State, Nation, and Autonomy:
Conflict Resolution and the "Linkage Communities"*

By

Yung Wei
Professor of Political Science
National Chiao-tung University
Hsin-chu, Taiwan
Republic of China
ywei@cc.nctu.edu.tw

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Abstract:

The existence of divided nations and peoples has always been a thorny problem in domestic and international politics. Yet with the process of globalization, inter-system interaction between different societies and political systems have led to the emergence of what this author has called "linkage communities" in various systems which have contributed to the ease of tension between the divided systems and societies. The international community, however, is slow in developing proper ways in dealing with different parts of a divided nation as well as in recognizing the importance of the emerging phenomenon of "linkage communities". This paper calls attention to this problem and argues that autonomy and jurisdiction, not statehood and sovereignty, are the key elements for peaceful resolution of the problems between different parts of a divided nation. Both new empirical paradigms and legal norms should be developed to effectively deal with both the phenomena of divided nations as well as "linkage communities."

Keywords: autonomy; linkage community; divided nation; multi-system nation; jurisdiction; intra-national commonwealth; glocalization

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As the world enters into the 21st century, the idea of the state and the notion of "community" as well as "nation" have assumed new content and implications. What we have witnessed has been the development of an accelerated process of globalization propelled by rapid mode of communication and transportation on the one hand, yet coupled with an increasing tendency toward political fragmentation in many parts of the world on the other. The crumbling of the communist systems has not brought about global peace as many of us originally had anticipated. Instead, serious and prolonged conflicts along ethnic as well as religious line have been created in the Balkan Peninsula, Middle East, and Central Asia. The attack by extremist terrorists against the United States in New York and Washington is a painful reminder of our failure in developing mechanisms that can adequately handle international and intra-national conflicts.

Other than the Balkan Peninsula and the Middle East, other potential areas of military conflicts include the India sub-continent, the Korea Peninsula, and the Taiwan-Strait. In one way or another, these countries and areas share certain common features that have contributed the conflict-prone situation. Among theses features are: (1) history of political division or partitioning; (2) large scale of inter-system migration and refugees; (3) creation of minorities and (4) aspiration of non-state system either for unification or division through peaceful or violent means.

It is the purpose of this paper to address to the problems of the divided nations and people by going beyond international-relations analysis and by adopting a multi-disciplinary approach, borrowing various conceptual schemes of comparative politics, sociology, economics, psychology, and international law. It is my hope that by taking a multi dimensional perspective as well as by embracing an interdisciplinary approach, a newer and deeper understanding of the nature of the conflicts created by political division and partitioning can be

obtained.

1. Analyzing Political Partitioning: The Need for a Multi-dimensional Paradigm

The need to investigate political partitioning, migration, minorities, and non-state nations as interrelated research topics or even as a single research problem was resulted from the realization among scholars engaging in research on each of the related topics that in order to fully understand and explain the problem in their own research topic, they must also examine the problem in other related areas.[1] For instance, one cannot really understand the problem of the partition of the sub-continent of India into the state of India and Pakistan (and later the separation of East Pakistan from the rest of Pakistan) without also acquiring an understanding of the problem of the Muslim minorities in India, the migration of huge numbers of population during and after the division of the sub-continent into several states, and the aspiration of the people of Bengal to have an independent state of their own separated from West Pakistan.

Likewise, the Palestinian question cannot be fully understood without a simultaneous investigation into: (1) The phenomenon of a highly cultivated and motivated group of people who have been minorities in various parts of the world and yet have managed to have kept alive for thousands of years their aspiration for the "restoration" or the "re-establishment" of a sate of their own; (2) The emergence of the state of Israel and the dislocation of a large number of Arabs in the neighboring states；(3) The demand of the restoration or the establishment of an Arab state in all or part of today's Israel; (4) The emergence of a sizeable number of Palestinian minorities in many of the Arab states and their influence in the domestics of these states as well as in the international society.

There are essentially two ways to perceive the subject matter.

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[1] See Yung Wei, "Political Partitioning, Migration, Minorities, and Non-state Nations: A Manifesto and Research Note" in Yung Wei (ed.), "Political Partitioning, Migration, Minorities, and Non-State Nations: Models, Proposition, and Intellectual Exchanges," Comparative Interdisciplinary Studies Section, International Studies Association, working paper, No. 49. (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1975).

