the arbitrary and authoritarian constitutional amendments process and Government’s handling of the Pai Hsiao-yen Incident, the popularity of President Lee took a nose dive. Before March, 1997, the satisfaction level of the people of Taiwan toward Lee had always been fluctuating between 61% to 75%. Yet the poll taken right after the Pai Hsiao-yen Incident found President Lee “satisfaction dropped from 73% in March, 1997 to 48% in April, 1997, a drop of popularity of the President which has not been able to recovered ever since. (See Figure 4)

Other than the decline of the popularity of President Lee, another concrete result of the negative impact of the constitutional amendment was the severe defeat suffered by the ruling party in the January, 1998 local election in Taiwan. Of the 25 counties and cities in Taiwan, the KMT won

37 Ibid., pp. 266-267.
only 7 with a combined population less than 23% in the total population—a unprecedented defeat ever happened to the KMT in Taiwan since the end of the World War II.

7. The Evolvement of President Lee’s Leadership Style: Psychic Response, Cultural Adaptation, and populist Authoritarian Rule

Why President Lee, who had been rather popular in the first half of his ten years rule, chose to push for policies which more or less contributed to his declining popular support toward the latter half of his terms? The answer, or answers, is a complex one. The first type of answers may be found in a psycho-historical analysis of President Lee’s personality and life story. Here we find rather limited in-depth academic research in this area. President Lee Teng-hui himself, however, has provided us with a most revealing account of his innermost thinking in this regard in an interview conducted in May, 1994 by a Japanese columnist, Shiba Ryo Taro. In a lengthy interview with Shiba Ryo Taro, a Japanese whom Lee had known for many years, the President revealed many of his personal feeling toward the Japanese colonial rule, the lot of the Taiwanese people, KMT’s language policy, his attitude toward Taiwan’s international relations, and finally his sense of mission toward the future of Taiwan.39

With extraordinary candidness, Lee lamented about “the sadness to be born as a Taiwanese.”40 Lee mentioned “Exodus,” the Bible story on Moses’ leading the suppressed Israelis to escape from Egypt, to compare to the lot of the Taiwanese and his sense of mission. As the chairman of the KMT, the ruling party, Lee asserted that “All the peoples holding power in Taiwan were alien regimes… Even the KMT is an alien regime, it is a party rule (control) the Taiwanese.”41 In short, Lee believe that “Taiwan must

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38 For initial attempts, see Kuang-kuo Huang, op. cit.; for a critical analysis of President Lee’s background and political personality, see Hsiang-tuo Tseng, A Critique of Lee Teng-hui (Taipei: Society for Consolidating the Chinese Nation, 1996); for a thinly veiled critical analysis of the inner-thinking of Lee Teng-hui in the form of a novel, see Ta-chun Chang, The Lying Disciple (Taipei: United Literary Publisher, 1996); also see Julian C. L. Kuo, op. cit., especially chapter one.


40 Ibid., p. 471.

41 Ibid., p. 477.
belong to the Taiwanese; this is a fundamental concept.”

As the President of the ROC and the chairman of the ruling KMT party, Lee’s unfolding, or to put more precisely, unloading of his inner thinking and feeling to a Japanese columnist naturally raised many eyebrows in Taiwan, particularly his comrades in the KMT. For scholars interested in Lee psycho-cultural background and orientation, the content of the interview, however, offers most precious first hand information on the psychic makeup and political personality of a leader caught in the process of having to bridge the gaps consciously or unconsciously between his colonialist past and nationalist present and between his strong sense of remorse of being a member of the suppressed Taiwanese people and his sense of mission to lead his people to disown the past and to build a new nation. In fact, Lee’s transformation from a Taiwanese youth who have received Japanese education, to a college student having a record of joining left-wing student activities in Taiwan to a successful technocrat in Chang Ching-Kuo’s cabinet, and finally to the President of the Republic of China, fits so well with Harold D. Lasswell’s “frustration-displacement-rationalization-realization” model of psychoanalysis of political personality that rivals to few other cases.

Other than psychoanalytical model of Harold D. Lasswell, another analytical scheme that may be useful in understanding President Lee’s orientation and behavior in the political arena is Robert K. Merton’s theory on culture adaptation. Addressing on the problem of social structure and anomie, Robert K. Merton differentiated five types of adaptation to cultural systems, including “conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion.” Merton used two criteria, cultural goals and “institutional means” to determine to which categories an individual belongs.

