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From "Multi-System Nations" to "Linkage Communities": A New Conceptual Scheme for the Integration of Divided Nations*

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Studies of the issues related to the unification of "divided nations" have focused too heavily on the political and legal sides of the problem. Frequently, analyses have been clouded by concepts of conventional international law such as "sovereignty" and "jurisdiction." Moving beyond the innovative concept of "multi-system nations" coined by this author in the 1970s, the idea of "linkage communities" emphasizes the natural process of economic, cultural, and people-to-people exchanges between different parts of a "divided nation." The conceptual scheme argues that through continuous interactions in the private sectors, "linkage communities" will be developed within both sides of a divided nation which in turn will bring about gradual functional integration, if not political unification of a divided state.

Keywords: multi-system nations; linkage communities; functional integration; cross-Strait relations; unification of Chinese political systems

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The emergence of the so-called "divided states" since World War II poses special problems for political scientists and international jurists. In terms of commonly accepted criteria for statehood, such as the existence of an effective government controlling a well-defined territory and people, "divided states" are without question full-fledged members in the community of states.

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Yet owing to the problem of overlapping claims of sovereignty and jurisdiction, many members of divided states have been denied international recognition as well as membership in international organizations.

In addition to the problem of nonrecognition, "divided states" have often been caught in internecine conflicts which have led to dislocated people, which in turn creates the problem of minorities and refugees. Furthermore, a large number of displaced people with a strong sense of nationhood but without any self-governing territory have generated the phenomenon of non-state nations, such as the case of the Arabs in Palestine until recently.

Since developing an interest in "divided states," this author has been struck by the suffering of displaced peoples who are caught in the process of either political partitioning or forced amalgamation. This human agony has often been caused not only by open warfare created by contending political ideologies and groups, but also by the inadequacy of conventional international law, which allows itself to be used as an instrument to deny recognition to the disadvantaged system; this in turn deprives or greatly hampers the right of individual citizens of the nonrecognized part of a divided state to engage in international travel and other activities.¹

The Origin and Impact of the Concept of "Multi-System Nations"

In order to develop more efficient intellectual tools to tackle the phenomena of divided states, in 1975 this author coined a new term, "multi-system nations." The development of this concept can be traced back to the formation of a Comparative and Interdisciplinary Studies Section within the International Studies Association (ISA) in 1969. As one of the co-founders of this research section within ISA, the author was particularly interested in the complex problems of political partitioning which leads to a host of problems, including refugees, migration, minorities, and non-state nations.²

With a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities of the United States, the author gathered a group of sixteen social scientists, in-

¹See Yung Wei, "Divided States and International Law: Political Reality and Legal Practice" (Paper delivered at the Panel on "The Legal Status of Divided States," Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, St. Louis, Missouri, March 16-20, 1997).

²See Yung Wei, ed., *Political Partitioning, Migration, Minorities, and Non-State Nations: Models, Propositions, and Intellectual Exchanges* (CISS working paper no. 49, University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1975).

cluding sociologists, economists, anthropologists, political scientists, and international jurists, to examine the problems of political partitioning from an interdisciplinary perspective. From the research findings of this group, called "Internet" by Fred Riggs,³ the author soon discovered that it is incorrect to call most of the partitioned nations "divided states," for in most of these nations the different parts share a common culture and ethnic origin. The situation therefore should not be seen as the division of a political system into two or more different parts along cultural or ethnic lines, but the coexistence of two or more political systems within one nation. For this reason, the author decided to coin the term "multi-system nations" to more accurately define the situation.⁴

The major focus of the new concept of "multi-system nations" rests on the emphasis that relations between different parts of a divided nation are not between different states but different political systems. These competing systems try to deny the international status of the other side, despite the fact that both sides meet almost all the criteria of an independent state. By advancing the new concept of "multi-system nations," the author proposes to preserve the idea of "one nation," but face the reality of the coexistence of two or more mutually separated political systems within that nation. The logical derivation from this concept would be: "one nation, two systems"; "one sovereignty, two jurisdictions"; and "one country, two international personalities."

Having coined the term "multi-system nations," the author further proposes that in order to resolve the problems associated with these types of nations, the international community should separate the issues of unification and recognition. It is suggested that other states should recognize all political systems within a multi-system nation without recognizing or denying their

³Ibid.

