# Constructing an Alternative International Order: Bridging History, Community, and Globalization*

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**Abstract:**

The field of international relations has witnessed a mushrooming of new theoretical constructs in tackling the problems of international reality. Whether one applies realism, liberalism, neo-functionalism, structuralism, constructivism, post-modernism, or dependency theory, one thing is clear: We are still living in a world regulated by the norms developed originally in Western Europe. Yet the various concepts and rules developed in the West, including sovereignty, nation-state, and modern diplomacy, have not been able to prevent large scale international warfare and widespread internecine conflicts within various nations.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the "international system" in Pre-modern Asia, encompassing China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, in order to see whether an alternate international system did exist in pre-20 century Asia; and then to ponder the implication of the rules and interaction patterns among members of the Asian international system to modern international society under increasing impact of globalization. A combination of historical, globalization, and community-oriented analysis will the major mode of explication of this paper.

# Constructing an Alternative International Order:
## Bridging History, Community, and Globalization

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The 44th ISA Convention is held under the shadow of a war between the United States and Iraq.   On the surface, it seems that it is an unavoidable military confrontation between a superpower determined to rid of a hostile state in the Middle East region and an unyielding regional power dedicated to maintain its independence and state goals.   Yet a deeper examination of the nature of conflict between the United States and Iraq would lead us to discover that it is actually a confrontation between the Anglo-American socio-cultural system on the one hand and the world wide Arab communities on the other.   A US victory over Iraq may temporarily resolve the confrontation between the superpower and the regional power; but it most likely will not bring to an end the fundamental animosity between Anglo-American alliance and the Arab world.

The purpose of the paper is to highlight the shortcoming of the idea of sovereign state and the weakness of the existing international system by reviewing the history of the Confucianist international order in East Asia, by investigating the phenomenon of the "linkage community," and by examining the changing attitude of the people of Taiwan toward the state, the local community, and the international community.   It is the hope of this author that through the above intellectual exercise, we can come to the realization that many of the problems of toady actually are rooted in the state system and the international system composed by the so-called sovereign states.

The international system we have today has been developed from the inter-state system of Western Europe after the end of the Thirty Years' War in 1648.   Central to the inter-state system in Western European countries after 1648 has been the concept of sovereignty.   A sovereign state enjoyed exclusive right to represent that state in the international community.   It also exercises complete control over domestic affairs within that state.   Other states cannot interfere with the domestic matters of other states.   Along with the idea of sovereignty, there is the assumed

legal "equality" among states.[1]

In addition to the key concept of sovereignty, another two accepted, though not always openly acknowledged, principles are the right of the state to use force as a means to protect its national interest and the anarchical nature of the international system. As a result, despite repeated efforts to prevent and restrain the use of force in inter-state conflicts, war has been a constant reality in this international system. Bigger states never hesitate to apply military force to achieve their national goals. Only the weaker states try to use international law to protest their national interest which often failed to bring about concrete results. With the expansion of European colonial power to the rest of the world, this system of inter-state intervention based upon the concept of sovereignty states and the resultant privilege of the states to use force as an instrument to fulfill their national goals have gradually become the norms for other non-European countries.

After more than 350 years of operation, the shortcomings of Western-European type of inter-state system have become obvious. First, there have been almost ceaseless warfares among states with tremendous loss of human lives and properties. With the development of nuclear weapons, the total destruction of human society as well as the planet on which we reside is not a remote possibility. Second, the suppression of minority groups by the state in the name of maintaining sovereignty and territorial integrity. Third, the intervention by superpowers into the internal affairs of weaker states in the name of protecting human rights or persevering democracy against undemocratic leaders or government.

With the above observations in mind, I propose that we should explore the possibility of developing an alternate international system by looking into the history of the Confucianist international system that had been in existence in Asia for almost two thousand years. In addition, I also suggest that we should examine the new transnational and cross-system phenomenon of "linkage community." Finally, I propose that we probe the evolving phenomenon of globalization through which

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[1] K. J. Holsti, *International Politics, A Framework for Analysis*, 6th ed. (Englewood, N.J.: Simon & Schutter, 1992), pp. 35-45; K. J. Holsti, *Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

people in many countries identity increasingly with their own local community and the international community; and decreasingly with the state.

## I. People, Family, Community, State, and the Civilized World: The Confucianist Idea of the Political System and the International Order

Contrary to the Western European Inter-state system that focused on the concept of "Sovereignty," the Chinese Confucianist world order emphasized the right way of ruling the country by benevolent ruler according to the teachings of Confucius. According to research conducted by various scholars, an "inter-state system" existed in China as early as in 700 B.C.[2] Whether one can agree with the observation that the co-existence of various political systems in Ancient China approximates the modern inter-state may be subject of intellectual debate. Yet there has been repetitive unification and division in the three thousand year history of China is an established fact.

Beginning with the Han Dynasty (202 B.C. to 220 A.D.), a Chinese Confucianist "International System" gradually took shape. At the center of this system was Zhong-guo (The Middle Kingdom) with the Chinese Emperor as the highest ruler. Within the territories of the Middle Kingdom, there were two different types of administrative units: one was the counties and prefectures residing by Han Chinese; another was the special region inhabited by non-Han minority groups. The Chinese Emperor dispatched officials to rule the counties and prefecture directly but appointed tribal chieftains to practice self-rule in the minority areas.

