From "The Third Wave" to "Therapeutic Politics": Interpreting and Predicting Taiwan's Democratization Process by Examining Endogenous and Exogenous Variables*

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Abstract

The establishment of democratic institutions in the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has not brought about a concomitant development of democratic practice and behavior. Taiwan is beset with populist authoritarianism in government operation and increasingly unrestrained utilization of provincialism which sometimes borders on racism in domestic political debates and confrontations.

Adding to the complexity of the process of democratization has been the intricate and sometimes dangerous manipulation as well as utilization of external threat, primarily from Mainland China, as a means of diverting disaffection among the populace in Taiwan from domestic problems to external pressure.

Furthermore, there has been a deliberate effort among certain circles of the "local" politicians and parties to link anti-mainlander sentiment to anti-PRC feelings. Thus, an intentionally induced anti-Mainland China gesture or action is aimed at generating hostile response from the regime on Mainland China which has been utilized to generate anti-KMT or anti-Mainlander feeling which in turns is conveniently exploited for domestic political goals.

Fortunately, despite manipulation of inter-group cleavages by political parties and leaders, there has not been a total break of identification of the people of Taiwan with the larger Chinese polity and society. The majority of the population on the Island still identify themselves as Chinese and the influence of separatist oriented political leaders is waning on Taiwan.

Democratization process in Taiwan often has been described as "political miracle" on top of the "economic miracle" which has been bestowed on for Taiwan several decades ago. The taking over of governmental power by the Democratic Progressive Party from the KMT

was considered by certain Western scholars as the consummation of the democratization process after a long struggle by indigenous political parties against an outsider political party transplanted onto Taiwan.

Not until the unemployment rate climbed onto 5 percent, economic growth rate dropped below 2 percent, and crime rate reached record high that the scholars studying Taiwan started wondering about the quality and consequence of "democratic governance" on the Island. Furthermore, when former president Lee Teng-hui recently openly declared that "the Republic of China no longer exists" and advocated the establishment of a "Republic of Taiwan," even the most pro-Taiwan scholars began to question the real intent of Mr. Lee who were often dubbed as "Mr. Democracy in Taiwan."

The purpose of this paper is to examine the process of democratization in Taiwan from three dimensions: its policy outcomes, its institutions, and its basic value system. In the process of analyzing the impact on Taiwan democratization on the Island's socio-economic conditions, the drastic constitutional revamping and deconstruction in the name of democracy and the psychic-cultural influence of the leader as well as the Taiwan's population on the democratization process will be examined one after another. Finally, the interplay of Taiwan's domestic politics and its international environment, especially the Island polity's relations with Mainland China will be probed along with the ROC's ceaseless drive toward international participation whose results in turn affect on the internal political debates and contests.

1. Democratization: The Need for More Clarified Theoretical Constructs

Despite the extent of interest and efforts among social scientist, there has been a lacking of coherent testable empirical theories relating to democracy. Early democratic theoreticians do not try to differentiate the different aspects of the democratization process and loom them together in their discourse on democracy. What is implied in their discussions is that once you have democracy, you will automatically have social justice and economic well-being.

A second category of democratic theories examine the socio-economic condition of a country and its relations to more social equality which in turn will generate the condition for the development of both democratic values and institutions.[1]

A third group of scholars, such as Almond and Verba, deem the existence of a civic culture as the precondition for the development of political democracy in a country. Their research seems to imply that once a country acquires the right type of civic culture, democratic political development and socio-economic progress will be the logical results. Yet how can a country acquire the right kind of civic culture has not been fully elucidated by Almond and Verba.[2] Addressing on the simplicity of socio-economic model and civic-culture analysis, other social scientist have put forth other critiques of the simplistic democratic theories; among them are "dependency theories," "bureaucratic authoritarianism," and "the world system." Some of them even have been applied to the Taiwan case.[3]

In order to develop an empirically testable model on the relationship among political democratization, social equality, and economic development, this author has developed a three-dimensional model with three sets of bi-variate relations. The models are as follows.

As shown in Figure 1, social equality and political democracy are assumed to have a positive correlation with each other.

[1] For examples, see Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1960); Alex Inkeles and David Smith, *Becoming Modern* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974); and Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization, Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).

[2] See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitude and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press); Robert J. Barro argues, however, political democratization does not always bring about economic growth. See Robert J. Barro, "Is Democracy Good for Growth?" Hoover Digest (1996, No. 2), pp. 14-18.

[3] For examples of this line of discussion, see Alice H. Amsden, "Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Estatisme and a Challenge to Dependent Theory," *Modern China* 5, No. 3 (July, 1979), pp. 341-79; and Cal Clark, "The Taiwan Exception: Implication for Contending Political Economy Paradigms," *International Studies Quarterly* 31, No. 3 (September, 1987), pp. 287-356; also see Guillermo O'Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1988) and Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (New York: Academic Press, 1987), for comparative perspectives on the issue of economic development and political democratization. For a brand comparative studies based on empirical data, see Tatu Vanhanen, *Democratization; A Comparative Analysis of 170 Countries* (London: Routledge, 2003).

Figure 1 Social Equality and Political Democracy

Political Democracy

Social Equality

As for relationships between social equality and political democracy on the one hand, and economic growth on the other; both are hypothesized as having an curved relationship with the latter. That means, while increased social equality and political democracy are beneficial to economic growth in the initial and intermediate stage, too much social equality and political democracy will have a negative effect on economic growth in the later stage. (See Figures 2, 3 and 4)

Figure 2   Social Equality and Economic Growth

Economic Growth

Social Equality

Figure 3   Political Democracy and Economic Growth

Economic Growth

Political Democracy

Figure 4 Political Democracy, Social Equality, and Economic Growth: A Three-Dimension Heuristic Model

2. Examining the Process of Democratization: Socio-economic Outcomes, the Process of Institutionalization, and Values Orientations

Having presented an empirical model on the condition among political democracy, social equality, and economic growth, we may now move onto the examination of the case of Taiwan. Generally speaking, empirically oriented democratic social and political scientists usually start with the investigation of the "stimulus," the development of democratic value system, followed by the examination of the "organizations," i.e., the establishment of various institutions that sustain democratic operation; finally, an exploration of the "reaction," the system outcome of democratic government, is needed to see whatever the policy results

benefit or damage the citizens of that polity.[4]

According to Samuel P. Huntington, more than thirty countries in Southern Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe shifted from authoritarian to democratic system of government between 1974 and 1990. He calls the development the "Third Wave" of democracy. Yet, just like the first and second wave, some of the new democracies after a period of liberal-democratic rule, fall back to more authoritarian practice.[5] Other scholars, using "social capital" as the yardstick of measurement, noticed similar disturbing trends.[6] What happened in Taiwan in the past 15 years more or less reflects the deterioration of a "Third Wave" democracy with enhanced institutionalization and with constantly improving socio-economic condition in the beginning gradually moved onto the dismantling of democratic institutions with declining socio-economic condition coupled with a worsening of inter-group relations on the Island.

Since 1970s, Taiwan has been known as an Island enjoying extremely high rate of economic growth. Yet in the latter part of President Lee Teng-hui's rule, economic growth has dwindled to less than 7%. After Chen Shui-bian took over in 2000, economic growth rate hit a record low of –2.18% in 2001 and has been lingering around 3 percent ever since.[7]

Other than the decline of economic growth rate, another indicator of the worsening of the socio-economic condition in Taiwan can be seen in income distribution. Using the lowest 20 percent of the household income as the base to divide the highest 20 percent of the household in Taiwan, the result were around 4 times in late 1970s and up to mid-1980s. Since Lee Teng-hui assumed presidency in 1988, however, the ratio quickly worsened to above 5 times. After Chen Shui-bian became president, it worsened to above 6 times in 2001 and 2002. (See Figure

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[4] See Charles F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubauer (eds.), *Empirical Democratic Theory* (Chicago: Markham Pub. Co., 1969), pp. 6-7.

[5] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

[6] Donatella della Porta, "Social Capitals Belief in Government, and Political Corruption," in Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam (eds.), *Disaffected Democracies, What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 202-230.

[7] According to data released by Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistic, Executive Yuan, ROC, March, 2003.

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Other than economic growth and income distribution, another indicator reflecting the well being of the people in a society is the unemployment rate. As an Island enjoyed high economic growth, Taiwan has always had relatively low unemployment rate. Before 1995, with the exception of the year of 1985, Taiwan always had an unemployment rate of lower than 2 percent. After 1996, however, the unemployment of the people of Taiwan, has steadily increased. It reached 3 percent when Chen Shui-bian became president in 2000 and climbed to 4.6% in 2001, 5.2% in 2002, and 5.1% in 2003. (See Figure 6)

One may attribute Taiwan's economic downturn to the general slowdown of the world economy, particularly that of Japan. But the unusual close ties among the ROC Government, the ruling party (first the KMT and then DPP), and the business community in Taiwan has been another element leading to the unhealthy expansion of credit and loan on the one hand and the widening of the gap between the rich and poor in Taiwan on the other hand. As of this writing, the possible burst of a Japanese-type economic "bubble" in Taiwan is in the mind of many leading entrepreneurs. If democracy is assumed as an independent variable leading to an enhance of living standard in Taiwan and more equitable distribution of income in Taiwan, this definitely has not happened. In fact, a reverse negative correlation seems to be the case.