⁴For further discussion by this author on the inception, development, and policy impact of the concept of multi-system nations, see Yung Wei, "The Unification and Division of Multi-System Nations: A Comparative Analysis of Basic Concepts, Issues, and Approaches" (Paper delivered at symposium on Functional Integration of Divided Nations, Seoul, Republic of Korea, October 6-7, 1980); later published in *Multi-System Nations and International Law: The International Status of Germany, Korea, and China*, ed. Hungdah Chiu and Robert Downen (Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland, 1981). Also see the author's following papers: "Multi-System Nations Revisited: Interaction Between Theories and Realities" (Paper delivered at the International Conference on Unification of Multi-System Nations, Taipei, September 27-29, 1991); "Unification or Separation: Assessment of Relations Between the Two Chinese Political Systems Through the Concept of Multi-System Nations" (Paper delivered at the Conference on China's Constitutional Systems: Convergence or Divergence, Columbia University, New York, April 29, 1994); and "Conceptual Schemes for Multi-System Nations and Inter-System Developments" (Paper delivered at the Panel on System Integration of Divided Nations, XVI World Congress, International Political Science Association [IPSA], Berlin, August 21-25, 1994).

claims beyond the territories under their effective control. It is further proposed that under the notion of "one nation," all parts of a multi-system nation should be allowed to join international organizations as bona fide members on equal footing. In short, the concept of multi-system nations argues that the problem of national unification should be left to the people of the multi-system nations to decide among themselves, whereas the issue of recognition should be handled by the principle of political realism.

Developments in various so-called "divided states" more or less have corresponded to the concept of "multi-system nations." The "common roof theory" (*Dachtheorie*) developed in Germany largely echoes the idea of multi-system nations. By asserting the notion of one German nation, East Germany and West Germany managed to separate the issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction: sovereignty belonged to the abstract German nation, while jurisdictions were clearly delineated between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Democratic Republic of Germany. Consequently, both Germanies were able to be simultaneously recognized by other states as well as join international organizations, including the United Nations.⁵

In the case of two Koreas, the application of "multi-system nations" theory has been more direct and encompassing.⁶ Some officials and scholars, such as Professor Hakjoon Kim, former special assistant to the South Korean president, have openly described Korea as a "multi-system nation." The December 1991 communiqué between the representatives of North and South Korea clearly defined the situation in the Korean Peninsula as two political systems coexisting in one Korean nation. Relations between the two Korean political systems are not international relations, but special relations regulated by special agreements between the North and South. Today both North and South Korea are members of the United Nations and enjoy dual recognitions in many capitals around the world.⁷

As for the Chinese situation, the government of the People's Republic of

⁵See Joyce Marie Mushaben, "A Search for Identity: The German Question in Atlantic Alliance Relations," *World Politics* 40, no. 3 (April 1988): 395-417; and Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, "The Unification of Germany's Multi-System Nations: The Evolution of West Germany's Strategies" (Paper delivered at International Conference on the Unification of Multi-System Nations co-sponsored by the Vanguard Foundation and American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Taipei, September 27-29, 1991).

⁶See John H. Herz, "Korea and Germany as Divided Nations: The Systemic Impact," *Asian Survey* 15, no. 2 (February 1975): 957-70.

⁷See Hakjoon Kim, "Korean Reunification: A Seoul Perspective on the Korean National Community Unification Formula as Seen Through the Various Concepts on the Unification on Multi-System Nations" (Paper presented at International Conference on the Unification on Multi-System Nations, Taipei, September 27-29, 1991).

China (PRC) advanced the notion of "one country, two systems" some time between 1983 and 1984. Despite repeated denials by the Beijing authorities, many scholars are of the opinion that PRC leaders have borrowed and skillfully twisted the concept of "multi-system nations" to suit its own political framework, in which the two systems are only socioeconomic institutions without international personalities. Unquestionably, Beijing had both Hong Kong and Taiwan in mind when it put forth the "one country, two systems" scheme.