Surrounding the Middle Kingdom were tributary states whose rulers were granted the titled of kings or dukes by the Chinese Emperor. These tributary states paid respect to the Chinese Emperor by sending emissaries with tributes to the Chinese court which usually were rewarded with gifts from the Chinese Emperor that usually was worth more than that of the tributes presented to China. As late as Cheng Dynasty (1644-1912), the

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[2] See Gerald Chan, "The Origin of the Inter-State System: The Warring states in Ancient China," *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (January/February, 1999), pp. 147-166; and Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, "The Emergence and Demise of Nascient Constitutional Rights: Comparing Ancient China and Early Modern Europe," *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (2001), pp. 373-403.

tributary states of China included Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Nepal and many states in Southeast Asia as well as in central Asia. It was not until 1895 when China was defeated by Japan in a war in which China came to the protection of a tributary state -Korea- that this Confucianist international system came to an end.

Several distinct features of this Chinese international system deserve some discussion. First of all, the foremost binding factor of the tributary system was the sharing of Confucianist idea of the State. In this type of state, the basic unit was not the "citizen," but the "people." The "people" was a natural entity defined by blood, culture, and membership in the community. In fact, the Chinese term for "state," "guo chia," means "national family" if translated literally. Consequently, one's relations with the "state" in the Chinese setting is through the family, the community, and gradually ascending to the state and finally to "Tien-Hsia" (The World).

In addition to the culturally oriented nature of the state and inter-state relations, another unique feature of the Chinese world-view has been the awareness of the repetitive cycles of the unification and division of the Chinese political system. An examination of the history of China and Korea led to the discovery that in both nations, division and unification have been a repetitive and almost cyclical process. The more than three-thousand-year history of China has witnessed 25 dynasties of which many were periods of division. Likewise, Korea as a nation of long history and rich culture also has experienced periods of unity and divisions. Both China and Korea, for instance, had the so-called "Three Kingdoms," though of different time periods.

If one computes the percentage of all the years wherein China was in the period of division, it would come up with 37.14% of the 3124 years of the continuously recorded Chinese history. (see table 1) No wonder there is the saying in China: "In terms of the state of the Tien-hsia (under the Heaven or empire), division will eventually lead to unification；and unification, to division." Another noticeable feature of the Chinese unification-division process has been the repetitive patterns of geographical demarcation of various political systems in China. (see maps 1, 2, 3) After a thorough examination of the dynastical changes in the Chinese history, this author was able to develop a flow chart to illustrate and predict the rise and downfall of political systems in the Chinese setting. (see Figure 1)

Table 1
# A Chronological Table on the Unification and Division of China (1122 B.C. to 2002 A.D.)

| Period of Unification | Period of Division |
|---|---|
| **Chou (Western Chou)**(1122-771 B.C.) | |
| | **Eastern Chou** (770-249 B.C.) |
| | **The Epoch of Spring and Autumn** (722-481 B.C.) |
| | **Warring States** (403-221B.C.) |
| **Chin** (221-202 B.C.) | |
| **Han (Western Han)** (202 B.C.-9 A.D.) | |
| **Han (Eastern Han)** (9-220 A.D.) | |
| | **Three Kingdoms** (220-280 A.D.) |
| **Tsin (Western Tsin)** (280 or 265-317 A.D.) | |
| | **Eastern Tsin** (317-420 A.D.) |
| | **North and South Dynasties** (420-590 A.D.) |
| **Sui** (590-618 A.D.) | |
| **Tang** (618-906 A.D.) | |
| | **Five Dynasties** (907-960 A.D.) |
| **Sung (Northern Sung)** (960-1126 A.D.) | |
| | **Southern Sung** (1127-1279 A.D.) |
| **Yuan** (1260-1368 A.D.) | |
| **Ming** (1368-1644 A.D.) | |
| **Ch'ing** (1644-1912 A.D.) | |
| | **Republic of China** (1912 A.D.-) |
| | **People's Republic of China** (1949 A.D.-) |
| Years of Unification: 1963 years 62.84% of total years | Years of Division: 1161 years 37.14% |

Drawn by Yung Wei in March 20, 1974 and updated in May 17, 2002, according to data in Dun Li, *The Ageless Chinese, A History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965), pp. 562-568.

**Map 1: Minority Areas of China**

黃　河　國

Yellow River

中

江

長　Yangtze

台灣

Minority areas
drawn by Yung Wei

**Map 2: Core Area of China**

Core

Drawn by Yung Wei,
according to map in Albert
Herrmann, An Historical
Atlas of China (Chicago,
Aldine, 1966, p.4)

**Map 3: Map of The Three Kingdoms**

Wei

Shu　　Wu

Drawn by Yung Wei,
according to map in Albert
Herrmann, *An Historical
Atlas of China* (Chicago,
Aldine, 1966, p.13)

Source: Yung Wei, "*The Division and Unification of Chinese Political Systems*,"
Asian Forum (Taipei, 1974).