3. From Institutionalization to Deinstitutionalization: The Gradual Demise of the ROC Constitution

In order to develop democratic political system, building relevant institutions is an indispensable task. Without it, democracy cannot either develop or sustain. In an article published in 1965, Samuel P. Huntington argued forcefully that political development with no concomitant efforts toward institutionalization will lead to political

Figure 5

Percentage Share of Disposable Income by Disposable Income Quintile


Source：Report on The Survey of Family Income and Expenditure in Taiwan Area of The Republic of China.　http://www.dgbasey.gov.tw/

Figure 6

Taiwan's Unemployment Rate

Source: http://www.dgbasey.gov.tw

decay.[8]   Huntington's analysis and prediction, unfortunately, seems to have happened in Taiwan.[9]

When the Chinese Nationalist Government retreated to Taiwan, they brought with them an Constitution passed in 1947 by the National Assembly, the Constitution-making body.   The majority of the National Assemblymen followed the ROC Government (GRC) to Taiwan after the Chinese Communists took over Mainland China.   The 1947 Constitution of the ROC kept a five-branch government: the executive, the legislative, the judicial, the control, and the examination.   The last two branches of the ROC Government usually belong either to the executive or the judicial branch in other countries.   To have the structure of a National Government operate in only one of the provinces of China undoubtedly created difficulties and limitations for the GRC.   One of the problems was the rejuvenation of the membership of the representative bodies at the national level.   The problem was partially resolved by holding supplementary election held in 1972; an additional 53 members were added to the National Assembly, 51 to Legislative Yuan, and 15 to Control Yuan.   Through this type of supplementary elections, the problem of rejuvenation of the membership of the representative bodies at the national level in the Republic of China in Taiwan was partially and temporarily resolved.[10]

From 1980 onward, however, the opposition political groups continued mounting its pressure upon the GRC for more political participation.   In April 1984, the opposition established the Public Policy Research Association as a focal point of organizational activities. In the election of 1985, the candidates supported by the association were successful in their bids for various positions in the local election. Encouraged by the result of this election, the opposition completed the formation of a formal political party.

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[8] See S. P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics* (April, 1965).

[9] See Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu, "Neo-Authoritarianism, Polarized Conflict and Populism in a Newly Democratizing Regime: Taiwan's Emerging Mass Politics.," *Journal of Contemporary China*, 5 (1996), pp. 23-41; Yung Wei, "Democratization and Institutionalization: Problems, Prospects, and Policy Implication of Political Development in the Republic of China on Taiwan," *Issues and Studies* (March, 1991), pp. 29-43; and Cheng-tian Kuo, "Taiwan's Distorted Democracy in Comparative Perspectives," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2000), pp. 85-112.

[10] See Yung Wei, "Political Development in the Republic of China on Taiwan," in Hungdah Chiu(ed.), *China and the Question of Taiwan*, (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1972).

Facing both international challenges and domestic turmoil, the government of the ROC decided that a conciliatory rather than confrontational strategy should be adopted. Under the personal guidance of President Chiang Ching-kuo, a task force composed of twelve members of the standing committee of the KMT was formed to deliberate an all encompassing program for reform in the government and in the ruling party. Among the subjects under planning and review were: (1) reinforcing the membership of the central representative bodies; (2) legalizing the structure of the provincial and local government in Taiwan; (3) drafting a national security law (for the preparation of the lifting of martial law); (4) revising the law on civic organization, to pave the way for the formation of new political parties; (5) improving law and order; and (6) reforming the ruling party.

In order to gain insight and experience into the planning process for this unprecedented political reform, four study groups composed of government officials and scholars were sent to the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan to examine the process of democratization as well as party politics in these countries. Reports resulting from these study tours were used for the drafting of various proposals for the enactment of the national security law, the revision of the law on assembly and parade, and the revision of the law on election and recall.[11]

By August 1986, all preparations for the lifting of martial law had been completed pending approval through the internal procedures by the government and the ruling party. Yet, sensing what was coming, the Dang-wai (non-party group) made a preemptive move by announcing the formation of the Democratic Progressive party (DPP) on September 28,1986. On October 8, 1986, in an interview with Katharine Graham, publisher of the *Washington post*, President Chiang Ching-kuo formally declared the intention of the ROC's government to lift martial law and to permit the formation of new political parties. Following this announcement by President Chiang, new legislation was passed that paved the way for the coming of a new era of party competition in

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[11] As an example of the effect of these study tours on political reform, see Yung Wei, "A Reflection on the Insight Gained from Party Politics in Great Britain," *The Excellent Magazine* (January 1990), pp. 277-99.

Taiwan. By the end of 1990, more than fifty political parties had been registered with the Ministry of Interior Affairs.

Beyond the lifting of martial law and the permission for the formation of new political parties, the announcement by President Chiang Ching-kuo to permit retired servicemen, and later the people on Taiwan in general, to visit their relatives on mainland China has had lasting effects on the political development on Taiwan, relations with mainland China, and the external relations of the ROC with the rest of the world.

The passing of President Chiang Ching-kuo on January 13, 1988, ushered in a new era of political development on Taiwan. In accordance with the constitution, Dr. Lee Teng-hui, the vice president, was sworn in as the successor of Chiang as president of the republic. But his succession to the chairmanship of the ruling party was not as smooth as the presidency. President Lee demonstrated during the period of the Thirteenth Party Congress that he was not content to be merely a titular head of state, but actually aimed at becoming a substantive leader with strong opinions on personnel matters, both in the party and in the government. Many domestic and international observers of Taiwan politics believe that President Lee Teng-hui's actions, coupled with an unprecedented demonstration of the independent will of the delegates to the Thirteenth Party Congress in selecting members of the Central Committee of the ruling party, might have sown the seeds for later conflicts within the ruling party.[12]

The majority of the political analysts in Taiwan believed that Lee Teng-hui managed to succeed to the presidency as well as to the chairmanship left by Chiang Ching-kuo, yet he "did not inherit the authority of Chiang Ching-kuo."[13] What the leaders and the rank and file of the ruling party could not accept was the attempt to become a new strongman by using the procedures generally regarded as appropriate only for the late Chiang Kai-shek and for Chiang Ching-kuo, who in the

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[12] In an analysis of the challenges faced by Lee Teng-hui in his ascendancy to the leadership of the government and the party, see Huang Hui-chen, "The Radical Change in the Highest Political Leadership Structure," series reports on the challenges of the 1990s, *China Times* (December 28, 1990)), p. 11; also see Jurgen Domes, "The Thirteenth Party Congress of the Kuomintang: Toward Political Competition?" *China Quarterly*, Vol. 118 (June 1989), pp. 345-59.

[13] Kao Long, "Reform in the KMT,, Constitutional Change, and the Development of Party Politics," conference on the challenges facing the KMT in the 1990s, held in Taipei, ROC, June 9, 1990.

opinion of many political observers on Taiwan had acquired party and government leadership through a prolonged period of sacrifice and dedication.

Controversies within the Special Meeting of the Central Committee of the KMT were carried over to the meeting of the National Assembly in March. Lee Teng-hui and Lee Yuan-tsu were elected president and vice president of the republic, but only after much oral and physical confrontation in the National Assembly, a difficult and complicated process of mediation by senior statesmen among contending presidential and vice-presidential candidates, and a large-scale student demonstration for constitutional reform.

The so-called Kuo-Shih Hui-yi (National Affairs Conference) may or may not have resulted from the student demonstration. Some observers believe the conference was held to deal with the side effects of the meeting of the National Assembly. Divided into sections on parliament reform, local government, central government, constitutional reform, and mainland China policy, the conference arrived at many far-reaching conclusions. These included the retirement of all senior members of national representative bodies by the end of 1991; the curtailing of the recruitment of members of the national representative bodies from overseas Chinese and from occupational groups; the popular election of the governor of Taiwan and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung municipalities; the end of the period of mobilization and the suppression of rebellion; and the treating of both sides of the Taiwan Strait as political entities (Zheng-zi Shih-ti) and enacting laws to deal with relations between them.[14]

Discussions within the National Affairs Conference, and particularly views voiced by members of the DPP, caused considerable concern among the members of the more orthodox wing of the ruling party. Partly to offset the separatist flavor of the National Affairs Conference and partly to gain a dominant role in deciding policy regarding national reunification, a National Unification Council was established under the aegis of the president's office. The main purpose of the board is to study problems relating to national reunification and to develop broad

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[14] *United Daily News* (July 5, 1990), pp. 3-4; and *Central Daily News* (July 4, 1990), pp. 5-6.

general guidelines on the important policy area.[15]

Following the April 1993 meeting in Singapore between Koo Chen-fu, chairman of Hai-ji-hui (Straits Exchange Foundation) in Taiwan, and Wang Daohan, president of Hai-xie-hui (Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits) of mainland China, relations between the two sides entered a new era.