In regard to the Republic of China (ROC), the inner circle of the ROC government basically concurs with the concept of "multi-system nations," as does the academic community, with only a few senior members of the Legislative Yuan (Parliament) voicing different opinions. Since Lee Teng-hui assumed the post of the ROC president, the official policy of the ROC government has gradually moved closer to the notion of "multi-system nations." The *Guidelines for National Unification*, for instance, advocates the concept of "one China" but allows the coexistence of two "political entities" within one China. The white paper on cross-Strait relations released by the Mainland Affairs Council goes further to formally declare that "one China" is a "historical, geographic, and cultural Chinese nation."⁸ Within this notion, two political entities which are not foreign countries to each other coexist, yet are full-fledged international personalities in their relations with other countries. Hence, the concept of "one China" corresponds completely to the ideas of "multi-system nations" as defined by official ROC government policy.⁹

The Concept of "Linkage Communities" and the Prospects for "Functional Integration"

While the concept of "multi-system nations" has been applied in one way or another to the situations of all "divided nations" with varying degrees of success, it nevertheless still faces a number of problems in actual application. Foremost among these problems has been the issue of overlapping claims of sovereignty and jurisdictions. Usually the bigger and stronger side of a multi-system nation will impose sovereignty claims not only on the ter-

⁸*Policy Paper on Cross-Taiwan-Strait Relations* (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 1994), 30.

⁹For an official view of the ROC position on the issue of national reunification, see Lien Chan, "A Pragmatic Strategy for China's Peaceful Reunification," *American Asian Review* 14, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 97-107.

ritories under its effective control but also on those parts which they do not control. In the case of Korea, the formal agreement signed between North and South Korea in 1990 has not yet led to the emergence of an integrated civil society. Hence it may be concluded that while agreements have been arrived at between the relevant authorities within a multi-system nation and may help reduce tension between two sides, real political integration¹⁰ is still far out of the picture.

The reasons are to be found that despite official endorsement of the principles of unification and jurisdictions, there have been no active interactions and contacts between the people on the two sides of the Korean Peninsula. In contrast, the authorities in Beijing and Taipei have not yet arrived at a commonly accepted framework for reunification, but the flow of people and goods across the Taiwan Strait has been far more intensive and extensive than between the two Koreas.


A third example illustrating the importance of informal, functional, people-to-people contact is the case of East and West Germany. What we witnessed was a continuous flow of people, goods, and information across boundaries long before formal and legal arrangements for reunification were achieved.¹¹ In fact, the societies of the two Germanies entered into rather extensive economic, cultural, and information exchanges to the point that the two sides of Germany had become somewhat "integrated" before it was politically "unified."

From the above comparison among the Chinese, Korean, and German cases, it has become clear that formal-structural arrangements are not as effective as informal and interpersonal contracts and interactions. Yet regrettably,

¹⁰For various discussions on the idea of functional integration, see Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957); Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965); Ernst B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing," *International Organization* 24, no. 4 (Autumn 1970): 607-46; Leon N. Lindberg, "Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement," *ibid.*, 649-731; Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integration Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community," in *The Integration of Political Communities*, ed. Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1964); James A. Caporaso and Alan L. Pelowski, "Economic and Political Integration in Europe: A Time-Series Quasi-Experimental Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 65, no. 2 (June 1971): 418-33; Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1953); Joseph S. Nye, "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement," *International Organization* 22, no. 4 (Autumn 1968): 855-80; and Henry R. Nau, "From Integration to Interdependence: Gains, Losses, and Continuing Gaps," *ibid.* 33, no. 1 (Winter 1979): 119-47.

¹¹Kindermann, "The Unification of Germany's Multi-System Nations."

Figure 1
The Concept of "Linkage Community": A Heuristic Model*



*Developed and drawn by Yung Wei, May 1996.

more often than not, one finds that analyses on the issues of divided states are often too obviously state-oriented, elite-oriented, law-oriented, and structure-oriented, thus losing sight of the impact of interactions between the people, culture, and communities of a multi-system nation.

With a view to further identifying and highlighting this process of informal but functional interactions between the people of different political systems within a multi-system nation, the author proposes a new term, "linkage communities," to illustrate the actual process of functional integration within either side of a divided state (see figure 1). What I mean by "linkage communities" is the existence of a group of people who have had such extensive social, cultural, commercial, or other types of contacts with the people and society of the opposite system that they have developed an understanding, sensitivity, and empathy with the people and society across system boundaries. People who belong to this type of "linkage community" not only have higher contacts with individuals and groups across boundary lines, they also keep close contact with people of similar orientations and experiences within their own political system.