# Figure 1
## The Process of Unification and Division of China:
## A Flow-Chart Illustration



Source: Yung Wei, "*The Divisions and unification of Chinese Political Systems*," <u>Asian Forum</u>, (Taipei, 1974).

Several outstanding findings have been resulted from the above investigation. First, while China had long ago developed an international system of its own, it did not employ either the concept of "nations state" nor the idea "of sovereignty" in handling inter-"state (system)" relations among the political systems within China. The term "Guo" actually meant not the "sovereign state" in the western sense but a political and territorial unit within the Chinese cultural sphere.

Based upon the historical lesson deriving from the Confucianist world order, I would like to strongly recommend that we learn from the past history of both China and Korea and try to employ different approaches to deal with inter-system relations on the one hand and those with other states on the other. On the relations between the ROC and PRC, I would like to make the following prescriptions and recommendations:

1. The situation between the ROC and PRC is not the separation of China into two states in the Western sense, but is a part of the repetitive patterns of divisions and unifications of traditional China.

2. Since the Cross-Taiwan Strait situation is a new phase of the above-mentioned process, the relations between the ROC and the PRC are not the relations between two sovereignty states, but between two Chinese political systems in which delineation of sovereignty has never been an issue.

3. Since sovereignty belong to the original nation (state)—China—, both the ROC and the PRC have *de facto* and temporarily separated jurisdictions under one ***shared*** sovereignty.

4. Relations between the ROC and PRC should not be handled by international law, but by special agreements between the two sides; relations of the two Chinese systems with other states, however, employ international law.

5. "One-China" does not refer either to the ROC or to the PRC but to the "historical, cultural, and geographical China" that has been in existence for thousands of years.

## II. The "Linkage Community": An Alternate Mode of Inter-state and Inter-system interaction

Other than the existence of Chinese Confucianist international system, another growing phenomenon that may serve as alternate mode of transnational interaction is the existence of "linkage community." This is especially true in the relations between different parts of a divided nation. What I mean by "linkage community" refers to the process of informal but functional interactions between the people of different political systems through travel, trade, cultural exchanges and other type of cross-system interactions (see Figure 2). Thus the "linkage communities" point to the existence of a group of people who have had such extensive social, cultural, commercial, or other types of contacts with the people and society of the opposite system that they have developed an understanding, sensitivity, and empathy with the people and society across system boundaries. People who belong to this type of "linkage community" not only have higher contacts with individuals and groups across boundary lines, they also keep close contact with people of similar orientation and experience within their own political system.

The higher the percentage of people belonging to the "linkage Community" in two different states or on each side of a partitioned society, or multi-system nation, the less likely the possibility of inter-system military confrontation and the more likely the achievement of functional integration which may eventually lead to peaceful political unification. By this definition, USA and Canada is a typical "transnational linkage community" while Taiwan and Mainland China have been moving toward to an "intra-national linkage community."

To put into more precise and empirical terms, one can identify and measure the size of "linkage communities" in either part of a partitioned society by examining the number and percentages of people who have traveled to the other side, have business contacts or establishment across the system boundaries, or maintain substantial social, cultural, as well as academic ties with individuals or groups in the opposite system.

Figure 2
The Concept of "Linkage Community":
A Heuristic Model

Community A

Community B

Trade and Investments

Lingkage

Tourism

Lingkage

Community to

Cultural Exchange

Community to

Community B

Scientific Exchange

Community A

*Developed and drawn by Yung Wei, May 1996.

Once we set our mind to the phenomenon of "linkage communities" in a multi-system nation, a new perspective in empirical research and new orientation for policy-making will emerge. Instead of focusing our attention on the role of the state, the problems of sovereignty, the decisions of the elite, the legal process, and the political structure, one shall turn his attention more to the orientation of the population, the development of shared values and norms between people of different systems, the direction of deliberation and debate in the representative bodies at the central and local levels, and the overall volume as well as intensity of actual interaction of individuals and groups between the two political systems within a partitioned society.

With the above perspectives in mind, I would like to advance the proposition that political integration will be made much easier if there are sizable and substantive linkage communities already in existence on either side of a partitioned society. Otherwise, forced political amalgamation of two political systems with little or non-existent development of linkage groups will most likely lead to continuous conflicts and enduring tension among incongruent and divergent social and political forces.

By adopting a new perspective on the development of "linkage communities", we shall be able to uncover a new fertile ground in research, borrowing from various existing concepts and theories such as Karl W. Deutsch's "social communication," David Truman's "overlapping membership," Harold Guetzkow's "multiple loyalty," and James Rosenau's new construct of "value autonomy" and "interdependence" across system boundaries. [3]

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[3] See Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level*, *op. cit.*; K. W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication, An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality*, *op. cit.*; Amitai Etzioni, *Political Integration* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965); David B. Truman, *The Government Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951); Harold Gustzkow, *Multiple Loyalty* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Center for Research on World Political Institution, 1955); James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); J. N. Rosenau, " The New Global Order Underpinnings and Outcomes," (paper presented at the XVth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Buenos Aires, July 24, 1991) and J. N. Rosenau, "Constitution is a Turbulent World," (paper presented at International Conference on the Unification of Multi-System Nations, co-sponsored by Vanguard Institute for Policy Studies and American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Taipei, Republic of China, September 27-29, 1991).