42 Ibid., p. 473.
43 President Lee is widely reportedly to have joined the radical student movement, even the Chinese Communist party, during his days as a student at National Taiwan University. See “Special Consultant and the AB Archives,” Shih-Pao Chou-Kan (China Times Weekly), 1065 (July 23-Aug, 1, 1998), pp. 30-37. It must be pointed out, however, leaning to the left was not a rare occurrence among college students at National Taiwan University at that time. For a comparative perspective, see Kuang-chi Chang, Fan Shu Jên Ti Ku-Shih (The Story of a Sweet Potato Man) (Taipei: Lien Ching Publisher, 1998).
Judging by Merton’s classification, Lee Teng-hui might never have been a “conformist” to the Chinese Nationalist value system and institution. He simply behaved in a ritualistically manners in order to gain ascendancy to political power. Once feeling secure in his power position, Lee then moved ahead to change the institutions and eventually the value system of Nationalist China to fit his own preferences and beliefs, thus resolving the tension between himself and the system which he inherited. In doing so, Lee was playing the role of a “innovator” or “rebel” so far as the original culture-political values and institutions are concerned. In this regard, Lee’s role and strategies are not different from the Republicans revolutionaries in the late Ch’ing period who hid themselves in the Manchu bureaucratic and military establishment so as to utilize the sources of the Ch’ing government to bring about latter’s eventual downfall and demise. The critiques of President Lee may accuse him of being a “turncoat” to the KMT or to the nationalist Chinese cause. Yet Lee’s supporters and admirers might as well point out that the President was simply adopting smart tactics to achieve what he really had in mind after all.

A third analytical scheme that may be applied to the interpretation of the Lee Teng-hui era is what I coined “the populist-authoritarian” model. By “populism,” I mean the methods for the mobilization of public opinion through ethnic sentiment, emotional agitation, and mass movement; by “authoritarianism,” I mean the decision-making which is an autocratic and closed system resistant to outside influence. By using a four-fold typology, four different types of political systems can be differentiated; they are: (1) “traditional authoritarian society” in which the mobilization of the mass is low and the degree of closeness of decision-making process is high; (2) “unstable mass society” in which mobilization is high but the degree of closeness of decision-making process is high; (2) “unstable mass society” in which mobilization is high but the process of

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45 Seeking for unification of one’s own value system with objective world by carrying out reforms on the existing social and political system can also be traced to neo-Confucianist teaching which has contributed to Meiji Restoration in Japan where Lee Teng-hui did his study at Kyoto University. For Neo-Confucianism and the unification of mind and action, see William Theodore de Bary, *The Message of the Mind in Neo-Confucianism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).


47 For instance, see Shiba Ryo Taro’s praise for President Lee’s political strategy of remaining passive and vague before obtaining real power, see Lee Teng-hui, *op. cit.*, pp. 481-483.

decision-making is open and decentralized; (3) “democratic pluralistic society” in which the both process of mobilization and decision-making are open and decentralized; and finally (4) “populist authoritarian society” in which the mobilization process are highly agitative, manipulative and emotional and the process of decision-making process is centralized and closed.49 (See Figure 5)

Unfortunately, despite the stereotype cliché-filled analysis of Taiwan’s transition from “authoritarian politics” to “pluralistic democracy,” the actual process of transition has not been moving from “traditional authoritarian society” to “pluralistic democracy,” but from “mass society” to “populistic authoritarian society.” In this connection, the process of the National Development Conference can best illustrate the situation.50 Here one witnesses a process in which the regular channels and institutions for the exchange of opinion either in the constitutional bodies or the various political parties were almost totally bypassed in the initial stage of deliberation. An ad hoc and temporary setup, the National Development Conference, was organized to serve as an substitute for deliberation on constitutional problems both to the Parliament and to the parties. No wonder it arose unprecedented criticisms and rebuttal from more than twelve hundred scholars in almost all universities and colleges in Taiwan.