There exists, nevertheless, a host of problems between Taipei and Beijing. The PRC government insists on the "one China" principle and refuses to recognize the international personality of the ROC. It also denies the GRC's request for "equal footing" between the two Chinese political systems. The GRC, conversely, has decided to launch a diplomatic offensive toward membership in the United Nations, despite strong opposition voiced by Beijing. These are but a few examples of the existing differences between Taipei and Beijing.[16]

Having resolved the problem of leadership both in the party and in the ROC Government, President Lee moved quietly toward foundational change of the form as well as the nature of the political system on Taiwan. Through a series of the so-called "constitutional reforms," Lee was able to carry out a series of fundamental changes to the ROC Government. These changes included: (1) Abolition of the Province of Taiwan; (2) Removal of the power of approval by the Legislative Yuan of the Prime Minister of the GRC, thus making the Premier an appointive position at the pleasure of the President, and not the head of the Executive Branch endorsed by the Legislative Yuan (parliament); (3) Members of the Control Yuan, originally were nominated by the President but approved by the provincial assembly. Yet after the abolition of the Taiwan Province, no longer was there a provincial assembly exercising power of approval, the power then goes to Legislative; (4) Since the Control Yuan no longer is approved by the provincial assembly, the approve of Grand

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[15] *China Times* (December 20, 1990), p. 2.

[16] For the problem facing the ROC on Taiwan in regard to the relationship among democratization, unification and elite conflict on Taiwan's future, see Yung Wei, "The Effects of Democratization, Unification, and Elite Conflict on Taiwan's future," in Zhi-lin Lin and Thomas W. Robinson (eds.), *The Chinese and Their Future, Beijing, Taipei, and Hong Kong*, (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1994), pp. 213-240; also see Steven Goldstein, "The Rest of the Story: The Impact of Domestic Politics on Taiwan's Mainland Policy," *Harvard Studies on Taiwan*, Vol. 2 (1998), pp. 62-90.

Justice, President of Control Yuan as well as the Examination Yuan all go to the Legislative Yuan; (5) The President has the power to disband the Legislative Yuan while the Legislative Yuan has the power to recall the President.[17]

More than four hundred scholars marched to the site of meeting of National Assembly to oppose what they regarded as unconstitutional amendments. In addition, many KMT members of the National Assembly also opposed these amendments, especially the abolition of the Province of Taiwan. Yet as the head of the state and chairman of the ruling party KMT, Lee Teng-hui was able to use both state and party power to effectuate his "reforms." Television cameras were set up to record each move of the member of National Assembly, especially those of the ruling party. Even security agencies were employed to exercise surveillance the behavior in and out of the conference. Just before the vote was cast on the abolition of the Province Taiwan, an elderly Assembly man who opposed the move was reported leaving the meeting room crying and claiming that his daughter-in-law had called him pleading him to give up his opposition and return home. The daughter-in-law claimed that the family has been under too much pressure; "I would commit suicide if my father-in-law does not come home."[18]

The result of this extraordinary high-handed constitutional reform left the GRC with a President who has the power to appoint the prime minister, but no capacity to chair the Cabinet meeting; a prime minister who chairs the Cabinet meeting but neither has the endorsement of the Legislative Yuan (Parliament) nor unqualified support from the President; a Legislative Yuan whose majority party can pass law against the will of the President and the prime minister yet have no way to see these laws be effectively implemented by the executive branch. The result is a total stalemate. Currently, with the DPP controlling the presidency and the Cabinet and the KMT-PFP coalition controlling the Legislative Yuan, effective operation of the Government is impossible.

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[17] See Yung Wei, "Implementing Populist-authoritarianism through the So-called 'Constitutional Reform': A Theoretical an Practical Analysis" (Taipei: Vanguard Institute for Policy Studies, May 1997).

[18] Report in *United Daily News* (July 17, 1997), p. 3.

When President Lee Teng-hui was pushing for his brand of constitutional reform, certain political leaders in the KMT and New Party as well as some scholars in Taiwan already openly suspected that what President Lee tried to do was not constitutional reform but actually was the dismantling of the Republic of China and replaced with a Republic of Taiwan. With President Lee now openly declared that "the Republic of China no longer exists and there ought to be a Republic of Taiwan," what was mere speculation several years ago now becomes reality.

4. Psycho-cultural Factor in Taiwan's Democratization Process: The Emergence and Operation of Therapeutic Politics

Dependent upon the analyst's orientation, assessment of the achievements or failures of Taiwan's development process under the twelve-year Lee Teng-hui era can vary to a quite large extent.   For those who are close to or supportive of President Lee, Lee represents the best among the indigenous Taiwanese political leaders. He is viewed as a political reformer leading the ROC on Taiwan through various stages of economic and political developments. Lee is also regarded as a brave statesman standing firm against the pressure from across the Taiwan Strait and trying hard to maintain Taiwan's international status.   Above all, Lee is pictured as a spiritual leader who fully understands the innermost feeling of the people of Taiwan, thus is able to lead the Taiwanese society toward a future of autonomy and dignity.[19]

For the individuals who are critical of President Lee Teng-hui, however, Lee is viewed as a political leader who is basically against pluralistic democracy and has a strong tendency toward autocratic control of the decision-making process. He is considered being too close to Japan, the former colonial ruler in Taiwan, and not identified with the Chinese nation and national goal of reunification. His efforts toward diplomatic breakthrough have been viewed as being too adventurous and counter-productive to cross-Taiwan-Strait relations.   Even President Lee's endeavor in the area of political democratization are tarnished by the observation that President Lee has permitted, or at least tolerated, the inclusion of money politics and even underground elements in the KMT,

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[19] See Jen-fong Li, "Building a Greater Taiwan, Every Step a New Footprint," in Lee Teng-hui, *Managing (Building) a Greater Taiwan* (Taipei: Yuan-Liu Publishers, 1994).

the ruling party, and in the electoral political process.[20]

However, despite different assessments of President Lee's performance as a political leader, one thing is certain, he will be remembered as one of the most influential and dominant leaders in Taiwan's development process, particularly in the political arena in the past twelve years. What are the most prominent features of President Lee's leadership style? What is his attitude toward democracy and the idea of due process? What has been the leading factors which enables President Lee to gain support from the Taiwanese people and to fend off the challenges of his political opponents? What are the reasons for President Lee to push for rather radical constitutional changes and for rather aggressive attempts toward breaking ROC's diplomatic isolationism?

Furthermore, given the fact that almost none of President Lee's diplomatic efforts has brought about concrete beneficial results, why has he been so steadfast in pursuing these seemingly untenable goals? Why President Lee paid such a high price in pushing for constitutional changes? What really is in his mind in regard to long term political development in the ROC on Taiwan and in cross-Strait relations? Finally, what kind of theoretical framework may we construct to analyze President Lee's behavior on the one hand and those of the people of Taiwan on the other through Taiwan's democratization process? These are but a few of the questions that this author shall try to tackle in this section of the paper.

In order to fully appreciate President Lee's idea on democracy, a brief discussion on the nature of democratic form of government and the relationship between the elite and the mass is necessary. Ever since the days of Greek States, the shortcomings and pitfalls of democratic system has been fully recognized by the political philosophers and practitioners. Aristotle, for instance, was one of the first philosophers to point out the agitative aspect of the democratic process. He said in *Politics*, that "Democracy is liable to change from the older and more moderate forms to a new and extreme type. This is largely due to the courting of the people by eager candidates for office;" he further added; "In democracies

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[20] Kwei-miao Chen, "The Doer will fail; the Holder will lose," in Yang-sun Chou, *The Ten Years of Lee Teng-hui Rule* (Taipei: Fong Yun Publisher, 1998), pp. 7-14; Julian J. Kuo, *op. cit*.; Kuan-kuo Huang, *The Fall of Taiwan by Populism* (Taipei: Commercial Culture Publisher Co., 1995).

changes are chiefly due to the wanton license of demagogues."[21]

Other than the demagogical and manipulative aspects, another undesirable facet of democracy is the tendency toward populist appeal and decision-making process-- a shortcoming fully recognized by the founding fathers of the United States.[22] In *The federalist*, No. 10 and other relevant treatises, James Madison times and again expressed his concern over the danger of the tyranny of majority expounded by the advocates of "pure" democratic government. He pointedly stated in No. 47 of *The federalist* that "the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.[23] To James Madison, the best form of government was not direct suffrage or referendum by people, but representative democracy though deliberation and debate in the Congress or Parliament. Hence, James Madison regarded the United State as a "republic," meaning "representative democracy" as opposed to direct democracy or "non-representative" democracy.[24]

At first glance, all the above mentioned concerns and discussions by Aristotle and James Madison may look remote or exotic for the investigation on Taiwan politics or the nature of Lee Teng-hui's rule. Yet a deeper probe will reveal what the Greek philosophers and American founding father were most concerned with have been the elements which have contributed to repetitive debates and conflicts in Taiwan politics. Here one finds that President Lee's strong conviction and commitment to "direct democracy" has propelled his political ambitions and has contributed to his ascendancy. It was the same fixation and obstinacy, however, that led Lee into serious conflicts with his political opponents, both within and outside of the KMT. President Lee's firm belief in populist democracy and his resistance, and sometimes even hostility, against representative democracy have led to serious differences and confrontations between President and his critiques in the ruling party, the

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[21] Ernest Burker, *The Politics of Aristotle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 214-215.