As we are entering into a new "information society" and as people are enjoying more direct and swift access to information and communication beyond national boundaries, and as horizontal relations are replacing vertical power structures in social contacts and organizational frameworks, a new policy orientation is needed to tackle the problems of multi-system nations.   Instead of allowing ourselves to get bogged down in the seemingly insoluble controversy over the issue of sovereignty, we should turn our attention to the development of a gradual but genuine process of functional integration of different systems wherein linkage groups[4] are quietly and persistently in the process of formation.

Rather than leaving our future to the judgment of the top leaders and the executive branches of government, we should pay more attention to the wishes of the people and their representatives at various levels of legislative bodies.   Businessmen, scientists, technicians, artists, school teachers, professional associations, labor unions, Kinship associations, and religious groups should be allowed and encouraged to play a more important role in inter-system relations and functional integration.[5] The experience of Germany's reunification and the development of European Union provide ample evidence and support this line of policy thinking.

## III. "Linkage Communities" in the Chinese Case: A Pre-testing of Basic Hypotheses

By all accounts, cross-Taiwan-Straits relations have already entered into an era of linkage-community formation and functional integration. According to data released by the Custom Office and Bureau on Tourism, the percentage of export to the United States in the total export of the ROC has declined from 44.12% in 1987 to that of 23.47% in 2000. During the same period, the percentage of export to Japan decreased from 13.01% to 11.19%, yet export to Hong Kong increased from 7.66% to 21.13%, mainly to Mainland China.   As for tourism, the percentage of

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[4] On the concept of "linkage group," see Karl W. Deutsch " External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States," in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, ILL.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 5-26; also see K. W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level* (New York: Random House, 1954); for an insightful discussion on the idea of the formation of communities and the interactions among them, see Talcott Parsons, " Order and Community in the International Social System," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, (New York: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 120-129.

[5] See Yung Wei, " Let the Concept of 'Linkage Communities' to Serve as a Vehicle to Breakthrough the Current Impasse in Cross-Taiwan-Strait Relations," <u>United Daily News</u> (June 19, 1996), p. 11.

Taiwanese tourists going to Japan decreases from 27.87% in 1987 to 10.99% in 1999; those to U.S.A., from 15.52% to 8.6%; yet the percentage of people of Taiwan traveling to Hong Kong increases from 18.47% in 1987 to 29.87% in 1999, again mainly to Mainland China.[6] (See Figure 3 and 4 as well as Table 2)

From the data in afore-mentioned figures and tables, one may compute the actual size of "linkage communities" both in Taiwan and on Mainland China. If one uses the number of Taiwanese-owned factories and companies on Mainland China as the basis of computation, there are approximately 30,000 Taiwanese business operations on Mainland China. If the average number of employees of these operations is twenty, then there are at least 600,000 employees of Taiwanese firms on Mainland China. Furthermore, if we assume the average size of the families on Mainland China is four, then there are almost 2,400,000 people on Mainland China whose livelihood is linked with the economy and society of Taiwan, hence constituting a "linkage community" to Taiwan.

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[6] For further discussion on the increasing interactions between the Chinese political systems, see Yung Wei, "Toward a New Framework of External Relations for the ROC in the 21st Century: Between Oceanic and Continental Strategies," in Yung Wei, *Tu-Po* (*Breakthrough, Creating a Future of Broad Perspective)* (Taipei: Commercial Weekly Publishers, 1995), pp. 319-323; for a broader discussion on the interplay of internal and external factors in cross-Taiwan-Strait relations, see Yung Wei, "Democratization, Unification, and Elite Conflict," in *The Chinese and Their Future: Beijing,, Taipei and Hong Kong*, edited by Zhi-ling Lin and Thomas W. Robinson (Washington, DC: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1994).

Figure3 Percentage of Exports by Destination (1987~2000)

Source：*Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2001* (Taipei：Council for Economic Planning & Development)

# Figure 4  Percentage of R.O.C. Tourists by Destination (1987~1999)



Source: Tourism Bureau, Ministry of Transportation and Communication, 2000.

## Table 2  Extent of Trade Dependency on Mainland China

Unit: US$ million.