One way is to see them as the different facets of a *single* phenomenon. In other words, the various activities and events relating to political partitioning, migration, minorities, and non-state nations are so interwoven and overlapping with each other that they are, and ought to be treated as, a single phenomenon. An alternative way is to treat these topics as separate but highly interrelated phenomena each having an identifiable boundary of activities and events of their own. Conceptually I am inclined to regard the various problems under consideration as different dimensions of a single phenomenon, i.e., the existence of a group or groups of people who want to change the status quo either by relocating themselves or by uniting with another group of people with whom they share more common characteristics or by separating themselves from the dominating group with whom they have little empathy and mutual identification.

Yet in dealing with the practical problem of conducting empirical research, it seems to be necessary for us to treat the problems of political partitioning, migration, minorities, and non-state nations as conceptually separated from each other so that we may derive testable propositions on the relationships between sets of concepts relating to each of the problem areas. In terms of model-building, we may select one of the problem areas as the dependent variable and consider others as independent or intervening variables. For instance, we may view migration as a dependent variable and examine how migration in different parts of the world has been affected by the act of political partition and unification, the status of minorities, and the appeal and activities of the non-state nations.

Figure 1

Political division, Migration, Minorities, Non-State Nations, and Inter-system Conflict: A Heuristic Model*

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                        ┌──────────────┐
                        │ Creation of  │
                        │ Minority     │──────────┐
                    ↗   │ groups       │          ↘
                   /    └──────┬┬──────┘
  ┌────────────┐ /            ↑↓            ┌──────────────┐
  │ Acts of    │/      ┌──────────────┐     │ Demands or   │    ┌──────────────┐
→ │ Division or│──────→│ Migration    │────→│ aspiration   │──→ │ Conflicts    │
  │ Unification│\      │ (dislocation │     │ for changing │    │ among        │
  └────────────┘ \     │ of population│     │ the status   │    │ national and │
                  \    └──────┬┬──────┘     │ quo          │    │ international │
                   \         ↑↓             └──────────────┘    │ actors       │
                    ↘  ┌──────────────┐    ↗                    └──────────────┘
                        │ Emergence of │  /
                        │ non-state    │─/
                        │ nations      │
                        └──────────────┘
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Feedback

* Revised and updated from Yung Wei, "Political Partitioning, Migration, Minorities, and Non-State Nations: A Manifesto and Research Note" in Yung Wei (ed.), "Political Partitioning, Migration, Minorities, and Non-State Nations: Models, Proposition, and Intellectual Exchanges," Comparative Interdisciplinary Studies Section, International Studies Association, working paper, No. 49. (Pittsburgh: University Center for international Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1975).

A potentially fruitful theoretical exercise may be made by treating each of the problem areas as interdependent phenomenon having mutual influence in a feedback loop. Figure 1 represents an effort by this author toward this direction. The model suggests that the act of division or unification of a certain territorial unit tends to create the phenomenon of displaced population (refugees and minorities), the emigration or immigration of large numbers of people, and the existence of a significant group of people within or without a certain territorial boundary who aspire to establish a sate of their own. This leads to the emergence of demands for readjustment or abolishment of the existing arrangements at the national and international level, which in turn sows the seeds for future partitioning and unification movements.

2. The Concept of "Multi-System Nations": The Reason and Origin of Development

In order to clarify the problems facing the divided nations, this author coined in 1975 a new concept "multi-system nations" more than twenty years ago to illustrate more accurately the true nature of the so-called "divided nation," i.e., the co-existence of more than one political systems within one nation and not the creation of two or more nations or states within the original nation. More recently, in order to further examine the interaction patterns between different parts of a multi-system nation, this author put forth another new concept "linkage communities" to serve as an analytical and operational concept to investigate the relationship between different political systems within a divided nation.

While this author is investigating the various problems facing the multi-system nations, he has become increasingly aware of the inadequacy of the both state system and the codes of contemporary international law in dealing the various problems facing the divided states and peoples. Observing from different angles and using varied conceptual approaches as well as methods, many scholars including the author of this paper have arrived at the same conclusion: that is, both the state system as well as the international law as they exist today not only have become increasingly obsolete but also detrimental to the maintenance of peace

and security of the peoples of the world. In many cases, they have become the major sources of conflicts, suppression, and wars in past several centuries.