[22] For a thought provoking discussion on this issue, see Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1956); also see Thomas E. Cronin, *Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiatives, Referendum, and Recall* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989).

[23] *The Federalist Paper*, ed. By Jacob E. Cooke (New York: Meridian, 1961) and quoted by R. A. Dahl, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[24] See "Representative Democracy," in chapter 2 of Thomas E. Cronin, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-37.

parliament, and the academic community in regard to the proper power of the leader of a state in a democracy, the role of the Parliament, the merits and demerits of direct democracy, and the importance of check-and-balance to the development as well as preservation of pluralistic democracy.[25]

Having briefly discussed the historical and philosophical roots of the populist aspect of President Lee's leadership style, I would argue that the orientation and mode of Lee's leadership actually is not unique both in historical and comparative perspective. In fact, one can easily find rather similar personality traits, methods of political mobilization and control, and attitudes toward internal as well as external challenges in other political leaders who are caught in similar circumstances like President Lee's.

Several sets of variable seem to have working in an interconnected fashion to produce what I would coin "therapeutic politics." For lacking a better and more precise adjective to accurately describe the phenomenon, "therapeutic politics" is used to refer to the kind of political process in which both the leaders and the followers are looking ***not for*** concrete policy results ***but for*** the psychic satisfaction in response to either the feeling of the individual actor or the general sentiment of the population as a whole. In other words, in "therapeutic politics," people are not looking for tangible results from the decisions and actions of the government or political leaders, but for sentimental satisfaction deriving from the release or relief of inner psychic tensions embedded in the accumulated past frustrations or the seemingly insurmountable current difficulties in the internal as well external environments of the political system.[26]

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[25] For a fuller discussion of this point, see Yung Wei, *Tu Pô (Breakthrough: Toward a Greater Framework for Taiwan's future)*, (Taipei: Shang-Chou Wen Hua [Business Weekly Publishing Company], 1995).

[26] For the relief of inner psychic tension in political participation and the interaction between personality and politics, see Robert E. Lane, *Political Life, Why are How People Get Involved in Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 115-132; John Dollard and Associates, *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939); John Dollard and Neal Miller, *Personality and Psychotherapy* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1950); "Individual and Social Change in a Community under Pressure," in Nevitt Sanford, *Self and Society, Social Change and Individual Development* (New York: Atherterm Press, 1966), pp. 231-254; Robert E. Lane, *Political Thinking and Consciousness, the Private life of the Political Mind* (Chicago: Markham Pub Co., 1969), particularly chaps. 8 to 13; James C. Davies, *Human Nature in Politics, The Dynamics of Political Behavior* (New York: John Eiley and Sons, 1963); "A Psychometric Analysis of Connections

Of all the political scientists dealing with the problem of interaction between the inner psychic needs of the political actors and their behavior in politics, the works of Harold D. Lasswell is of particular relevance. Focusing on the frustration suffered by political leaders early in life and the projection of private motives onto public objects and stands, Lasswell tries to analyze the aggressive and sometimes almost pathological behavior of political leaders such as Napoleon, Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and Hitler.   The result is a quite insightful, though not conclusive, probing into the conscious or even unconscious mental state of political leaders and their extraordinary pursuit as well as use of political power.[27]

What I would like to stress here, however, in that private frustration of the leader alone is not the sufficient condition for the emergence of men of power.   It takes the psychic need of both the leader and the followers, i.e., that of the elite and the mass, to create the conditions for a conscious or unconscious merger of the two emotional forces which in turn providers the foundation for "therapeutic politics."   In what I call "therapeutic politics," the foremost concern of political leaders is not focused on the formation and implementation of politics which will bring about concrete and beneficial result to the people and the society, but to satisfy consciously or subconsciously the psychic need of the population. Consequently, the process of decision-making is not aimed at a rational aggregation of the educated opinion of the citizens for the formation of policy through an open and pluralistic procedure, but to stress and manipulate the emotional need of the general public so at to mobilize popular support.   Under such circumstance, the political leaders can enjoy almost unlimited power in the decision-making process.   The end product of this process is what I called "populist authoritarianism"[28] in

Between Personality and Political Orientation," in Fred I. Greenstein and Michael Lerner, *A Source Book for the Studies of Personality and Politics* (Chicago: Markham Pub. Co., 1971); and Heinz Eulau, *The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics* (New York: Random House, 1963), chap. 4.

[27] See Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1951), and H. D. Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York: Norton, 1948).

[28] For the meaning of "populist authoritarianism," see Yung Wei, *Tu Pô (Breakthrough: Toward a Greater Framework for Taiwan's future), op. cit*.   For discussion on populism and authoritarian politics, see T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Denial J. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950); Milton Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind* (New York: Busii Books, 1960); Edward A Shils "Populism and the Rule of Law," University of Chicago Law School Conference on Jurisprudence and Politics (April, 1954), pp. 97-107; Ralph Turner and Lewis M. Killian, *Collective Behavior* (Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1957); Brian F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: Knopf, 1971); Neal R. Peirce, *The People's President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), pp. 305-307; Millon C. Cumnings,

which one often finds the leader of a country   enjoying autocratic power in the decision making process by mobilizing the people through advocating certain positions to satisfy the psychic needs either of the leader or of the people.   (See Figure 7)

5. Provincial and Ethnic Differences: An Enduring Theme in Taiwan's Political Culture

Having discussed the psycho-cultural variables which have contributed to therapeutic politics and populist authoritarianism, and having built a heuristic model on the relationship among various sets of variables, we may move onto an examination of the Taiwan situation in accordance with this model.   First of all, it must be pointed out that the consecutive colonial rules by the Dutch, Spanish, and Japanese in Taiwan since the Seventeenth Century, the conquest and control of Taiwanese by the Manchu Dynasty from 1688 to 1895; and the restoration of Taiwan to China in 1945, all added to the complexity of the attitude of the population of Taiwan toward "outside" rulers.   The method of "divide and rule" between the Min-nan and Hakka population by the colonial governments and the Manchu rulers further complicated the relations among different provincial and ethnic groups in Taiwan.   Above all, the most unfortunate incident of February 28, 1947-- an incident which almost led an all-out insurrection against the provincial authority-- has sowed the seed of long lasting grievances of many Taiwanese residents

Jr. and David Wise, *Democracy Under Pressure*, 6th edition (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovider, Pub., 1989), pp.272-274; and William Riker, *Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1982).   In regard to discussion on "populist authoritarianism" in Taiwan, see Yung Wei, "The Myth of Direct Democracy," *The Excellence* (February, 1994); Y. Wei, "Democracy, Groups, and Autonomy: On How to Avoid the Trap of Populism," *Feng Yun Monthly* (May, 1994); and Kuan-Kuo Huang, *The Fall of Taiwan by Populism, op. cit.*

Figure 7

Therapeutic Politics and Populistic Authoritarianism :
A Heuristic Paradigm

Designed by Yung Wei, July 30, 1998.

against the authority from Mainland China.[29]

Much of the problems spreading across the issue of "unification vs. Separation" spectrum can be traced to the feeling of alienation and "marginality"[30] of the pre-1949 immigrants and their offsprings as well as the post-1949 newer migrants to Taiwan from Mainland China. The division of China into two competing political systems across the Taiwan Strait created further complication in cultural as well as political identities of the various provincial and ethnic groups in Taiwan. Scholars studying the political personality of the population of Taiwan have noticed that the cultural and political value of various outside rulers all having an impact on the formation of the norms and values of the various provincial and ethnic groups in Taiwan.[31]

While study on the political culture of Mainland China has been a major subject of study among the western social scientists,[32] the political culture of the society of Taiwan has not received as much attention.

[29] On the psychological and cultural makeup of the immigrant society in Taiwan, see Hsu Tsun-mou, *Taiwan Jên Lun (on Taiwanese)* (Taipei: China Times Publishers, 1993); also see Julian C. L. Kuo, *op. cit.*

[30] On the concept of "marginality," see Robert E. Park, *Human Communities* (Glencoe, New York: The Free Press, 1952).

[31] There are four distinguishable provincial and ethnic groups on Taiwan. The three major population groups are of the Chinese Han origin; they can be furthered grouped into two categories; those who migrated to Taiwan before 1949, i.e., the Min-nan (southern Fukien) group which constitutes about 58% of the total population, and the Hakka (eastern Kwantung) group which constitute about 16%. The mainlanders, meaning those who came to Taiwan after 1949 constitutes about 14%, while the aborigines constitute about 2%. All the figure are based upon the combined results of various opinion surveys in which ethnic background usually used "self-identification" as the basis of response and measurement.