| Year | Estimated Exports to Mainland China (1) | Mainland's Exports to Taiwan via Hong Kong (2) | Estimated Total Trade Between Mainland and Taiwan (3)=(1)+(2) | Taiwan's Total Exports (4) | Taiwan's Dependency on Cross-Strait Trade (5)=(3)/(4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1981 | 384.8 | 75.2 | 460.0 | 43,810.8 | 1.05% |
| 1982 | 194.5 | 84.0 | 278.5 | 41,092.7 | 0.68% |
| 1983 | 201.4 | 88.9 | 290.3 | 45,409.8 | 0.64% |
| 1984 | 425.5 | 127.8 | 553.3 | 52,415.5 | 1.06% |
| 1985 | 986.8 | 115.9 | 1102.7 | 50,827.7 | 2.17% |
| 1986 | 811.3 | 144.2 | 955.5 | 64,043.0 | 1.49% |
| 1987 | 1,266.5 | 288.9 | 1,555.4 | 88,662.1 | 1.75% |
| 1988 | 2,242.2 | 478.7 | 2,720.9 | 110,340.2 | 2.47% |
| 1989 | 3,331.9 | 586.9 | 3,918.8 | 118,569.3 | 3.31% |
| 1990 | 4,394.6 | 765.4 | 5,160.0 | 121,930.5 | 4.23% |
| 1991 | 7,493.5 | 1,125.9 | 8,619.4 | 139,038.9 | 6.20% |
| 1992 | 10,547.6 | 1,119.0 | 11,666.6 | 153,477.0 | 7.60% |
| 1993 | 13,993.1 | 1,103.6 | 15,096.7 | 162,152.7 | 9.32% |
| 1994 | 16,002.5 | 1,858.7 | 17,861.2 | 178,398.0 | 10.01% |
| 1995 | 19,433.8 | 3,091.4 | 22,525.2 | 215,208.8 | 10.46% |
| 1996 | 20,727.3 | 3,059.8 | 23,787.1 | 218,312.1 | 10.95% |
| 1997 | 22,455.2 | 3,915.4 | 26,370.6 | 236,505.3 | 11.15% |
| 1998 | 19,840.9 | 4,110.5 | 23,951.4 | 215,247.6 | 11.13% |
| 1999 | 21,312.5 | 4,522.2 | 25,834.7 | 232,280.8 | 11.12% |
| 2000 | 25,029.5 | 6,223.3 | 31,252.8 | 288,291.4 | 10.84% |

Source: *Trade Statistics between Taiwan and Mainland China (2001,1)* by Mainland Affairs Council, R.O.C., 2001.

In contrast to the 1.2 billion people on Mainland China, 2.4 million may not be a big percentage. Yet since members of this linkage community are not eventually distributed throughout the whole China, but concentrated in the coasted areas and in a few major commercial and industrial centers, the percentage of population having ties with Taiwan can reach rather high portion. Other than Taiwanese enterprises on Mainland China, another measurement of the existence of "linkage communities" on both Taiwan and Mainland China can be measured by the number of people visiting to the other side of the Taiwan Strait. According to the estimated figure released by both Mainland China and Taiwan, there have been at least 3 million people who have visited Mainland China since the ban of travel there was lifted. Multiplying this figure by four that is the average size of families in Taiwan, it reaches 12 million. This is exactly the number of the total adult population of whole Taiwan. That means, the whole Taiwan can be viewed as a "linkage community" to Mainland China!

Looking from the Mainland-China side, according to data released by ROC's Mainland Affair Council, up to April 2001, a total of 608,841 mainlanders have visited Taiwan. Taking 608,841 as the basis of calculation and again multiply that by four, we arrive at 2,435,364 mainlanders who either have visited Taiwan themselves or are members of families which have at least one members who have visited Taiwan. Since both cross-Strait trade and tourism are on the rise, one may safely predict that the size of the linkage communities will grow larger over time, thus paving the way for a gradual and peaceful integration of the two Chinese societies on either side of the Taiwan Strait.

In order to further test the hypotheses of Linkage Community, this author decided to go beyond analysis of aggregate data on cross-Taiwan-Strait relations. In mid-November, 2001, an island-wide opinion survey was conducted by this author in Taiwan; using direct telephone interview, and employing an questionnaire designed by this author, a total 1,070 adult individuals of 20 years old or older were interviewed. The results strongly support the hypothesis that the more an individual have cross-Strait interaction, the more he or she will have positive attitude toward inter-system integration and unification.

As data in Table 3 clearly demonstrate the more frequently a person travels to Mainland China, the better impression he will have of Mainland China. (see Table 3)   This is especially true for the Taiwanese population who has been to Mainland China for more than seven times. Frequency of Mainland China by residents of Taiwan also led to more positive assessment to the likelihood of social and economic integration between Taiwan and Mainland China.   More than 78% of the people of Taiwan who have traveled to Mainland believe that there will be social integration between Taiwan and Mainland China (see Table 4), whereas 87% of the same group believe there will be economic integration between the two in the future. (see Table 5)

A final test on the impact of cross-Taiwan Strait interaction on inter-system relations is to be found on the relationship between cross-Strait travel and attitude of the Taiwanese population toward political unification.   Data in Table 6 clearly demonstrate that the more an individual travels to Mainland China, the more likely he will have a positive attitude toward national reunification.   This is especially true among those who have traveled to Mainland China more than 7 times. (see Table 6)

## III. State, Community, and the International Community: Changing Foci of Identification in the Globalization Process.

With the arrival of the information age and global community, peoples of the world are increasingly involved both in the local community wherein they reside as well as in the cross-national world-community with which they have almost monthly or even daily contact through international travel, email, and internet.   In this process of "glocalization," the state has become progressively both as an abstract notion yet at the same time as an obstructive system to personal freedom and welfare; the former is in term of personal experience of visualization; the latter is in the forms of various obligatory as well as restrictive state institutions such as taxation, compulsory military service, and passports. As a result, an increasing number of scholars have started to re-evaluate