In addition to the populistic-authoritarian methods of mobilization and decision-making in the process of constitutional amendment, the decision-making process in the KMT, the ruling party, has also become more closed than ever. For instance, the delegates to the party congress were compelled to use the method of “standing up” rather than casting secret ballots as the method of nominating the party’s presidential candidate. The previously held four times a seasonal year meetings of the members of the


Central Committee have been completely stopped in recent years. Nomination of party candidates to the Legislative Yuan which had been done through direct primary by party members in the past, is now replaced by cadres screening and non-publicized “opinion polls.” All these undemocratic practices have been severely criticized by party members, the academic community and the mass media. Yet there has been no response from the party chairman, neither is there any concrete signs of genuine reform in the KMT is insight.

Until the time of the National Development Conference, President Lee had been able to carry out his various policies with substantial portion of popular support. This might partially due to the traditional respect usually rendered to the leader of the state. The absence of the concept of individual rights and the passive acceptance of official authority may also have contributed to the lack of organized opposition against undemocratic practice.51 Yet skillful utilization of the feeling of “sadness and sorrow” of the local Taiwanese population has been clearly a most important factor in mobilizing popular support for the less than democratic decision-making process.52

Nevertheless, with the negative results of the constitutional change increasingly evident and the consequences of undemocratic political practice becoming progressively prevalent, even native Taiwanese scholars and members of the DPP started questioning the mode of operation of Lee’s government. Kuang-kuo Huang, a noted professor of socio-psychology, pointed out that Lee’s populist politics led to the shrinkage of Taiwan’s civil society, the deterioration of the quality of local politics, and the penetration of the political process by “money politics” and underground figures.53 An increasing numbers of social scientists who originally had high hope on Lee Teng-hui to lead Taiwan toward pluralist democracy started questioning his “illiberal democracy”54 and point out that Taiwan now is facing “serious

52 For a discussion by a Japanese scholar on Taiwan consciousness,” see Mi-Chia Wu and Wakabuyashi Masahiro, Taiwan Dialogue (Taipei: Independent Evening News Publisher, 1989), pp. 175-196.
53 Kuang-Kuo Huang, op. cit., pp. 43-123.
54 L. A. M. Ling and Chih-yu Shih, op. cit.
tension between populism and democracy” and warn that “the ‘top-to-bottom’ construction and manipulation of the concept of the ‘people’ is at odds with the notion of a pluralist democracy.”

8. From “Therapeutic Politics” to Pragmatic Policy: The Dawning of Rational Pluralist Democracy in Taiwan

In the foregoing sections of this paper, we have endeavored to present an interdisciplinary analysis on the nature of President Lee Teng-hui’s leadership and the process of “democratization” in Taiwan with the National Development Conference as a focus and watershed of investigation. From these analyses, it has become clear that a host of factors have contributed to the special kind of democratization process in Taiwan, including the personal orientation and experience of President Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan’s colonial past and the frustration as well anxiety of Taiwanese people, and the interaction of these two sets of factors with the concrete political problems both in the internal as well as the external environment, that the polity in Taiwan has been facing.

After a review of the process of political development in Taiwan and the relationship between the leader of the people in the past years, one most interesting and intriguing fact has surfaced, i.e., in the first part of President Lee’s rule, when he was not still following the policy passed onto him by Chiang Ching-kuo, President was enjoying higher level of popularity and the ROC on Taiwan was also having more political stability and cohesion, social order, higher economic growth. Yet after President Lee started implementary policies of his own, particularly after the National Development Conference, his popularity started to decline and the Taiwanese society began to experience lower political stability and consensus, less social tranquility, more crime, lower economic growth, and far more tension across Taiwan Strait. Furthermore, it is in the area wherein President put in less attention, such as science and technology and educational development that the ROC on Taiwan has had more

distinguished achievements; and it has been the areas wherein President Lee paid a great deal of attention, such as participation in the UN, head-of-state visit, cross-Strait relations, and relation with South-east Asia countries that the ROC has suffered serious setbacks.

Why there has been such a contradictory and paradoxical relationship between President Lee’s efforts and policies outcomes? The answer lies partially in the blocking efforts made by Mainland China, but more in the nature of the policies which President Lee has been pursuing. If one would take a deep look into the real intent of President Lee’s major policy measures, one would discover that these policies are not aimed at producing concrete results in the foreseeable future, but are aimed at delivering therapies to the hurt ego of the Taiwanese population. Thus policy measures embedded in “pragmatic diplomacy,” such as UN membership, President Lee’s visit to Cornell, inviting Dalai Lama to visit Taiwan, considering recognizing outer Mongolia, and restrictive policies toward Beijing may not bring about concrete beneficial results and, in some cases, may even engender negative results. Yet they are precisely “advocacy” policies which can soothe the nerve of the people of Taiwanese and induce a sense of dignity and self-respect. Thus, “we must be able to get out (of Taiwan)” is not just a slogan, but a therapeutic device responding to the psyche of certain sector of the people of Taiwan.