The higher the percentage of people belonging to the "linkage community" on each side of a partitioned society or multi-system nation, the less likely the possibility of inter-system military confrontation and the more likely the achievement of functional integration, which may eventually lead to peaceful political unification. To put it in more precise and empirical terms, one can

identify and measure the size of "linkage communities" in either part of a partitioned society by examining the number and percentages of people who have traveled to the "other side," have business contacts or establishments across system boundaries, or maintain substantial social, cultural, as well as academic ties with individuals or groups in the opposite system.

Once we set our mind to the phenomenon of "linkage communities" in a multi-system nation, a new perspective in empirical research and a new orientation for policymaking will emerge. Instead of focusing our attention on the role of the state, the problems of sovereignty, the decisions of the elite, the legal process, and the political structure, we will turn more to the orientation of the population; the development of shared values and norms between people of different systems; the direction of deliberation and debate in the representative bodies at the central and local levels; and the overall volume as well as intensity of actual individual and group interactions between the two political systems within a partitioned society.

With the above perspectives in mind, the author would like to advance the proposition that political integration will be made much easier if there are sizable and substantive linkage communities already in existence on either side of a partitioned society. Otherwise, forced political amalgamation of two political systems with little or nonexistent development of linkage groups will most likely lead to continuous conflicts and enduring tension among incongruent and divergent social and political forces.

By adopting a new perspective on the development of "linkage communities," we shall be able to uncover a new fertile ground in research, borrowing from various existing concepts and theories such as Karl W. Deutsch's "social communication," David Truman's "overlapping membership," Harold Guetzkow's "multiple loyalty," and James Rosenau's new construct of "value autonomy" and "interdependence" across system boundaries.¹²

As we are entering into a new "information society," where people are

¹²See Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level* (New York: Random House, 1954); Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*; Amitai Etzioni, *Political Integration* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965); David B. Truman, *The Government Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951); Harold Guetzkow, *Multiple Loyalty* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Center for Research on World Political Institution, 1955); James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); James N. Rosenau, "The New Global Order: Underpinnings and Outcomes" (Paper presented at the XV World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Buenos Aires, July 24, 1991); and James N. Rosenau, "Constitution Is a Turbulent World" (Paper presented at International Conference on the Unification of Multi-System Nations, co-sponsored by Vanguard Institute for Policy Studies and American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Taipei, September 27-29, 1991).

enjoying more direct and swift access to information and communications beyond national boundaries, and horizontal relations are replacing vertical power structures in social contacts and organizational frameworks, a new policy orientation is needed to tackle the problems of multi-system nations. Instead of allowing ourselves to get bogged down in the seemingly insoluble controversy over the issue of sovereignty, we should turn our attention to the development of a gradual but genuine process of functional integration of different systems wherein linkage groups¹³ are quietly and persistently in the process of formation.

Rather than leaving our future to the judgment of the top leaders and the executive branch of government, we should pay more attention to the wishes of the people and their representatives at various levels of legislative bodies. Businessmen, scientists, technicians, artists, school teachers, professional associations, labor unions, kinship associations, and religious groups should be allowed and encouraged to play a more important role in inter-system relations and functional integration.¹⁴ The experience of Germany's reunification and the development of the European Union provide ample evidence and support this line of policy thinking.


"Linkage Communities" in the Chinese Case: Analysis, Projections, and Policy Recommendations

By all accounts, cross-Strait relations have already entered an era of linkage-community formation and functional integration. According to data released by the Directorate General of Customs and Tourism Bureau, the percentage of exports to the United States in the ROC's total exports declined from 44.15 percent in 1987 to 23.65 percent in 1995. During the same period, the percentage of exports to Japan decreased from 13 percent to 11.79 percent, yet exports to Hong Kong increased from 7.68 percent to 23.39 percent, with

¹³On the concept of "linkage groups," see Karl W. Deutsch, "External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States," in *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, ed. R. Barry Farrell (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 5-26; also see Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level*. For an insightful discussion on the formation of communities and the interactions among them, see Talcott Parsons, "Order and Community in the International Social System," in *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1961), 120-29.