# Table 3

## Frequency of Travel to Mainland China and Impression of Mainland China

| Frequency of Travel to Mainland China | Impression of Mainland China | | | | | | | | Total (N) | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Very good | Good | All right | A bit no good | Not good | Very bad | Hard to say | Refuse answer | | |
| Reside both on Mainland and Taiwan | 0% | 12.5% | 25% | 0% | 25% | 37.5% | 0% | 0% | 8 | 100% |
| 15 times | 17.4% | 13% | 21.7% | 4.3% | 21.7% | 8.7% | 13% | 0% | 23 | 100% |
| 7 to 14 | 4.8% | 19% | 52.4% | 0% | 4.8% | 14.3% | 4.8% | 0% | 21 | 100% |
| 4 to 6 | 1.8% | 21.8% | 43.6% | 12.7% | 10.9% | 5.5% | 3.6% | 0% | 55 | 100% |
| 3 times | 1.8% | 14.5% | 47.3% | 5.5% | 14.5% | 7.3% | 9.1% | 0% | 55 | 100% |
| 2 times | 1.4% | 16.2% | 51.4% | 13.5% | 8.1% | 6.8% | 2.7% | 0% | 74 | 100% |
| Once | 2.7% | 8% | 43.4% | 8% | 15% | 9.7% | 12.4% | 0.9% | 113 | 100% |
| Never to Mainland | 1.3% | 6.6% | 47% | 10.3% | 11.6% | 7.9% | 14.5% | 0.8% | 709 | 100% |
| Can't remember | 8.3% | 0% | 41.7% | 8.3% | 16.7% | 0% | 25% | 0% | 12 | 100% |

# Table 4

## Frequency of Travel to Mainland China
## and Attitude toward Social Integration with Mainland China

| Frequency of Travel to Mainland China | **Attitude toward social integration** | | | | | | | Total (N) | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Integration together | Getting closer over time | Maintain status quo | Moving apart over time | Separate completely | Don't know | Refuse answer | | |
| Reside both on Mainland and Taiwan | 0% | 37.5% | 25% | 12.5% | 0% | 12.5% | 12.5% | 8 | 100% |
| 15 times | 26.1% | 52.2% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 21.7% | 0% | 23 | 100% |
| 7 to 14 | 38.1% | 28.6% | 14.3% | 4.8% | 0% | 9.5% | 4.8% | 21 | 100% |
| 4 to 6 | 12.7% | 45.5% | 18.2% | 7.3% | 7.3% | 9.1% | 0% | 55 | 100% |
| 3 times | 14.5% | 36.4% | 25.5% | 7.3% | 3.6% | 12.7% | 0% | 55 | 100% |
| 2 times | 12.2% | 41.9% | 27% | 4.1% | 1.4% | 13.5% | 0% | 74 | 100% |
| Once | 16.8% | 44.2% | 10.6% | 4.4% | 3.5% | 20.4% | 0% | 113 | 100% |
| Never to Mainland | 11.7% | 40.9% | 19% | 8.6% | 2.8% | 16.1% | 0.8% | 709 | 100% |
| Can't remember | 25% | 41.7% | 8.3% | 8.3% | 0% | 8.3% | 8.3% | 12 | 100% |

# Table 5

## Frequency of Travel to Mainland China
## and Attitude toward Economic Integration with Mainland China

| Frequency of Travel to Mainland China | Attitude toward economic integration | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Integration together | Getting closer over time | Maintain status quo | Moving apart over time | Separate completely | Don't know | Refuse answer | Total (N) | % |
| Reside both on Mainland and Taiwan | 12.5% | 25% | 37.5% | 0% | 0% | 25% | 0% | 8 | 100% |
| 15 times | 34.8% | 52.2% | 4.3% | 4.3% | 0% | 4.3% | 0% | 23 | 100% |
| 7 to 14 | 33.3% | 47.6% | 4.8% | 9.5% | 0% | 4.8% | 0% | 21 | 100% |
| 4 to 6 | 20% | 36.4% | 18.2% | 3.6% | 10.9% | 10.9% | 0% | 55 | 100% |
| 3 times | 14.5% | 49.1% | 10.9% | 9.1% | 0% | 14.5% | 1.8% | 55 | 100% |
| 2 times | 13.5% | 50% | 10.8% | 6.8% | 0% | 17.6% | 1.4% | 74 | 100% |
| Once | 23% | 40.7% | 10.6% | 2.7% | 1.8% | 20.4% | 0.9% | 113 | 100% |
| Never to Mainland | 15.7% | 43% | 12.4% | 7.9% | 3% | 17.2% | 0.8% | 709 | 100% |
| Can't remember | 8.3% | 66.7% | 0% | 16.7% | 0% | 8.3% | 0% | 12 | 100% |