With the arrival of the information age and global community, peoples of the world are increasingly involved both in the local community wherein they resides as well as in the real cross-national world-community with which they have almost monthly or even daily contact through international travel, email, and internet. In this process of "glocalization," the state has become progressively both an abstract notion yet at the same time an obstructive system to personal freedom and welfare; the former is in term of personal experience of visualization; the latter is in the forms of various obligatory as well as restrictive state institutions such as taxation, compulsory military service, and passports. As a result, an increasing number of scholars have started to re-evaluate the role of the state and the rules of international law.[2]

It is against the above-mentioned background that the author of this paper decided to investigate the issue of the divided nation by

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[2] For analysis on the abroad conceptual problems surrounding the issues relating to community developing, nationalism, ethnicity, sovereignty, globalization, and inter-system conflict, see Effrat, Marcia Pelly. (ed.), *The community: approaches and applications* (New York : Free Press ; London : Collier Macmillan, [1974]); Poplin, Dennis E. *Communities : a survey of theories and methods of research* (New York: Macmillan, c1979, 2nd ed); Anderson, Benedict. *Imagine Community: Reflections on the Origins and the Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (London: Verse, 1991.); Bloom, William. *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Campbell, John R. and Alan Rew (eds.), *Identity and affect : experiences of identity in a globalising world* (London ; Sterling, Va. : Pluto Press, c1999); Enloe, Cynthia H. "Ethnicity, the State, and the New International Order," in J. F. Stack, Jr. (ed.), *The Primordial Challenge: Ethnicity in the Contemporary World* (New York: Greenwood, 1986); Guibernau, Montserrat. *Nationalisms: the nation-state and nationalism in the twentieth century* (Cambridge, MA : Polity Press, 1996); Holton, R. J. *Globalization and the nation-state* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire : Macmillan Press ; New York : St. Martin's Press, c1998); Jordan, Bill. *The state: authority and autonomy* (Oxford [Oxfordshire] : Blackwell, 1985); Levine, Andrew. *The end of the state* (London : Verso, 1987); Kelman, Herbert. "Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System: A Social-Psychological Analysis of Political Legitimacy," in J. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1999); Mayall, James. *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Rosenau, James. *Turbulence in World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Shaw, Martin. *Theory of the global state: globality as an unfinished revolution* (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2000); Waever, Ole, et al. *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993); Yamaguchi, Kaoru (ed.) *Sustainable global communities in the information age: visions from futures studies* (Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 1997); Horng-luen Wang, "How 'Transnational' Are We? Some Speculations on the Nationalist Reality and World Society," paper prepared for presentation at "New Cultural Formations in an Era of Transnational Globalization," Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, October 6-7, 2001; and Chih-yu Shih, *Civilization Conflict and China* (Taipei: Wu-nan Publisher, 2000).

re-examining the concepts of "nation," "state," "sovereignty," "jurisdiction," and the principle of recognition under international law. After a systematic examination of the various concepts and issues, this author proposes that autonomy and jurisdiction, not statehood and sovereignty, are the core questions facing the divided peoples and nations. Forced amalgamation and artificial partition will not solve the problems of the divided nations, especially if they are imposed on these nations by external forces. Likewise, endless seeking of statehood by all the sub-units of an original nation or state will only lead to more intra-national or international conflicts. Hence, the key to the solution or at least the lessening of the problems of the multi-system nations lies both in the re-examination the state system and in the respect of the "autonomy" of the various racial, cultural and political sub-groups within each of the multi-system nations as well as multi-nation states.

A survey or relevant literature has led to the discovery that comparative study of political partitioning and the divided nations has been a late development in political science. Existing research on divided nations and societies reveals two basic problems.[3] First, there is the lack of a commonly accepted term or concept that is neutral and precise enough to serve as an effective instrument for empirical research on the "divided nations." Second, there is a failure in differentiating two separate types of division and unification processes, i.e., those involving communist political systems and those not involving the confrontation between communist and non-communist systems such as the case in the Middle East and the India sub-continent..

As for basic concepts, a host of terms including "the partitioned

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[3] Juan Diez Medrano, *Divided Nations* (Ithaca:: Cornell University Press, 1995); Jaushieh Joseph Wu,. *Divided Nations: The Experience of Germany, Korea, and China* (Taipei, Taiwan, Rep. of China: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 1995); Gregory Henderson, *Divided Nations in a Divided World* (New York: D. McKay Co., 1974); Bruce R. Silvers, *The Divided Nations* (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University, 1966); Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965); Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integration Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community", in *The Integration of Political Communities*, ed. Jacob, Philip E. and James V. Toscano (Philadelphia; J. B. Lippincott, 1964); Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1953); Joseph S. Nye, "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement," *International Organization* 22, no. 4 (Autumn, 1968): 855-80; Stuart A. Scheingold, *The Law in Political Integration* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1971), and Henry R. Nau, "From Integration to Interdependence: Gains, Losses, and Continuing Gaps," *International Organization* 33, no. 1 (Winter, 1979): 119-47.