¹⁴See Yung Wei, "Let the Concept of 'Linkage Communities' Serve as a Vehicle to Break Through the Current Impasse in Cross-Strait Relations," *Lianhe bao* (United Daily News) (Taipei), June 19, 1996, 11.

Figure 2
Percentage of Exports by Destination (1987-95)




Source: *Taiwan Statistical Data Book, Taiwan, Republic of China* (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, 1996).

many of the goods directed to mainland China. As for tourism, the percentage of Taiwanese tourists to Japan decreased from 27.87 percent to 9.8 percent and those to the United States, from 15.52 percent to 10.16 percent; yet, the percentage of Taiwan people traveling to Hong Kong increased from 18.4 percent in 1987 to 36.57 percent in 1995, with many of the visitors going to mainland China (see figures 2 and 3 as well as tables 1 and 2).¹⁵

From the data in aforementioned figures and tables, one may compute the actual size of the "linkage communities" in both Taiwan and mainland China. If one uses the number of Taiwanese-owned factories and companies on mainland China as the basis of computation, there are approximately 30,000 Taiwanese business operations on mainland China. If the average number of employees of these operations is twenty, then there are at least 600,000 employees of Taiwanese firms in mainland China. Furthermore, if

¹⁵For further discussion on the increasing interactions between the Chinese political systems, see Yung Wei, "Toward a New Framework of External Relations for the ROC in the Twenty-First Century: Between Oceanic and Continental Strategies," in Yung Wei, *Tupo* (Breakthrough, Creating a Future of Broad Perspective) (Taipei: Commercial Weekly Publishers, 1995), 319-23; for a broader discussion on the interplay of internal and external factors in cross-strait relations, see Yung Wei, "Democratization, Unification, and Elite Conflict," in *The Chinese and Their Future: Beijing, Taipei and Hong Kong*, ed. Zhi-ling Lin and Thomas W. Robinson (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1994), 213-40.

Figure 3
Percentage of ROC Tourists by Destination (1987-November 1995)



Source: Tourism Bureau, Ministry of Transportation and Communications.

Table 1
Extent of Taiwan's Trade Dependency on Mainland China, 1981-95

Unit: US\$ million

Year	Estimated Exports to Mainland China (1)	Mainland's Exports to Taiwan via Hong Kong (2)	Estimated Total Trade Between Mainland and Taiwan (3) = (1) + (2)	Taiwan's Total Exports (4)	Taiwan's Dependency on Cross-Strait Trade (5) = (3)/(4)
1981	384.8	75.2	460.0	43,810.8	1.05%
1982	194.5	84.0	278.5	41,092.7	0.68%
1983	201.4	88.9	290.3	45,409.8	0.64%
1984	425.5	127.8	553.3	52,415.5	1.06%
1985	986.8	115.9	1,102.7	50,827.7	2.17%
1986	811.3	144.2	955.5	64,043.0	1.49%
1987	1,266.5	288.9	1,555.4	88,662.1	1.75%
1988	2,242.2	478.7	2,720.9	110,340.2	2.47%
1989	3,331.9	586.9	3,918.8	118,569.3	3.31%
1990	4,394.6	765.4	5,160.0	121,930.4	4.23%
1991	7,493.5	1,125.9	8,619.4	139,038.8	6.20%
1992	10,547.6	1,119	11,666.6	153,477.1	7.60%
1993	13,993.1	1,103.6	15,096.7	162,022.1	9.32%
1994	16,002.5	1,858.7	17,861.2	178,415.4	10.01%
1995	19,433.8	3,091.4	22,525.2	215,259.9	10.46%

Sources: Hong Kong Customs Statistics (1996); Trade Statistics (Ministry of Finance, Republic of China, 1996).

Table 2
Approval and Entry of Mainland Chinese into Taiwan, 1988-96

Year	Approval	Entry	Percentage
1988	5	5	100
1989	75	59	79
1990	163	116	71
1991	274	204	74
1992	1,265	981	78
1993	3,978	3,365	85
1994	3,492	3,231	93
1995	4,605	3,785	82
1996	5,519	4,065	74
Total	19,376	15,811	81.78%

Note: The figures do not include overseas Chinese.