# Table 6

## Frequency of Travel to Mainland China and Attitude toward Unification

| Frequency of Travel to Mainland China | The sooner The better | Status quo and then unification | Status quo | Status quo and then separation | Separation forever | Don't know | Refuse answer | Total (N) | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Attitude toward Unification** | | | | | | | | | |
| Reside both on Mainland and Taiwan | 25% | 25% | 12.5% | 12.5% | 12.5% | 12.5% | 0% | 8 | 100% |
| 15 times | 21.7% | 47.8% | 17.4% | 4.3% | 0% | 8.7% | 0% | 23 | 100% |
| 7 to 14 | 14.3% | 47.6% | 28.6% | 4.8% | 0% | 4.8% | 0% | 21 | 100% |
| 4 to 6 | 7.3% | 45.5% | 23.6% | 9.1% | 5.5% | 9.1% | 0% | 55 | 100% |
| 3 times | 3.6% | 38.2% | 40% | 3.6% | 5.5% | 9.1% | 0% | 55 | 100% |
| 2 times | 6.8% | 47.3% | 20.3% | 9.5% | 4.1% | 9.5% | 2.7% | 74 | 100% |
| Once | 5.3% | 42.5% | 27.4% | 8% | 5.3% | 10.6% | 0.9% | 113 | 100% |
| Never to Mainland | 3.2% | 35.5% | 30.5% | 9.2% | 6.1% | 14.5% | 1% | 709 | 100% |
| Can't remember | 16.7% | 8.3% | 25% | 16.7% | 0% | 25% | 8.3% | 12 | 100% |

the role of the state and the rules of international law.[7]

In order to measure the impact of globalization on national identification and community orientation on empirical basis, I have designed an hypothetical model on the relationship among socio-economic background, cross-national travel, perception of future, and national identification. (see Figure 5)    It is hypothesized that:

(1) The younger a person is, the more likely he or she is inclined to "community" and "international community" orientation vis-à-vis state orientation.

(2) The more educated a person is, the more he or she will be identified with "local community" and the "international community."

(3) The more foreign travel a person has made, the more likely he or she will identify with the "local community" and "international community" and less identified with the state.

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[7] For analysis on the abroad conceptual problems surrounding the issues relating to community developing, nationalism, ethnicity, sovereignty, globalization, and inter-system conflict, see Effrat, Marcia Pelly. (ed.), *The community: approaches and applications* (New York : Free Press ; London : Collier Macmillan, [1974]); Poplin, Dennis E. *Communities : a survey of theories and methods of research* (New York: Macmillan, c1979, 2nd ed); Anderson, Benedict. *Imagine Community: Reflections on the Origins and the Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (London: Verse, 1991.); Bloom, William. *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Campbell, John R. and Alan Rew (eds.), *Identity and affect : experiences of identity in a globalising world* (London ; Sterling, Va. : Pluto Press, c1999); Enloe, Cynthia H. "Ethnicity, the State, and the New International Order," in J. F. Stack, Jr. (ed.), *The Primordial Challenge: Ethnicity in the Contemporary World* (New York: Greenwood, 1986); Guibernau, Montserrat. *Nationalisms: the nation-state and nationalism in the twentieth century* (Cambridge, MA : Polity Press, 1996); Holton, R. J. *Globalization and the nation-state* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire : Macmillan Press ; New York : St. Martin's Press, c1998); Jordan, Bill. *The state: authority and autonomy* (Oxford [Oxfordshire] : Blackwell, 1985); Levine, Andrew. *The end of the state* (London : Verso, 1987); Kelman, Herbert. "Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System: A Social-Psychological Analysis of Political Legitimacy," in J. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1999); Mayall, James. *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Rosenau, James. *Turbulence in World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Shaw, Martin. *Theory of the global state: globality as an unfinished revolution* (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2000); Waever, Ole, et al. *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993); Yamaguchi, Kaoru (ed.) *Sustainable global communities in the information age: visions from futures studies* (Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 1997); Horng-luen Wang, "How 'Transnational' Are We? Some Speculations on the Nationalist Reality and World Society," paper prepared for presentation at "New Cultural Formations in an Era of Transnational Globalization," Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, October 6-7, 2001; and Chih-yu Shih, *Civilization Conflict and China* (Taipei: Wu-nan Publisher, 2000).

Figure 5

Community Participation, Development Prospect, and National
Identity: A Hypothetical Model for Research Design



With a grant from the National Science Council of the Republic of China, this author was able to conduct a telephone sample survey in the Taiwan region during the period of December 31, 2002 to January 1, 2003. The results largely support all the above-mentioned hypotheses. When asked "what is your most identified institution or object?" 274 respondents, or 23.78% of the sample (1152) chose "the state (of the Republic of China);" 52.78% chose "the society and people of Taiwan;" and 14.32% chose "the whole world and whole human race." When asked to rank the importance of "the state," "the community," and "the world," the results are: "the state (ROC)": 36.98%; "the society and people of Taiwan": 27.69% and "the whole world and human race": 19.44%.