For an individual familiar with the process of sentimental and “nationalistic” politics of emerging nations, he can readily see the therapeutic value and the “latent function” of the above-mentioned policies advocated and pursued by Lee Teng-hui’s Government. Yet “therapeutic politics” can only created temporarily a sense of euphoria and may have a anesthesia effect to the populace. But eventually people will ask: “where is the real benefit of your policy?” And this is exactly the question people of Taiwan is now posing to President Lee and the KMT

government.

Unfortunately, by all indications, President Lee seems to be pursuing populist authoritarian politics to a higher level. A new textbook emphasizing Taiwan’s history, culture, and society is being used in junior high schools; cultural activities stressing local communities are encouraged; a “spiritual reform” movement is in the process of being implemented with the known purpose to bring the population to identify with President Lee’s values and goals. Despite severe criticisms both to the numerous factual errors and unbalanced treatment of the norms of the polity and society in Taiwan, these textbooks still were introduced and have been taught in junior high schools in Taiwan since September, 1997.

Recent public opinion polls have demonstrated, however, that people have started asking more for concrete policy measures, and not to be satisfied only which therapeutic measures and populist slogans. Despite ceaseless efforts made by President Lee’s government in promoting Taiwanese identity, an increasing number of local Taiwanese have started identifying as “Chinese.” For instances, results of survey research released by the Mainland Affairs Council reveal that there has been a drop of the percentage of people identifying as Taiwanese between November 1997 and May 1998; from 43.3% to 30.5%. Furthermore, a large public opinion survey conducted by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, yield a most interesting fact, i.e., the younger and the more educated the Taiwanese, the more they are for national reunification. (See Figure 7 and Table 1) The same survey also demonstrated that the younger the generation a Taiwanese belongs to, the more he is identified as being “Chinese” or “both Chinese and Taiwanese.” As for the mainlanders, the younger the generation, the more one is identified with being “Taiwanese” and “both Taiwanese and Chinese.” (See Table 2)

The implication of these data are quite clear, there is a natural

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58 Chūn-Chieh Huang, a Professor of History at National Taiwan University, criticized the content of the new textbook in completely negating the past and in perpetuating the sentiment of “self-pity” to the next generation of Taiwan, see Chūn-Chieh Huang, “Some Opinion on the New Textbook ‘Recognizing Taiwan’,” *Straits Review Monthly*, 92 (Taipei: Aug. 1, 1998), pp. 59-60.
59 Yi-yen Chen, *op. cit.*
assimilation and integration of the Taiwanese and mainlanders in the areas of ethnic and national identity. Consequently, the politician who try to explore provincial as well as ethnic differences and manipulate the issue of national identity as their basis of support will find their appeal gradually fading.

Thus it is no surprise that a recent poll conducted by “The Rising People Foundation,” a DPP front organization, revealed President Lee has rather poor rating in terms of his performances. With a scale of 100, almost half of population polled considered President Lee’s performance less than “passing (60 points).” And the low rating cut across all provincial groups with the Min-nan and Hakka groups slightly higher and the mainlander group slightly lower. Moreover, the higher the education level, the lower the rating of President Lee’s Performance.60 (See Table 3, 4)

At the height of President Lee’s populist appeal, anyone who expressed different opinion to President Lee and his policies was viewed as ill intended or not being able to understand President Lee’s devotion to Taiwan. Yet a recent survey showed that the majority of people of Taiwan do not regard Lee as the indispensable leader whom all the people of Taiwan must support. They also do not regard people criticizing Lee as “ill-intended.”61 (See Table 5) Giving the fact that President Lee customarily received more support from the older, male, rural, and less educated sector of the population-- all the dwindling sectors of voting population-- it will not be easy for Lee to rebound to higher level of support and popularity.62 (See Table 6)

Facing a declining popularity for President Lee and an increasingly difficult external environment after President Clinton’s trip to Mainland China, the ROC government have sent mixed signals on its policy orientations and implementation. In regard to policies toward Mainland China and the international community, some re-adjustments have been

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made such as the returning to the “system competition” rather than “state competition” concepts in regards to cross-Strait relations and lowering the priority of UN membership in ROC’s foreign policy.