[32] For example, see John W. Lewis, "The Study of Chinese Political Culture," *World Politics*, 18 (April, 1966), pp. 503-524; Lucian W. Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1968); Richard W. Wilson, *Learning to be Chinese: The Political Socialization of Children in Taiwan* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1970); R. W. Wilson, *The Moral State, A Study of the Political Socialization of Chinese and American Children* (New York: The Free Press, 1974); R. W. Wilson, "The Learning of Political Symbols in Chinese Culture," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 3 (July-October, 1968), pp. 246-254; Robert Jay Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of Brainwashing in China* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1963); R. J. Lifton, *Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968); Richard H. Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); R. H. Solomon, "Mao's Effort to Reintegrate the Chinese Polity: Problems of Authority and Conflict in Chinese Social Process," in *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, ed. A. Doak Barnett (Seattle: The University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 271-351; Yung Wei, "A Methodological Critique of Current Studies on Chinese Political Culture," *Journal of Politics*, (Spring, 1976); Y. Wei, "Cultural, Ideology, and Elite Conflict: Towards a 'Middle Range' Interpretation of Chinese Communist Behavior," *Issues & Studies*, (August, 1979); Lucian W. Pye, "The State and the Individual: An Overview Interpretation," *China Quarterly*, 127 (September, 1991), pp. 443-466; and Peter R. Moody, Jr., "Trends in the Study of Chinese Political Culture," *China Quarterly*, 139 (September, 1994), pp. 731-740.

Except some studies on the process of political socialization of college and elementary school students,[33] no major work has been done on the political culture of the Taiwanese polity as a whole.   Yet from the limited studies on the political orientation of the various groups in Taiwan, one senses a strong sentiment of alienation, displacement, and anxiety among all the groups in Taiwan.

First of all, for the Taiwanese group, the February 28 (1947) Incident probably has had the greatest impact on their political perception and attitude.[34]   This incident was caused initially by the expulsion of street cigarette peddlers which led to an island wide anti-government riot and which also led to violence between different provincial groups. Eventually, the central government in Nanking had to send troops over to suppress the "rebellion."   Thousands of people lost their lives in the process.   Despite later efforts toward rectification and reconciliation, this incident has left a deep scar on the relations between the local Taiwanese population and the KMT government and between the different provincial groups on the Island.

Other than the February 28 Incident, another factor which has had extensive influence on the political culture of the Taiwanese population is the fifty years of Japanese colonial rule.   Despite the fact that the Japanese ruled the Island with an iron hand and had severely limited Taiwanese participation in politics on the Island,[35] the Japanese colonial government did try very hard to incorporate Taiwan into an unalienable part of the Japanese Empire.   While Japanese rule had left very limited impact on the Chinese cultural pattern on average Taiwanese,[36] it did

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[33] R. Wilson, *op. cit.*; Yung Wei, 1976, *op. cit.*, and Sheldon Appleton, "Regime Support Among Taiwan High School Students," *Asian Survey*, 13 (August, 1973), pp. 750-760; and Song-hsi Yuan, "Children and Politics (in Taiwan)," *The Annual of the Chinese Association of Political Science*, 1 (September, 1971).   For an earlier general analysis of the Chinese national character, see Yih-Yuan Li and Kuo-shu Yang, *Chinese Character, An Interdisciplinary Symposium* (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1972).

[34] See Chi Cheng, *The Restoration and Rebuilding of Post-War Taiwan* (Taipei: Hsin Hua Book Co., 1994); for a personal but non-politically oriented account of the February 28 Incident, see Heng-dao Lin, *The Record of Interview of Lin Heng-dao* (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1992).

[35] See Shinkichi Ete, "An Outline of Formosa History," in Mark Marcall (ed.), *Formosa Today* (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 43-58; also see Yung Wei, "Political Development in the Republic of China on Taiwan," in Hungdah Chiu (ed.*), China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis* (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1973), pp. 74-111.

[36] On the limited impact of Japanese rule in social-cultural aspect of Taiwan and on the continuing identification of Taiwanese youth with China, see Jean T. Burke, *A Study of Existing Social Conditions on the Eight Townships of Shihmen Reservoir Area* (Taiyuan, Taiwan: Chinese-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1962), p. 78; and Sheldon Appleton,

have more influence on the gentry class, particularly those who collaborated with the Japanese colonizers.[37] The Japanese introduced modern educational system, legal institution, agricultural innovations, light industries and census system, into Taiwan and brought about a standard of living in Taiwan which was considerably higher than that of Mainland China. While Min-nan and Hakka dialects were still the languages spoken by ordinary Taiwanese, Japanese was the *lingua franca* of Taiwan, particularly among the educated class.

In addition to the spread of the Japanese language, intermarriage between the Japanese and the upper class Taiwanese was another factor which has contributed to closer ties with Japan. Although the exact figure of the intermarriage is not known, dispersed accounts are available in scattered biographical writing of established families in the Japan era.[38] The integration-oriented Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan, coupled with the introduction of modern institutions into Taiwan and intermarriage between the Japanese and upper-class Taiwanese, created a unique pro-Japanese sentiment in certain elite sector of Taiwanese population which differ rather distinctly from the more prevalent anti-Japanese attitudes of Korea, Philippines, and other southeast Asian countries which had been under Japanese colonial rule. So much so was this pro-Japanese feeling among leaders of the opposition movement in Taiwan that Annette Hsieu-Lien Lu, magistrate of the Taoyuan County and a former member of the Legislative Yuan, led a delegation to Japan in 1995 to pay tribute to the One-Hundred-Year Anniversary of the Signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki—a treaty ceding Taiwan to Japan after the defeat of China by Japan in 1895.

The mainlanders, as newly arrived immigrants, can be further divided into two major sub-groups. The upper-layer are the government official, scholars, teachers, and professionals who have enjoyed high socio-economic status in Taiwan. The vast majority of mainlanders, however, are in one way or another related to the military. Even today, the retired service men and their offsprings constituted the largest subgroups mainlander population in Taiwan. The older generation

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"Taiwan and Mainlanders on Taiwan: A Survey of Student Attitudes," *The China Quarterly*, No. 44 (October-December, 1970), p. 56.

[37] Tsung-mao Hsu, *op. cit.*

[38] For example, see Heng-dao Lin, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-59.

mainlanders strongly identify with the ruling KMT and the national goal of reunification. The younger generation of mainlanders, however, are increasingly identified with the island of Taiwan.[39] Yet with the accelerated "Taiwanization" of the Island polity, both the older as well as the younger generation of mainlanders feel left out in the socio-political process of Taiwan which has contributed to the appeal of the New Party, a party split from the KMT. The increasing practice by both the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the establishment KMT in redefining the history of Taiwan not along the nationalist line but from the perspective of an Island republic has added to the increasing alienation of the mainlander population from the ruling elite.[40]

Different experience between the Mainlander and Taiwanese have created different psycho-cultural orientation between the two groups which have had significant impact on the political orientation of the population on Taiwan. To put in a nutshell, while the mainlanders use the history of Mainland China as the point of reference in making judgment on things political, many Taiwanese use the history of Taiwan and even the Japanese colonial rule as the basis of evaluation. As a result, conflicting interpretations and attitudes toward political events become unavoidable. Hence while the Mainlanders have become increasingly alienated by the new political attitudes of the ruling elite in Taiwan who increasingly have used the Island of Taiwan as the focus and foundation of policy planning, the Taiwanese population, especially the older generations on the other hand, have become more alienated from the political posture of Mainland Chinese which in the mind of the Island-centered Taiwanese, has been too China centric and failed to take into account the history and experience of the Taiwanese society.[41] Despite increasing intermarriage between the Taiwanese and Mainlanders and the resultant decline of provincial feeling between the two groups, there remains hidden provincial feelings, especially in the political arena. This may partially explain why President Lee quite frequently

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[39] See, yi-yen Chen, "An Analysis of Political Culture of Various Ethnic (Provincial) Group Across Different Orientation," *Chinese Political Science Review*, Vol. 22 (December, 1996), pp. 83-121.

[40] For rather interesting analysis on the dilemma of the mainlanders in regard to national identification, see Kuang-chin Li, "Ethnic Groups, Nation-State, and Collective Memory: Preliminary Thoughts on the 1995 'Chung-chan Shih-chien [End of the (Second World War) Incident]' in Taipei," (paper delivered at the First Taiwan Colonial and Historical Symposium, Austin, Texas, August 9-12, 1996).

[41] For a discussion on ethnic (provincial) relations on Taiwan, see Mao-Kwei Chang, et. at., *Ethnic Relations and National Identity* (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1993).

emphasizes "Taiwan Ben Wei (Taiwan Primacy)" in his policy statements.[42]

Beginning in 1994, President Lee started making drastic and fundamental changes on both external and domestic policies. On the international front, President Lee started the push toward regaining membership in the United Nations, despite it was a major policy position of the DPP having strong flavor of separatism. President Lee also initiated a series of head-of-state visit to countries wherein the ROC had no formal ties, cumulating in his visiting to the Cornell University, his *alma mater*, in the United States which in one way or another, led to the Beijing's decision to conduct missile tests against Taiwan.