Source: Bureau of Entry and Exit, Ministry of the Interior, Republic of China.

we assume the average size of the families on mainland China to be four people, then there are almost 2,400,000 people on mainland China whose livelihood is linked with Taiwan's economy and society, hence constituting a "linkage community" to Taiwan.

In contrast to the 1.2 billion people on mainland China, 2.4 million may not seem to be a large percentage. However, since members of this linkage community are not evenly distributed throughout the whole of China, but concentrated in the coastal areas and in a few major commercial and industrial centers, the percentage of the population having ties with Taiwan can reach a rather high ratio in certain localities. Other than Taiwanese enterprises on mainland China, another measurement of the existence of "linkage communities" on both Taiwan and mainland China can be measured by the number of people visiting the other side of the Taiwan Strait. According to estimated figures released by both mainland China and Taiwan, at least 3 million people have visited mainland China since the ban on travel there was lifted in November 1987. Multiplying this figure by four, which is the average size of families in Taiwan, it reaches 12 million, which is exactly the total adult population of all of Taiwan. This means that the whole of Taiwan can be viewed as a "linkage community" to mainland China.

Looking from the mainland China side, there were 58,275 mainlanders visiting Taiwan in 1996, according to data released by the Mainland Affairs Council in 1997. Yet the estimated figure of accumulated number of visitors

is well beyond 100,000. Taking 100,000 as the basis of calculation and again multiplying that by four, we arrive at 400,000 people who either have visited Taiwan themselves or are members of families which have at least one member who has visited Taiwan. Another figure released by the Bureau of Entry and Exit, Ministry of the Interior shows that there are 15,811 approved visits by mainlanders to Taiwan since 1988. However, since most the approved visitors from the mainland are either owners or managers of business operations or directors of academic as well as governmental agencies, one really needs to multiply the 30,000 at least by ten, thus reaching the figure of 300,000. Both figures come quite close to show the actual number of people who have been affected in one way or another by mainlanders' visits to Taiwan. Since both cross-Strait trade and tourism are on the rise, one may safely predict that the size of the linkage communities will grow larger over time, thus paving the way for a gradual and peaceful integration of the two Chinese societies on either side of the Taiwan Strait.

All the above-mentioned figures also testify to one view: while relationships with the traditional oceanic nations remain important to the ROC on Taiwan, its real expanding relations are to be found with mainland China and eventually will expand to include Russia, Vietnam, North Korea, and Central Asia. Consequently, a mixed developmental strategy is needed for Taiwan's future. This strategy should include a continuous strengthening of traditional ties with countries such as the United States, Japan, Southeast Asia, and Europe, but will also develop forward-looking relations with mainland China, Russia, and other countries in continental Asia. Furthermore, in the absence of formal, political ties, functional and socioeconomic interchanges should be forged with all these areas.¹⁶

Looking to the future, several probable projections on cross-Strait relations can be made. First, as long as the PRC refrains from further use of force against Taiwan and continues to promote economic as well as cultural ties with Taiwan, there will be ample room for gradual social and economic integration leading to the development of "linkage communities" on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, which may pave the way for eventual political integration with or without the framework of a loose confederation.

¹⁶For a more detailed discussion of the concepts of oceanic and continental strategies, see Yung Wei, "Relations Between Taiwan and Mainland China" (Paper delivered at Multilateral Conference on East Asia: In Search of a New Order, co-sponsored by The Yomiuri Shimbun and The Gaston Sigur Center for East Asian Studies, The George Washington University, Tokyo, May 31-June 2, 1995).

On the ROC side, as long as its leaders adhere to the "one China" principle and avoid a legal separation of Taiwan from China, there will always be the possibility of developing some conceptual frameworks under which the question of national unification and international recognition may be resolved.¹⁷ Despite the seeming incongruence between the ROC's "one nation, two entities" concept and the PRC's "one country, two systems" policy, there indeed exist certain common features which can be further explored for mutual accommodation. The "eight-point" statement issued by PRC President Jiang Zemin and the "six-point" response from President Lee Teng-hui testify to the gradual expansion of elasticity between the two sides.