Yet the stalemated relations between Taiwan and Mainland China also provided the ingredient for President Lee and the ROC Government to continue adhering to a confrontational and separatist attitude against Beijing. So much so that the Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Justice has been reported as having been keeping special and secret files on political activities and private life of government officials and important political figures. It was also revealed that the Bureau is engaging covert “loyalty” investigations against prominent political figures including former Prime Minister, Hau Po-tsun, former President of Judicial Yuan, Lin Yang-kang, and former President of Legislation Yuan, Liang Shu-Jong. The Bureau of Personnel Affairs even announced a plan to require officials holding positions equal to or higher than class 12 (equivalent to Bureau Chiefs) must report their contact with Mainland China in the future. The covert loyalty investigation reportedly even includes prominent religious leaders and famous entertainers who have made contacts with Mainland China. The revelation of these kinds of undercovered “loyalty” investigation arouse great apprehension among all circles in Taiwan. Many prominent leaders of all political parties challenged that this type of operation constitutes a heightening of undemocratic practice which may become an instrument for suppressing political opponents or dissidents by the ruling elites. It may ushered a new era of “McCarthyism Taiwan Style” on the Island.63

Observing the declining influence and power of the KMT and the waning popularity of Lee Teng-hui, many important figures in the DPP are making new assessments on the nature of the Lee Teng-hui regime and DPP’s relations with it. While many leaders of the DPP still feel that President Lee symbolizes Taiwan’s searching for self-determination and a national identity separate from that of that of Mainland China, they are increasingly troubled by the “stealing (absorption)” of DPP’s platform for Taiwanese autonomy by the KMT and the increasing populist-authoritarian

63 “What is an Appropriate Definition of ‘Loyalty’,” The China Post (Taipei: August 16, 199), p.3.
Some scholars close to DPP even started openly calling Lee’s leadership “Populist authoritarianism.” Even in the area of “China Policy (DPP’s term for policy toward Mainland China),” the DPP is making effort to disassociate from the emotional and confrontational policies of Lee Teng-hui and move onto a more pragmatic and realistic policy of “Ku-Ben Si-ching [Reinforce ourselves but move west (dealing with Mainland China)].” As the DPP has transcended from its earlier policies of advocacy and therapy on to a policy for results, it would be interesting to observe whether the KMT is able to move onto similar direction.

9. Conclusions and Suggestions

This paper represents a preliminary and exploratory investigation on a complex and important subject matter, i.e., the interaction between the personality of the political leader and the psycho-cultural orientation of the general public as well as the entanglement between complexes and policies. What we have found, through the preliminary investigation conducted by this author, is that the policy-making process in Taiwan in the past decade seemed to have been influenced greatly both by the personal experiences and orientation of President Lee and the unique psycho-cultural makeup of the people of Taiwan. The result of interaction between these two sets of elements have brought a type of politics which are oriented not toward a practical resolution of concrete problems facing the Island polity but toward giving therapy to the leader and the people who, consciously or unconsciously, are aimed at rectifying past injustice and at restoring dignity for the hurt “ego.” The result is a populist-authoritarian process whose shortcomings and danger are surfacing only most recently.

If we may compare “therapeutic politics” as betel nuts and rational as

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64 See Julian Kuo, op. cit., pp. 11-13.
65 See Sechin Y. S. Chiou and Jenn-hwan Wang, op. cit.
66 See Julian Kuo, op. cit., pp. 135-150.
67 For an inspiring empirical research on the relationships between the leader and followers and the type of political system, see Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich, Bert E. Swanson, The Ruler and the Ruled: Political Power and the Impotence in American Communities (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), particularly chapter 11.
well as problem-solving policies as beefs or rice, eventually no leader in Taiwan can avoid answering Taiwan people’s demand “where is the beef (rice, practical policies)?” no matter how frequently or how heavily the leaders feed the people with betel nuts (ethnic appeals, populistic-authoritarian operation, and advocative policies). Given the still dominating role of President Lee in the ROC and the delicate position of Taiwan in cross-Strait relations and international politics, it is important for us to fully understand the rational as well as irrational elements which have been affecting the future of political development on the Island.