On domestic front, the Government of the Republic of China started using "The ROC on Taiwan," "The ROC as an independent sovereign state" and that the relations between Taiwan and Mainland China is a "special state-to-state relations." "One China" gradually was de-emphasized by government official until it almost completely disappeared in official statements. None of the afore-mentioned external and domestic policies has produced as significant and concrete benefits to the functioning of the political system or the people of Taiwan as their proponents had claimed. This was especially true to the external policies of President Lee which have brought very little substantive benefit to the people of Taiwan. And in the cases of UN Membership and Lee's visit to Cornell, they even brought about serious crises in the Taiwan Strait. Yet these policies were resolutely carried not because President Lee or the ROC Government failed to see the futility and negative consequences of the policy measures but because they served an important therapeutic value to meet the psychological need of the people of Taiwan "to go out."[43]   (See Figure 8)

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[42] See Pu-chang Wang, "The Nature of Provincial Integration," in Mao-kwei Chang, *Provincial (Ethnic) Relations and National Identity* (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1993), pp. 53-97; also see Yung Wei, "Democratization, Unification, and Elite Conflict", *op. cit.*

[43] See Yung Wei, "Assessment of Cross-Strait Relations from the Perspective of Internal Policies in Taiwan," *Vanguard Analysis* (Taipei: Vanguard Institute for Policy Studies, August, 1999).

Figure 8
Psycho-Cultural Analysis and Populist Authoritarianism: The Taiwan Case

Designed by Yung Wei, August 6, 1998.

Why President Lee, who had been rather popular in the first half of his twelve years rule, chose to push for policies which more or less contributed to his declining popular support toward the latter half of his terms? The answer, or answers, is a complex one. The first type of answers may be found in a psycho-historical analysis of President Lee's personality and life story. Here we find rather limited in-depth academic research in this area.[44] President Lee Teng-hui himself, however, has provided us with a most revealing account of his innermost thinking in this regard in an interview conducted in May, 1994 by a Japanese columnist, Shiba Ryo Taro. In a lengthy interview with Shiba Ryo Taro, a Japanese whom Lee had known for many years, the President revealed many of his personal positive feeling toward the Japanese colonial rule, the lot of the Taiwanese people, KMT's language policy, his attitude toward Taiwan's international relations, and finally his sense of mission toward the future of Taiwan.[45]

With extraordinary candidness, Lee lamented about "the sadness to be born as a Taiwanese."[46] Lee mentioned "Exodus," the Bible story on Moses' leading the suppressed Israelis to escape from Egypt, to compare to the lot of the Taiwanese and his sense of mission. As the chairman of the KMT, the ruling party, Lee asserted that "All the peoples holding power in Taiwan were alien regimes… Even the KMT is an alien regime, it is a party rule (control) the Taiwanese."[47] In short, Lee believe that "Taiwan must belong to the Taiwanese; this is a fundamental concept."[48]

As the President of the ROC and the chairman of the ruling KMT party, Lee's unfolding, or to put more precisely, unloading of his inner thinking and feeling to a Japanese columnist naturally raised many eyebrows in Taiwan, particularly his comrades in the KMT. For scholars interested in Lee's psycho-cultural background and orientation, the content of the interview, however, offers most precious first hand

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[44] For initial attempts, see Kuang-kuo Huang, *op. cit.*; for a critical analysis of President Lee's background and political personality, see Hsiang-tuo Tseng, *A Critique of Lee Teng-hui* (Taipei: Society for Consolidating the Chinese Nation, 1996); for a thinly veiled critical analysis of the inner-thinking of Lee Teng-hui in the form of a novel, see Ta-chun Chang, *The Lying Disciple* (Taipei: United Literary Publisher, 1996); also see Julian C. L. Kuo, *op. cit.*, especially chapter one.

[45] Lee Teng-hui, "Chang-so ti pe ai (The Sadness and Sorry of Locale)" in Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 469-483.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 471.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 477.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 473.

information on the psychic makeup and political personality of a leader caught in the process of having to bridge the gaps consciously or unconsciously between his colonialist past and nationalist present and between his strong sense of remorse of being a member of the suppressed Taiwanese people and his sense of mission to lead his people to disown the past and to build a new nation.   In fact, Lee's transformation from a Taiwanese youth who have received Japanese education, to a college student having a record of joining left-wing student activities in Taiwan[49] to a successful technocrat in Chang Ching-Kuo's cabinet, and finally to the President of the Republic of China, fits so well with Harold D. Lasswell's "frustration-displacement-rationalization-realization" model of psychoanalysis of political personality that one can find few rival cases.

The above analysis clearly show that, despite the stereotype cliché-filled analysis of Taiwan's transition from "authoritarian politics" to "pluralistic democracy," the actual process of transition has not been moving from "traditional authoritarian society" to "pluralistic democracy," but from "mass society" to "populistic authoritarian society."[50]   (See Figure 9)

Kuang-kuo Huang, a noted professor of socio-psychology in Taiwan, pointed out that Lee's populist politics led to the shrinkage of Taiwan's civil society, the deterioration of the quality of local politics, and the penetration of the political process by "money politics" and underground figures.[51]   An increasing numbers of social scientists who originally had high hope on Lee Teng-hui to lead Taiwan toward pluralist democracy penetration of the political process by "money politics" and underground

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[49] President Lee is widely reportedly to have joined the radical student movement, even the Chinese Communist party, during his days as a student at National Taiwan University.   See "Special Consultant and the AB Archives," *Shih-Pao Chou-Kan (China Times Weekly)*, 1065 (July 23-Aug, 1, 1998), pp. 30-37.   It must be pointed out, however, leaning to the left was not a rare occurrence among college students at National Taiwan University at that time.   For a comparative perspective, see Kuang-chi Chang, *Fan Shu Jên Ti Ku-Shih (The Story of a Sweet Potato Man)* (Taipei: Lien Ching Publisher, 1998).

[50] For the phenomenon of "mass society" and its impact on democratic institution, see William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1959).   In regard to the impact of populism, see Edward A. Shih, "Populism and the Rule of Law," University of Chicago Law School Conference on Jurisprudence and Politics (April, 1954), pp. 97-107; William Riker, *Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choices* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1982); Lawrence Goodwyr, *The Populist Movement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Thomas E. Cronin, *op. cit.*

[51] Kuang-Kuo Huang, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-123.

Figure 9

The Formation of Populist Authoritarianism: A Typology

Populist mobilization	Authoritarianism Rule	
	High	Low
High	Populist Authoritarian Society	Unstable Mass Society
Low	Traditional Authoritarian Society	Democratic Pluralistic Society

(Designed and made by Yung Wei, Jan. 10, 1997)

figures.[52]   An increasing numbers of social scientists who originally had high hope on Lee Teng-hui to lead Taiwan toward pluralist democracy also started questioning his "illiberal democracy"[53] and point out that Taiwan now is facing "serious tension between populism and democracy" and warn that "the 'top-to-bottom' construction and manipulation of the concept of the 'people' is at odds with the notion of a pluralist democracy."[54]

6. From "Therapeutic Politics" to "Pragmatic Policies": The Waning of Authoritarian-populist politics and the Gradual Emergence of Integration-oriented Democratization in Taiwan

Despite more than a decade of divisive, populist, and authoritarian political development, amidst the democratization process in Taiwan, the people of the Island seem to have gradually come to realize the danger of

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[52] Kuang-Kuo Huang, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-123.
[53] L. A. M. Ling and Chih-yu Shih, *op. cit.*
[54] Chung-huan Wang and Yuong-hsiang Chien, "Moving Toward New State?   The Formation of Populist Democracy and the Problem of Democracy," *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Sciences*, No. 20 (August, 1995), pp. 17-55.

populist politics and therapeutic maneuvers. This type of politics have created serious damages among social groups and political parties and have more than once brought the two sides of Taiwan Strait into military confrontation. For the people of Taiwan today, economic growth, unemployment, and improving relations with Mainland China increasingly have become their primary concerns.

This may partially explain why former President Lee's statement to a pro-independence group that "Republic of China no longer exists. We should have a 'Republic of Taiwan'" did not created much a stir in Taiwan.   In fact, an opinion survey conducted by this author reveals that President Lee's popularity, which reached sometimes 70% during earlier part of his tern now drops to lower than about 20%.   When asked the question "Do you support President Lee's political position and activities?", only 20.8% of the people of Taiwan indicated support while 50.68% voiced opposition.   After cross-tabulating against age and education, it shows a clear tendency that the younger a person is, the more he or she is opposed to President Lee.   Even among the Min-nan group, less than 24% support President Lee. (See Tables 1, 2, 3)   This is probably the reason President Chen Shui-bian tries to keep a distance from President Lee.