nations," "the divided states," "the divided nations," and "two China's (Korea's, Germany's)" has been used. All of these terms designate certain features of the "divided nations," yet none is accurate and broad enough to reflect and include all the cases. For example, the term "partitioned nations" can not be used to refer to countries which were divided not through international intervention or by international agreements but through internal war, such as the case of China after the end of the Second World War. The concept of "divided states" is broader than "partitioned nation," yet many of the leaders and scholars of the so-called "divided states" are very reluctant to accept the word "state" in the concept because it implies a more permanent separation of a nation into two or more legal entities under international law. Similarly, most of the leaders and people in the "divided states" resent terms such as "two China's," "two Korea's," and "two Germany's." As for "divided nations," it is a term used most often by social scientists; however, it also has the misleading connotation that there are two or more nations in a "divided" state – an idea that is unacceptable to most leaders and scholars of divided systems. For these reasons, I decided to coin a new term to refer to these nations and societies.

Efforts by this author in developing a new concept, "multi-system nations" can be traced back to the formation of a "Comparative and Interdisciplinary Studies Section" (CISS) within the International Studies Association (ISA) in 1969. As one of the co-founders of this research section within ISA, I was particularly interested in the complex problems of political partitioning which leads to a host of problems including refugees, migration, minorities, and non-state-nations. [4] As the coordinator of a workshop on "Political Partitioning, Migration, Refugees and Non-State Nations" within the CISS supported by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, I soon discovered that it is incorrect to call most of the partitioned nations "divided states." Based upon the finding of this workshop, I decided to coin a new term, "multi-system nations" in 1975, to define more accurately the situation.

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[4] The formation of a "Divided Nations Internet" in the Comparative and interdisciplinary Studies Section of the International Studies Association in l969 was a pioneering effort toward empirical study of divided systems and peoples. For some examples of the results of this intellectual endeavor, *see* Yung Wei (ed.), "Political Partitioning, Migration, Minorities, and Non-State Nations: Models, Propositions, and Intellectual Exchanges," (CISS working paper no. 49, University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1975) and Ray E. Johnston (ed.), *The Politics of Division, Partition, and Unification* (New York: Praeger, 1976).

The core of the new concept of "multi-system nations" rests on the emphasis that relations between different parts of a divided nation or people of different culture but are between different political systems of within a *single* nation. These competing systems try to deny international status of the other side despite the fact that both sides meet almost all the criteria of an independent state. By advancing the new concept of "multi-system nations," I propose that we preserve the idea of "one nation" but face the reality of the co-existence of two or more mutually separated political systems within that nation.[5] The logical derivations from this concept would be: "one nation, two systems;" "one sovereignty, two jurisdictions;" "one country, two international personalities."

3. Development in the Divided Nations After the Introduction of the Concept of "Multi-System Nations"

Developments in various so-called "divided states" following the coinage of the concept of multi-system nations more or less have corresponded to the analysis and predictions of the theory of "multi-system nations."[6] The "common roof (Dachtheoie) theory" developed in Germany largely echoes the idea of multi-system nations. By asserting the notion of one German nation, East Germany and West Germany managed to separate the issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction.

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[5] For further discussions by this author on the inception, development and policy impact of the concept of multi-system nations, see Wei Yung, "The Unification and Division of Multi-System Nations: A Comparative Analysis of Basic Concepts, Issues, and Approaches," (Paper delivered at symposium on Functional Integration of Divided Nations, Seoul, Republic of Korea, October 6-7, 1980); later published in *Multi-System Nations and International Law: The International Status of Germany, Korea, and China* , edited by Hungdah Chiu and Robert Downon (Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland, 1981). Also see the author's following papers: "Multi-System Nations Revisited: Interaction Between Theories and Realities" (Paper delivered at the International Conference on Unification of Multi-System Nations, Taipei, September 27-29, 1991). "Unification or Separation: Assessment of Relations between the Two Chinese Political Systems through the Concept of Multi-System Nations" (Paper delivered at the Conference on China's Constitutional Systems: Convergence or Divergence, Columbia University, New York, 29 April 1994); "Conceptual Schemes for Multi-System Nations and Inter-System Developments" (Paper delivered at Panel on System Integration of Divided Nations, XVI World Congress, International Political Science Association (IPSA), Berlin, 21-25 August 1994); and "From Integration to 'Intra-National Commonwealth': Towards Peaceful Resolution of Problems Facing Divided States", paper delivered at the panel on "Unification Issues in the 21st Century," (Research Committee 42 on System Integration of Divided Nations, 18th IPSA World Congress, Quebec, Canada, August 1-5, 2000).