Finally, it must be pointed out, since the focus of the analysis of this paper is on the psycho-cultural aspect of Taiwan’s development process, particularly the therapeutic aspect in Taiwan’s policy-making process, the achievements in Taiwan’s democratization have not received as full a treatment as has been done in other papers on similar subject. With the Asian financial crisis having had tremendous damaging impact on many Asian Pacific countries, Taiwan’s ability in upholding its economy is a positive testimony not only to its economic strength, but also to the gradual maturing of its democratic political process.

Looking to the future, two areas in this paper needs further investigation and treatment. One is President Lee’s early life and its impact upon his political outlooks and orientation. It may take President Lee to finish writing his memory or further studies made by scholars of intellectual history as well as psychohistory on the intellectual growth of President Lee before a more complete analysis can be realized. Another subject which needs deeper and more thorough investigation is the role of Mainland China in affecting the attitude of the people of Taiwan. Obviously, a dominating and hostile Mainland China not only will have a negative impact on the external behavior of the ROC but also on internal politics within Taiwan. A less threatening and more accommodating Mainland China not

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68 For example, see Joseph R. Levenson, Modern China and Its Confucian Part (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1964).
69 Robert J. Lifton, op. cit.
only will build more mutual trust\textsuperscript{71} in cross-Strait relations but also will contribute to a less adventurous and more pragmatic external posture for the ROC on Taiwan. It may also lead to a reduction and decline of populist authoritarian element on the Island in the Twenty first century.

To sum up, the problems and challenges facing Taiwan in the areas of democratic ideology, leadership’s style, political process, and policy formations may not be unique after all. Rather, these problems may have been shared by all the political systems caught in the transition from colonial occupation to self-rule, from an unified country to a partitioned nation, from more centralized governing authority to more decentralized competitive politics. In addition, the existence of multiple ethnic groups and their different positions on the issue of national reunification or separation is another facet of the Taiwan question that can easily find comparative cases in other countries. Hence the paradigms proposed by the author in this paper are not just aimed at explaining political behavior in Taiwan alone but also are attempts toward generating general models which might have a heuristic value in studying other cases of similar nature elsewhere as well.

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\textsuperscript{71} For the importance of “trust” in national development and inter-society relations, see Francis Fukuyama, \textit{Trust, the Social Virtues & the Creation of Prosperity} (New York: The Free Press, 1995), particularly Part III.
Figure 1

Therapeutic Politics and Populistic Authoritarianism:
A Heuristic Paradigm

Exogenous challenges and Threats

Endogenous
Socio-economic and
Political conditions

Elite
frustration
and grievances

Mass
frustration
and anxieties

Therapeutic
Politics

Populist
Authoritarian
Decision making
process

Policies of
advocacy

feedback

Designed by Yung Wei, July 30, 1998.
Figure 2

Formation of Public Policy in the ROC:
The Formal and Regular Decision-Making Process

Public Opinion

Mass Media

Interest Groups

Political Parties

Think tanks, Scholars

Legislative Branch

Executive Branch

Office of President

Public Policy

(Designed and made by Yung Wei, Jan. 10, 1997)
Figure 3
The Actual Process of Decision-Making in the ROC
The Populist-Authoritarian Model

Mass Media
Office of the President
Public Opinion
Out-System Conference (National Affairs Conference, National Development Conference)
Opposition Party
Ruling Party
Legislative Bodies [National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, Provincial Assembly (to be abolished)]
Executive Branch
Public Policy

(Design and made by Yung Wei, Jan. 10, 1997)
Figure 4
Satisfaction over President Lee Teng-hui Among the Population in Taiwan
(June 8, 1996 to May 19, 1997)

Figure 5
The Formation of Populist Authoritarianism: A Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Populist mobilization</th>
<th>Authoritarianism Rule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Populist Authoritarian Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unstable Mass Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Traditional Authoritarian Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Pluralistic Society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Designed and made by Yung Wei, Jan. 10, 1997)
Figure 6
Psycho-Cultural Analysis and Populist Authoritarianism: The Taiwan Case

Diplomatic Isolation and Pressures from Mainland

Colonial Past: Economic development, social diversity and political democratization

The “Sadness of the Locale” of President Lee’s private frustration displaced on Building a Greater Taiwan