Other than attitude toward former President Lee, another indicator demonstrating a new trend of political development in Taiwan is people's national identity.   One of the sensitive questions in Taiwan is whether the people in Taiwan still identify themselves as Chinese.   Previous surveys on Taiwan have shown that there has been a steady trend toward lower percentages of Taiwanese identifying as "Chinese."   Yet this author has always suspected that this may have been due to erroneous survey methods that had been employed.   Rejecting the practice of asking the question "Are you 'Chinese.' 'Taiwanese,' or 'both Taiwanese and Chinese?' in a single question, which is both conceptually and methodologically wrong, this author chose to ask the questions separately. The respondents were first asked the question: "Are you Taiwanese?" and

Table 1

Do you support President Lee's political position, opinion and activities?

Age	Support very much	Support	Oppose	Oppose very much	Not sure	Answer (n)	Total Response %
20-34	2.82%	16.41%	30.25%	24.10%	26.41%	390	100.00%
35-49	4.02%	15.82%	28.14%	27.63%	24.37%	398	100.00%
50 and above	7.82%	17.03%	20.11%	21.78%	33.24%	358	100.00%

x^2=41.06215; df=12; p=0.00005

Source: Data from survey conducted by Yung Wei, on December 31, 2002 to January 1, 2003, National Science Council Research Project (No: NSC 91-2414-H-128-012-SSS) on "Community, State, Globalization and National Identity: Testing Relevant Theoretical Model through Opinion Survey in Taiwan and Hong Kong," sponsored by National Science Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China.

Table 2

Do you support President Lee's political position, opinion and activities?

Education	Support very much	Support	Oppose	Oppose very much	Not sure	Answer (n)	Total Response %
College	3.69%	14.08%	31.40%	30.71%	20.09%	433	100.00%
Senior high	4.45%	17.53%	25.13%	25.65%	27.22%	382	100.00%
Junior high	6.99%	21.67%	30.06%	18.18%	23.07%	143	100.00%
Elementary	6.74%	15.16%	13.48%	13.48%	51.12%	178	100.00%

x^2=89.03276; df=12; p<0.00000

Source: See Table 1.

Table 3

Do you support President Lee's political position, opinion and activities?

Provincial Origin	Support very much	Support	Oppose	Oppose very much	Not sure	Answer (n)	Total Response %
Taiwanese Min-nan	5.68%	18.29%	26.47%	20.22%	29.31%	880	100.00%
Taiwanese Hakka	2.43%	13.82%	31.70%	27.64%	24.39%	123	100.00%
Mainlander	1.69%	5.93%	20.33%	54.23%	17.79%	118	100.00%
Aborigines	0.00%	16.66%	16.66%	41.66%	25.00%	12	100.00%

x^2=82.36811; df=16; p<0.00000

Source: See Table 1.

then in a separate question, he is asked: "Are you Chinese?" By cross-tabulating the answers to these two questions, we have obtained a quite different result in Table 4. As data in Table 4 demonstrate, 71.5% of the Taiwanese people believe that they are both Taiwanese and Chinese; 24.04%, Taiwanese and not Chinese; 4.25%, Chinese and not Taiwanese; 0.002%, neither Taiwanese nor Chinese. (See Table 4)

After cross-tabulating with education, and provincial origin, our data clearly show that: (1) the higher a person's educational level and the younger a person's age, the more he or she will regard himself or herself as Chinese; (2) the Min-nan group and Hakka group have lower identification as "Chinese"; yet even the Min-nan group has 67.1% identifying themselves as "Chinese." (See Tables 5, 6, 7)

In addition to data on national identity of the people of Taiwan, another survey conducted by this author on Taiwan people's travel to Mainland China also yields rather interesting results. My survey clearly shows that the more the Taiwan people travel to Mainland China, the more he or she will have positive image of Mainland China. Likewise, the more frequently a Taiwanese travels to Mainland China, the more he or she will have more positive attitude toward social integration and economic integration with Mainland China. (See Tables 8, 9, 10) A recent survey conducted by a manpower bank reveal that among the younger generation (18 to 30 years old) in Taiwan, one third expresses desire to work on Mainland. 51.87% respondents who are already employed in Taiwan indicated that they would not reject good job offer from Mainland China.[55] It must be pointed out, however, despite repeated appeals by Beijing, the majority of the people of the Island are still against the "one-country, two-system" formula.

7. Conclusion

The democratization process in Taiwan has clearly shown that populist leaders playing divisive political tactics can bring a country to the brink of economic depression, social unrest, and external military crisis. The pursuit of personal aggrandizement through manipulation of

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[55] Survey conducted by 1111 Manpower Bank and reported in China Broadcasting Company (July 24, 2003).

Table 4

The Cross-Tabulation of Taiwanese Electorate's Identity of being "Taiwanese" or "Chinese"

Taiwanese or not	Chinese or not		Total
	Yes	No	% (N)
Yes	705 71.5%	237 24.04%	100% (942)
No	42 4.25%	2 0.002%	100% (44)

χ_2=9.38   df=1   p<0.01

Source: Data from survey conducted by Yung Wei, on November 16-18, 2001, National Science Council Research Project (No: NSC 89-2414-H-009-001) on "Testing the Theoretical Model of 'Linkage Communities': A Comparative Examination of the Integrating Process of the Divided States with Emphasis on the Chinese Case," sponsored by National Science Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China.

Table 5

Age and National Identification

| | **Are You Chinese?** | | | | |
Age	Yes	No	Refuse	Answer (n)	Total Response %
20-24	77.2%	18.4%	4.4%	114	100.0%
25-29	73.0%	20.5%	6.6%	122	100.0%
30-39	73.4%	21.2%	5.4%	278	100.0%
40-49	67.8%	24.8%	7.4%	230	100.0%
50-59	66.7%	28.1%	5.2%	153	100.0%
60-69	67.0%	26.1%	6.8%	88	100.0%
70 and above	75.8%	12.9%	11.3%	62	100.0%
Total	70.7%	22.4%	6.9%	1070	100.0%

$\chi^2 = 25.900$ df=12   p=0.01109

Source: See Table 4.

Table 6

Education and National Identification

	Are You Chinese?				
Education	Yes	No	Refuse	Answer (n)	Total Response %
Grad. School and above	75.0%	17.3%	7.7%	52	100.0%
University	76.5%	21.9%	1.6%	187	100.0%
Junior college	76.8%	18.8%	4.3%	207	100.0%
Senior high	73.0%	21.6%	5.4%	315	100.0%
Junior high	68.8%	24.2%	7.0%	128	100.0%
Elementary	55.7%	33.0%	11.4%	88	100.0%
Elementary below and illiteracy	61.0%	25.4%	13.6%	59	100.0%
Total	70.7%	22.4%	6.9%	1070	100.0%

χ^2=93.434   df=14   p<0.00000

Source: See Table 4.

Table 7

Provincial Origins and National Identification

Provincial Origin	Are You Chinese?			Answer (n)	Total Response %
	Yes	No	Refuse		
Taiwanese Min-nan	67.1%	26.1%	6.8%	762	100.0%
Taiwanese Hakka	75.2%	22.1%	2.7%	113	100.0%
Mainlander	94.8%	4.4%	0.7%	135	100.0%
Aborigines	94.1%	5.9%	0.0%	17	100.0%
Refuse	37.2%	20.9%	41.9%	43	100.0%
Total（n）%	70.7%	22.4%	6.9%	1070	100.0%

χ_2=134.739   df=8   p<0.0000

Source: See Table 4.

Table 8

Frequency of Travel to Mainland China and Impression of Mainland China

Frequency of Travel to Mainland China	Very good	Good	All right	A bit no good	Not good	Very bad	Hard to say	Refuse answer	Total (N)	%
Reside both on Mainland and Taiwan	0%	12.5%	25%	0%	25%	37.5%	0%	0%	8	100%
15 times	17.4%	13%	21.7%	4.3%	21.7%	8.7%	13%	0%	23	100%
7 to 14	4.8%	19%	52.4%	0%	4.8%	14.3%	4.8%	0%	21	100%
4 to 6	1.8%	21.8%	43.6%	12.7%	10.9%	5.5%	3.6%	0%	55	100%
3 times	1.8%	14.5%	47.3%	5.5%	14.5%	7.3%	9.1%	0%	55	100%
2 times	1.4%	16.2%	51.4%	13.5%	8.1%	6.8%	2.7%	0%	74	100%
Once	2.7%	8%	43.4%	8%	15%	9.7%	12.4%	0.9%	113	100%
Never to Mainland	1.3%	6.6%	47%	10.3%	11.6%	7.9%	14.5%	0.8%	709	100%
Can't remember	8.3%	0%	41.7%	8.3%	16.7%	0%	25%	0%	12	100%

$\chi^2=71.011$ df=49   p=0.02156

Source: See Table 4.