[6] For an example of American international lawyers' taking note of the concept of "Multi-System Nation," see Gerhard Von Glahn, *Law Among Nations, An Introduction to Public International Law*, 7th ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996), suggested readings, pp. 64.

Sovereignty belongs to the abstract German nation while jurisdictions were clearly delineated between the Federal Republic of Germany and Democratic Republic of Germany. Consequently, both West and East Germany were able to be simultaneously recognized by other states as well as to join the international organizations including the United Nations without violating the "one German Nation" principle.[7]

In the case of the two Koreas, the application of "multi-system nations" theory has been more direct and encompassing.[8] Some officials and scholars, such as Prof. Hakjoon Kim, former special assistant to the President, openly described Korea as a "multi-system nation."[9] The December 1991 Communiqué between the representatives of North and South Korea almost completely adopted the concept of "multi-system nations" and clearly defined the situation in the Korean peninsula as two political systems co-existing in one Korean Nation. As a result, relations between the two Korean political systems are not international relations, but special relations to be regulated by specific agreements between the North and South. Today both North and South Koreas are members of the United Nations and enjoy dual recognitions in many

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[7] See Joyce Marie Mushaben, " A Search for Identity: The German Question in Atlantic Alliance Relations," *World Politics*, 40 (April 1988), pp. 395-417; and Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, "The Unification of Germany's Multi-System Nations: the Evolution of West Germany's Strategies," (paper delivered at International Conference on the Unification of Multi-System Nations co-sponsored by Vanguard Foundation and American Enterprise Institution, Taipei, Republic of China, September 27-29, 1991.

[8] See John H. Herz, "Korea and Germany as Divided Nations: The Systemic Impact," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1975), pp. 957-970.

[9] See Hakjoon Kim, "Korean Reunification: A Seoul Perspective on the Korean National Community Unification Formula as Seen Through the Various Concepts on the Unification on Multi-System Nations," (Paper presented at International Conference on the Unification on Multi-System Nations, Taipei, September 27-29, 1991).

capitals around the world.[10] (For a comparison of the Chinese and Korean situation, see Table 1)

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[10] See Hong Nack Kim, "The 'Two Koreas' Enter into the United Nations and the Implications for Inter-Korean Relations," *Korea and World Affairs* (Fall, 1991), pp. 397-413.

Table 1

The Separation and the Projects of Unification of China and Korea: A Comparative Paradigm*

made by Yung Wei

Nov. 15, 1997

	Chinese Case	**Korean Case**
Nature and Origin of Separation	Prolonged internecine warfare	International and inter-system military conflicts and negotiation
Original Position on National Reunification	Before l980s,complete rejection of the legitimacy of the opposing system; unification through replacement	Before 1973, complete rejection of the legitimacy of the opposing system; unification through replacement
Revised position on National Reunification	After 1980s, de facto acceptance of opposing regime, peaceful unification by stages for the ROC; PRC prefers peaceful unification but use of forces not ruled out.	After 1980s, gradual acceptance of each other's existence, leading to formal agreement on co-existence in Dec., 1991; conditional acceptance of the idea of confederation by North and South Korea in July, 2000.
Position toward International Recognition	The ROC side tolerates dual recognition since late 1980s; the PRC opposes all kinds of dual recognition	Dual and separate recognition, but still adhere to one-Korean-nation and community notion
Attitude toward International Organizations	The ROC side is for dual memberships in international organizations; the PRC is against it	Dual and separate memberships for all international organizations, including UN
Actual Interaction through trade, cultural exchanges and tourism	Extensive exchange of goods, people, and ideas occurred, with the ROC somewhat on the defensive side	Minimal trade and cross-boarder contacts; reunion of families in the North and South started in August, 2000.
Prospect of Peaceful Transition and Unification	Uncertain; acute crisis have subsided; but renew of para-military confrontation is possible if peaceful exchanges failed	Uncertain; large scale military confrontation still possible; ROK side seems to have the upper hand in long-term peaceful reunification

*This table was first published in Yung Wei, "'Multi-System Nations', 'Linkage Communities' and 'Intra-National Commonwealth': General Concepts on the Unification of Divided States and Their Application to the Chinese as well as Korean Cases," New Asia Vol. 4, No. 4(Seoul, Korea: Winter, 1997), revised and updated by the author on August 15, 2000.