When we cross-tabulate the socio-economic background of the respondents and their attitudes towards national identification, it becomes clear that the younger a person is, the more likely he or she is more likely to identified with the local Taiwanese community and the international community, and the less with the "state." Likewise, the more educated a person is, the more likely he or she will identified with the local community and the international community. (see table 7, 8) Similar relationships also exist in the socio-economic background of the people

of Taiwan and their ranking of importance of the "state, community, and the international community." (see table 9, 10)

When cross-tabulating a person's frequencies of foreign travel as well as his projection of his own future and that of his family, it was discovered that the more a person has traveled to other countries, the more he or she will identify with the local community and the international community, and less with the state. Likewise, the more optimistic a person is in his or her projection of the future, the more he or she will identify with the local community and the international community. The more pessimistic a person is with his future, the more he will identify with the state.

The above-mentioned findings of the survey research on Taiwan have shed important light on the process of globalization and national identification. From the responses of the Taiwan population, the increasing cross-national contrast among people of different countries clearly have led to more identification both with the local community as well as the international community at the cost of identification with the state. "Glocalization," indeed, is not just an abstract concept, but an proven empirical fact in my research on Taiwan. One may even conclude that identification with the "state" is the loser's game. It is the older, less educated, and lack-of-confidence people who would chose to identify with the state.

## V. History, Community and Globalization: Conclusion and Suggestion for Further Research

From the analysis of the history of the Confucianist world order, the phenomenon of the "Linkage Community," and the responses of the people of Taiwan to the process of globalization, several tentative conclusions may be derived

First, the sovereign-state oriented Western-European international system may not be the only type of international system that we must have. Historical precedents may help us contemplate what kind of alternative international system that we might have which are more geared to basic human needs on the one hand and is able to reduce human conflicts on the other.

## Table 7
### When asked "Which of the following is the object you are most identified with?" what will be your choice?

| Age | The State | The society and people of Taiwan | The whole world and human race | Other choice | Not sure | Total (N) | (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20-34 | 22.30% | 51.79% | 20.00% | 0.25% | 5.64% | 390 | 100% |
| 35-49 | 23.11% | 56.28% | 15.07% | 0.00% | 5.52% | 398 | 100% |
| 50 and above | 26.25% | 50.83% | 7.26% | 0.27% | 15.36% | 358 | 100% |

$x^2$=67.38553; df=12; p<0.00000

## Table 8
### When asked "Which of the following is the object you are most identified with?" what will be your choice?

| Education | The State | The society and people of Taiwan | The whole world and human race | Other choice | Not sure | Total (N) | (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| College | 25.17% | 51.50% | 19.86% | 0.23% | 3.23% | 433 | 100% |
| Senior high | 23.82% | 54.45% | 15.44% | 0.00% | 6.28% | 382 | 100% |
| Junior high | 30.06% | 51.74% | 9.79% | 0.00% | 8.39% | 143 | 100% |
| Elementary | 15.73% | 54.49% | 2.80% | 0.56% | 26.40% | 178 | 100% |

$x^2$=124.97217; df=12; p<0.00000

## Table 9
### Of the following categories, which one is the most important?

| Age | The State | The society and people of Taiwan | The whole world and human race | Not sure | Total (N) | (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20-34 | 20.51% | 51.02% | 22.05% | 6.41% | 390 | 100% |
| 35-49 | 24.62% | 53.01% | 15.82% | 6.53% | 398 | 100% |
| 50 and above | 30.44% | 38.82% | 8.93% | 21.78% | 358 | 100% |

$x^2$=107.44185; df=9; p<0.00000

## Table 10
### Of the following categories, which one is the most important?

| Education | The State | The society and people of Taiwan | The whole world and human race | Not sure | Total (N) | (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| College | 25.40% | 52.19% | 18.01% | 4.38% | 433 | 100% |
| Senior high | 24.08% | 50.78% | 18.58% | 6.54% | 382 | 100% |
| Junior high | 34.26% | 42.65% | 14.68% | 8.39% | 143 | 100% |
| Elementary | 19.66% | 35.39% | 5.61% | 39.32% | 178 | 100% |

$x^2$=188.51802; df=9; p<0.00000

Second, the growing trend toward "linkage community" constitutes both a challenge to the state system on the one hand yet provide ample room for conflict resolution in cross-national and cross-system interactions on the other.   We should seriously deliberate therefore that in addition to the formal-legalistic mechanism of state relations, there ought to be other devices or norms that will allow interaction between people of different communities who have evolved increasingly toward "linkage community."

Third, the process of globalization definitely has led to a re-orientation of people's attitude toward the state, the community, and the international community.   The findings of my Taiwan survey amply prove this point.   How can the international law community respond to this fact and construct new rules to handle the demand for autonomy by different communities within a state deserves attention and action from the international jurists.[8]

More research is needed, therefore, on the empirical facts on the changing rule of the state, community, and the international community so as to ascertain future trends of development.   In the meantime, more efforts should be made in constructing new rules and norms to regulate the behavior of the states as well as the functioning of the existing international system so as to reduce both human sufferings and ecological decay.

-End-

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[8] For more elaboration on this point, see Yung Wei, "Recognition of Divided States: Implication and Application of Concepts of 'Multi-System nations,' 'Political Entities,' and 'Intra-National Commonwealth,'" *International Lawyer*, Volume. 34, Number 3 (Fall 2000), pp. 997-1101.