The majority Taiwanese feeling of being ruled by colonialists (outsiders) and the minority Mainlanders feeling of being a displaced

Populist authoritarian politics: ethnic and provincial orientation in elite recruitment and policy-making

Policies of Advocacy: UN membership; Lee’s visit to the US; Southern ward policy, Invitation to Dalai Lama, and abolition of the Taiwan Province

Feedback

Designed by Yung Wei, August 6, 1998.
Figure 7

Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China
Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, June 1998

Ethnic Identity of People in Taiwan

I am both Taiwanese and Chinese
I am Taiwanese
I am Chinese

Survey conducted by: (a) Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, Taipei
(b) Burke Marketing Research, Ltd., Taipei
(c) China Credit Information Service, Ltd., Taipei
(d) Center for Public Opinion and Election Studies, National Sun Yat-Sen University, Kaohsiung

Respondents: Taiwanese adults aged 20-69 accessible to telephone interviewers
Table 1

Cross-Generational Differences on “Reunification or Independence?”
among Various Provincial Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provincial Origin</th>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Reunification right away</th>
<th>Status quo now reunification later</th>
<th>Status quo now decision later</th>
<th>Status quo indefinitely</th>
<th>Status quo now independence later</th>
<th>Independence right away</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>Total(n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>first (born before</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>71.6%</td>
<td>(947)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1930</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>second (1931-1957)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>(4556)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>third (born after</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>(6804)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainlander</td>
<td>first (born before</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>(492)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1934</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>second (1935-1957)</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>(607)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>third (born after</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>(1244)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1958</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(349)</td>
<td>(3017)</td>
<td>(3664)</td>
<td>(2264)</td>
<td>(1268)</td>
<td>(545)</td>
<td>(3544)</td>
<td>(14650)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2=3464.58$ df=30 p<.001

Data Source: Survey conducted by Election Study Center, National Chengchi University and sponsored by Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, August, 1995.
Table 2

Cross-Generational Differences on National Identities among Various Provincial Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provincial Origin</th>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Taiwanese</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>Total(n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>first</td>
<td>46.6%</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>(947)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>second</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>(4544)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>third</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>(6783)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainlander</td>
<td>first</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>(487)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>second</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>(607)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>third</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>(1239)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3723)</td>
<td>(6918)</td>
<td>(3337)</td>
<td>(628)</td>
<td>(14606)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2=1792.64$ df=15 p<.001

Data Source: Survey conducted by Election Study Center, National Chengchi University and sponsored by Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, August, 1995.
### Table 3

If you were asked to rate President Lee’s performance, how many points would you give him (60 points represent “passing”, and 100 points represent “complete satisfaction”)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating Scores of President Lee</th>
<th>Provincial Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-50 points</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60 points</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-70 points</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-100 points</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to Say</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Response</td>
<td>(1068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4

If you were asked to rate President Lee’s performance, how many points would you give him (60 points represent “passing”, and 100 points represent “complete satisfaction”)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating Scores of President Lee</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Elementary and below</th>
<th>Junior high</th>
<th>Senior high</th>
<th>Junior college</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Grad. school and above</th>
<th>Refuse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-50 points</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60 points</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-70 points</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-100 points</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to Say</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Response</td>
<td>(1068)</td>
<td>(217)</td>
<td>(126)</td>
<td>(380)</td>
<td>(177)</td>
<td>(138)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5**  
Taiwan People’s Response to Questions Relating to President Lee Teng-hui*

*Question:* Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>month/year</th>
<th>agree</th>
<th>disagree</th>
<th>don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Since President Lee is the first President of the R.O.C. who is a Taiwanese, we all should support him</td>
<td>Jan., 1996</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May, 1998</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The people who always criticize President Lee are all ill-intended</td>
<td>Jan., 1996</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May, 1998</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan would have a future only if President Lee would lead us</td>
<td>Jan., 1996</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May, 1998</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The people who criticize President Lee are those who do not understand his devotion to struggle for Taiwan</td>
<td>Jan., 1996</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May, 1998</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6

**Relation between Voters Education and Candidates Support***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voters Education</th>
<th>Support for Presidential Candidate</th>
<th>Total % (600)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Graduate school</td>
<td>Lee Teng-hui 25.0%</td>
<td>Lin Yang-kang 27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior College</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior High</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary and below</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>