Table 9

Frequency of Travel to Mainland China
and Attitude toward Social Integration with Mainland China

Frequency of Travel to Mainland China	Attitude toward social integration								
	Integration together	Getting closer over time	Maintain status quo	Moving apart over time	Separate completely	Don't know	Refuse answer	Total (N)	%
Reside both on Mainland and Taiwan	0%	37.5%	25%	12.5%	0%	12.5%	12.5%	8	100%
15 times	26.1%	52.2%	0%	0%	0%	21.7%	0%	23	100%
7 to 14	38.1%	28.6%	14.3%	4.8%	0%	9.5%	4.8%	21	100%
4 to 6	12.7%	45.5%	18.2%	7.3%	7.3%	9.1%	0%	55	100%
3 times	14.5%	36.4%	25.5%	7.3%	3.6%	12.7%	0%	55	100%
2 times	12.2%	41.9%	27%	4.1%	1.4%	13.5%	0%	74	100%
Once	16.8%	44.2%	10.6%	4.4%	3.5%	20.4%	0%	113	100%
Never to Mainland	11.7%	40.9%	19%	8.6%	2.8%	16.1%	0.8%	709	100%
Can't remember	25%	41.7%	8.3%	8.3%	0%	8.3%	8.3%	12	100%

χ_2=83.540   df=42   p=0.00014

Source: See Table 4.

Table 10

Frequency of Travel to Mainland China
and Attitude toward Economic Integration with Mainland China

Frequency of Travel to Mainland China	Attitude toward economic integration								
	Integration together	Getting closer over time	Maintain status quo	Moving apart over time	Separate completely	Don't know	Refuse answer	Total (N)	%
Reside both on Mainland and Taiwan	12.5%	25%	37.5%	0%	0%	25%	0%	8	100%
15 times	34.8%	52.2%	4.3%	4.3%	0%	4.3%	0%	23	100%
7 to 14	33.3%	47.6%	4.8%	9.5%	0%	4.8%	0%	21	100%
4 to 6	20%	36.4%	18.2%	3.6%	10.9%	10.9%	0%	55	100%
3 times	14.5%	49.1%	10.9%	9.1%	0%	14.5%	1.8%	55	100%
2 times	13.5%	50%	10.8%	6.8%	0%	17.6%	1.4%	74	100%
Once	23%	40.7%	10.6%	2.7%	1.8%	20.4%	0.9%	113	100%
Never to Mainland	15.7%	43%	12.4%	7.9%	3%	17.2%	0.8%	709	100%
Can't remember	8.3%	66.7%	0%	16.7%	0%	8.3%	0%	12	100%

χ^2=59.700   df=42   p=0.03735

Source: See Table 4.

people's emotion and prejudice can damage not only democratic institutions but also can bring about economic downturn and internecine conflicts as well as international crisis.

As of this writing, former president Lee Teng-hui is leading a crowd of approximately 100,000 in a demonstration in Taipei for the "Rectification of the correct name of Taiwan (Taiwan Zheng-min)."[56] Neither President Chen nor Vice-President Lu participated in the demonstration. Although some DPP legislators showed up, many of them expressed the opinion in private that given the composition of the membership of the Legislative Yuan now and in the foreseeable future, it is not possible to amend the Constitution to change the current state name from "the Republic of China" to that of "Republic of Taiwan." Hence the demonstration represents more an expression of sentiment than a realistic demand for concrete policy decision.

From the analysis in the paper, it is clear that judging by the development of democratic values, the development and maintenance of democratic institutions, and the deliverance of concrete policies benefit to the people, the Republic of China cannot be viewed as an successful case of democratic consolidation. It definitely has fallen short of the original anticipation of a fine example of the "Third Wave."[57]

The most disturbing aspect of the ROC's democratization process is Taiwan's progressive move toward what this author dubbed "therapeutic politics."[58] The emotional interaction between a leader who, for one reason or another, feels to have been mistreated and deprived and the section of the people of Taiwan who also have a sense of frustration is probably a most disquieting part of the process of democratization on Taiwan. Feeding the people with affective symbols and launching emotional attack of against internal and external enemies by charismatic leaders may not be unique for Taiwan politics along.[59] Yet for a political leader to totally disown his state

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[56] See *China Times* (September 7, 2003), pp. 1-2.

[57] See Yu-shan Wu, "Comparing Third-Wave Democracy: East Central Europe and the ROC," *Issues and Studies*, 37 (July-Aug., 2001), pp. 1-37; also see Guillermo O'Donnell, "Illusions about Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy*, 7 (1996) and Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" *Journal of Democracy*, 7 (1996), pp. 20-37.

[58] See Yung Wei, "The Waning of 'Therapeutic' Politics: A Psycho-Cultural Analysis of Populist-Authoritarianism in Taiwan's Democratization Process," paper delivered at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place and Sheraton Boston Hotel and Towers, September 3-6, 1998.

[59] See James L. Nolan, Jr., *The Therapeutic State: Justifying Government at Century's End* (New York and

wherein he has been President as well as the party wherein has been chairman for more than twelve years is indeed a rare case in any political system of the world.

Some political analysts may try to explain or rationalize Lee Teng-hui's behavior by picturing him as a Taiwanese "Nationalist" or "revolutionist" who utilized both the ROC Government and KMT Party to step-by-step achieve his hidden "revolutionary goals." Yet a review of many of the interviews he gave, particularly those given to Japanese scholars and reporters, one may come to a surprising conclusion, i.e., Lee may be more a "colonial restorationist" than a Taiwanese "Nationalist" after all. For if Lee is what he claimed to be a Taiwanese Nationalist against all "alien regimes;" that should also include the Japanese colonial regime in Taiwan. An indepth examination of Lee's thinking and behavior, however, led us to find that instead of being critical about Japan, Lee is highly laudable Japanese cultural, economic system and political institution. His identification with Japan was so strong that he even once openly wept in front of Japanese Diet members over the death of the late Japanese Emperor. He also is the lone leader in Asia to express the opinion that Japan needs not to repetitively apologize for the wrong doings during the Second World War.[60] Interesting enough, there are certain Japanese scholars and political leaders who also regard Lee Teng-hui as a fine example of well breed "Japanese" intellectual and political leader who should be a role-model for younger Japanese.[61]

The process of pursuing nationalism, democracy and economic development by non-western countries has been a focus of analysis of many social scientists. The most intricate part is that while the leaders of newly independent states tend to be against the colonial power politically, they sometimes secretly admire the cultural sophistication, the scientific achievement, and even economic capability of their former colonial rulers.[62] Only by grasping this kind of perspective can we understand the seemingly contradictory behavior of the Taiwanese who are against Mainland China and the KMT as alien regimes on the one hand, yet treat Taiwan's former colonial

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London: New York University Press, 1998).

[60] Lee Teng-hui and Mineo Nakajima, *The Strategy for Asia*, translated from Japanese to Chinese by Lo Wen-seng and Yang Min-zhu (Taipei: Yuan-Liu Pub., November 2000), pp. 132-133.

[61] *Ibid.*, pp. 139-141.

[62] For the complicated socio-psychological entanglement of the leaders and people of newly independent state with the old colonial rulers. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York: Verso, 1983).

ruler, Japan, as a model to emulate on the other.

Despite the tumultuous political changes in Taiwan, there has been little analysis on the relationship between Taiwanese nationalism and pro-Japanism. For one thing, there has been no indepth discussion of the six consecutive constitutional "reforms" engineered by President Lee which almost destroy the foundation of the political system on Taiwan. Barring academic grantsmanship, it is difficult to explain the reticence of Western and Chinese (Taiwanese) scholar in this regard. One explanation may be found in these scholars' overwhelming endorsement of "localization" and "ridding of the ancient regime" as the major content of "democratization on Taiwan." Another reason may be traced to the overall concern of both Taiwanese and American scholars over the security of Taiwan. Since democratization is one of the major factors contributing to US commitment to Taiwan's security. Any analysis that may diminish Taiwan's democratic image is a negative impact to Taiwan's security; hence better avoid it.[63]

Fortunately for Taiwan, leaders in Beijing have already learned the intricacies of domestic politics in Taiwan, particularly in a election year. Hence the PRC tries hard not provide ammunition for the separatists in Taiwan to attack their political opponents, particularly during the campaign period in Taiwan. The effects of sending of missile in 1996 and the harsh words by Zhu Rong-ji before the 2000 presidential election are hard but useful lessons for Beijing to contemplate and to act accordingly. As for the United States, it is content to maintain the status quo the Taiwan region. That is the reason that the US Government expresses concern over the declaration by the DPP Government to hold referendum or plebiscite on various issues along with the Presidential election next March. Certain section of the DPP, however responded by charging the US is intervening into the domestic politics of Taiwan. In response to the charge, the US Government clarified its position as only opposing any plebiscite that may touch upon the issue of unification or independence. Here one finds that even a major power and a para-ally of Taiwan still has to exercise caution in dealing with the domestic politics of the Island polity.

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[63] For American interest in Asian Democracy, see Paul Wolfowitz, "Asian Democracy and American Interest," The B. C. Lee Lectures (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2000); for a broader review of US policy toward China and Taiwan, see Yung Wei (ed.), *US Policy toward Mainland China and the ROC on Taiwan: Possible Developments and Policy Recommendations* (Taipei: Vanguard Institute for Policy Studies, November, 2002).