Furthermore, the PRC may eventually come to the conclusion that depriving the ROC of all its diplomatic ties may not be in Beijing's interest, since this strategy may lead to a complete isolation of the Taiwan region, which will only add fuel to the appeal of the independence movement on Taiwan (see figure 4). The best that can happen, therefore, is for the PRC and ROC to reach a tacit or overt understanding that improvement of cross-Strait relations and expansion of external relations of the two political systems in China are not "zero-sum" games (see figure 5). If Beijing can tolerate Taipei's external relations to a limited extent, Taipei will have more confidence in dealing with Beijing, which may eventually lead to the formation of a loose confederation by the two Chinese political systems across the Taiwan Strait in a "multi-system nation" framework along with the formation of various linkage groups and communities in each other's territories.


In the opinion of this author, unless both sides of the Taiwan Strait are unified by force, "multi-system nations" and "linkage communities" are probably the only workable concepts which still preserve the notion of "one Chinese nation" on the one hand, yet allow either side to gain international recognition without violating the principle and goal of eventual national reunification on the other. By most estimations, the current division between the two Chinese political systems probably will last well into the twenty-first century.¹⁸ Under this situation, the concepts of "multi-system nations" and

¹⁷For a proposal in redefining the ROC's foreign policy goals, see Yung Wei, "Needed: A Forward-Looking Perspective and Pragmatic External Policy for the Republic of China" (Paper delivered at the Conference on the Republic of China and the United Nations, Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, New York, October 25-26, 1993). Also see Yung Wei, "A New World Perspective for the Republic of China," *Issues & Studies* 28, no. 7 (July 1992): 1-24; also see Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, eds., *Taiwan in World Affairs* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994). For suggestions to strike a balance between cross-Strait relations and expansion of international relations, see an interview of this author in "Time to Clarify the One-China Principle," *Free China Review* 46, no. 3 (March 1996): 21-26.

¹⁸For a projection of Taiwan's future in the twenty-first century, see Yung Wei, "The Interplay

Figure 4

International Personality of the Chinese Political Systems: A Paradigm



Source: Yung Wei, "Unification or Separation: Assessment of Relations Between the Two Chinese Political Systems Through the Concept of Multi-System Nations" (Paper delivered at the Conference on China's Constitutional Systems: Convergence or Divergence, Columbia University, New York, April 29, 1994).


"linkage communities" may serve both as theoretical constructs to help explain the existing reality and as an intellectual tool projecting and prescribing possible policy options.

Having discussed the cross-Strait relations between the two Chinese political systems and the application of the concepts of "multi-system nations" and "linkage communities" to the solution of cross-Strait relations, we may now proceed to a discussion of the basic strategies which the PRC and the ROC may employ to deal with developments in cross-Strait relations and international politics.

On the PRC side, if the leaders in Beijing still wish to preserve the possibility of eventually reunifying the two Chinese political systems, they

Between Taiwan's Internal and External Environments to 2020: A Contingency Analysis," in *Development in Taiwan to 2020: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations and U.S. Policy*, ed. Karen M. Sutter, with Paul H. B. Godwin and Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr. as co-rapporteurs (Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1996), 3-22.

Figure 5
Map of Interactive Relationship Between Cross-Strait Relations and Diplomatic Relations



Source: Yung Wei, "Unification or Separation: Assessment of Relations Between the Two Chinese Political Systems Through the Concept of Multi-System Nations" (Paper delivered at the Conference on China's Constitutional Systems: Convergence or Divergence, Columbia University, New York, April 29, 1994).

should think hard on its short-range, middle-range, and long-range policies regarding the Taiwan issue. The worst that can happen to Beijing is for it to find that because of misjudgment and miscalculation, its policy toward Taiwan has led to the heightening of resistance and hostility among the Taiwan populace against the mainland, an increase of support for the separatist cause on the island, and a deepening of involvement of international elements, notably the United States, in determining the future of Taiwan. The recent missile tests and military exercises conducted by Beijing in the Taiwan Strait may have had the effect of dampening the fever for Formosan independence in Taiwan, but they also had negative effects both on the international image of Beijing and the unfavorable attitudes of the Taiwan people toward the mainland regime.

As for the ROC government, the recent crisis in the Taiwan Strait brought about unprecedented international attention to, and concern for, the

security and the process of democratization on Taiwan. It also led to the sailing of American aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait. Hence it may be concluded that Taipei has harvested certain short-term gains from the recent military crisis, yet whether American intervention in the cross-Strait crisis will remain a positive element in Taiwan's long-term security interests against a sustained military build-up in the mainland is a question without a clear answer. With U.S. President Bill Clinton openly declaring "constructive engagement" rather than "containment" policy toward Beijing, it would be wise for the leaders in Taipei not to adopt excessively confrontational policies on the diplomatic front, such as the push for UN membership and ROC leaders' visits to countries with no formal ties to the ROC,¹⁹ although efforts in joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) and in maintaining formal bilateral ties are still a *sine qua non* for Taipei.

With the above scenarios in mind, the following policy recommendations for the preservation of peace in the Taiwan Strait are suggested, pending possible functional integration of the two systems in the Chinese setting in the future:

1. Both the ROC and the PRC should develop an overall strategy for long-term development and adaptation, simultaneously incorporating domestic political development, cross-Strait relations, and external relations.

2. The ROC should adopt only a transitional model and strategy in dealing with the issues of cross-Strait relations, neither pushing for quick reunification with mainland China nor pursuing legal separation or independence for Taiwan, but building linkage communities within a "multi-system nation" framework.

3. The current situation in China should be defined as "one Chinese nation, two Chinese political systems." Both systems are international personalities in their relations with other states but relations between the two systems are not international; rather, they are special relations regulated by negotiated agreements.

4. Apply the concept of "multi-system nations" to the handling of the issues of national unification and recognition, asserting that there is only

¹⁹For an overall discussion on USA-ROC relations under the Clinton administration, see Yung Wei, "USA-ROC Relations: Parameters and Variables" (Paper delivered at European Symposium on "The Republic of China on Taiwan in International Politics" sponsored by the Institute for the Relations of Europe with Non-European Areas, Research Unit on China and East Asia, European Academy, Otzenhausen, Germany, November 15-17, 1996); also see Yung Wei, *Taiwan Strait Crises and Taipei-Washington-Beijing Relations*, to be published by the Atlantic Council of the United States, December 1997.

"one sovereignty" in China but "two de facto jurisdictions" across the Taiwan Strait. Both sides can enter into diplomatic relations with every country in the world and join all international organizations so long as they recognize the separate jurisdictions, not sovereignties, of the two Chinese systems.

5. Strengthen oceanic ties, but rule out the pursuance of Taiwan's independence; expand relations with mainland China but avoid premature political negotiations before conditions are ripe; and encourage and enlarge trade, scientific, technological, and cultural ties across the Taiwan Strait as a precondition for functional integration.

6. The ROC government should redefine its priorities in foreign policy goals, making the maintenance and expansion of bilateral ties as the foremost important policy priority, followed by participation in the WTO, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and other governmental international organizations; and reevaluate efforts in rejoining the United Nations, with possible changes of emphasis to the UN's specialized agencies, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

7. With the assurance from Taipei that it will not pursue Taiwan independence or any forms of "nation-building," Beijing should modify its policy of complete isolation of the ROC on Taiwan. To put it in more concrete terms, the PRC should consent or at least tolerate the ROC's efforts to maintain bilateral ties with a limited number of countries coupled with memberships in certain financially and economically-oriented international organizations. In addition, the PRC should discontinue its policy of depriving the ROC of consular relations, since this deals only with nonpolitical ties and focuses on economic and cultural transactions.

8. Both sides should endeavor to resume, with as little delay as possible, bilateral talks under the "one China" principle, but allow either side to define the content of "one China" themselves.

Finally, some suggestions can be made regarding U.S. policy toward the two political systems within China. So far, the U.S. government has handled its policy toward mainland China and Taiwan with pragmatism and prudence. This author concurs with the U.S. position to continue maintaining a "one China" policy, but at the same time I must point out the term "one China" should not be the equivalent to "the PRC," but a "Chinese nation" more or less defined in historical, geographic, and cultural terms. Within this Chinese nation, there exist two political entities which should be both recognized by the international community before China's eventual reunification.

Furthermore, the author believes that it is in the interest of the United States to avoid playing a role either as a third party pushing for political unifi-

cation of the two Chinese systems or to become an overt or covert supporter for Taiwanese separatist movements aiming at independence. It will serve the interest of all the parties concerned to see to it that the Chinese people on either side of the Taiwan Strait have ample time and room to work out solutions to their own problems without undue outside influence and interference.