As for the Chinese situation, leaders of the People's Republic of China (PRC) put forth the notion of "one country, two systems" some time around 1983, shortly after the concept of "multi-system nations" gained international recognition and caused debates in Taiwan. Despite repeated denials by the Beijing authorities, many scholars are of the opinion that before 1983, PRC leaders already were aware of the concept and its implication to the cross-Strait relation and to the diplomatic efforts of the ROC. Thus they have borrowed the idea but have skillfully adjusted the content of "multi-system nations" to suit their own political framework and purposes, i.e., the two *systems* in the "One Country Two System" scheme were merely socio-economic institutions without international personalities. Unquestionably, Beijing had both Hong Kong and Taiwan in mind when it put forth the "one-country-two-system" scheme.

In regard to the Republic of China, the inner circle of the ROC government basically concurred the concept of "multi-system nations" and actually called high-level meetings to discuss the implications of the concept to the cross-Strait situation as well as possible positive usage of the concept.[11] Enthusiastic and generally positive responses also came from the academic community in Taiwan. Only a few senior members of the Legislative Yuan (Parliament) voiced different opinions. Whatever the initial responses, the fact has been that since 1981, the official policy of the ROC government towards the cross-Taiwan-strait relations as well as toward international participation have steadily moved closer to the idea of "multi-system nations."

The Guideline for National Unification, for instance, advocates the concept of "one China" but allows the co-existence of two "political entities" within one China. The White Paper on Cross-Strait Relations released by the Mainland Affairs Council went further to formally declare that "one China" is a "historical, geographic, and cultural Chinese nation."[12] Within this nation, the two Chinese political entities are not foreign countries to each other; rather they are inter-system relations to be

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[11] For an insider's account of the deliberation process within the ROC Government of the possible application of the concept of multi-system nations, see Yung Wei, Two Koreas and Multi-System Nations," *History Monthly* (Sept. 2000), forthcoming.

[12] *Policy Paper on Cross-Taiwan-Strait Relations* (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 1994), p. 30.

regulated by agreements signed by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.   In their relations with other countries, however both the ROC and the PRC are fully-fledged international personalities. Hence, the idea   "one China, two entities" embedded in the Guideline for National Unification corresponds completely to the ideas of "multi-system nations" as defined by official ROC government policy. Responding to interpellation from members of the Legislative Yuan, Dr, Huang Kuen-hui, Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council of the Executive Yuan (Cabinet), openly acknowledged in 1992 that the content of the Guideline for National Unification indeed had borrowed the idea of "Multi-System Nations."[13]

It must be pointed out, however, that the release by former President Lee Teng-hui of the thesis of "Special state-to-state relations" to refer to cross-Taiwan-Strait situation was a blunt rejection of the "One China" concept and the Guideline of National Unification and was a serious setback in cross-Strait relations.   Fortunately, after Chen Shui-bian assumed the Office of the Presidency of the ROC, more moderate and restrained positions have been taken by the ROC Government.   Nevertheless, the reluctance of the new ROC government to openly acknowledge "One China" policy and the lack of desire of the PRC to give ROC more international space have led to the current deadlock in cross-Strait relations.

4. The concept of "linkage communities" and the prospects of "functional integration"

While the concept of "multi-system nations" has been applied in one way or another to the situations of all "divided nations" with varying degrees of success, it nevertheless still faces a number of problems in actual application.   Foremost among these problems has been the issue of overlapping claims of sovereignty and jurisdictions.   Usually the bigger and stronger side of a multi-system nation will impose sovereignty claims not only on the territories under its effective control but also on those parts which they do not control.   In the case of Korea, the formal agreement signed between North and South Korea in 1990 has not yet led

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[13] For an official view of the ROC position on the issue of national reunification, see Lien Chan, "A Pragmatic Strategy for China's Peaceful Reunification," *American Asian Review*, 14, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 97-107.

to the emergence of an integrated civil society. Hence it may be concluded that while agreements have been arrived at between the relevant authorities within a Multi-System-Nation and may help reduce tension between two sides, real political integration[14] is still far out of the picture.

The reasons are to be found that despite official endorsement of the principle of unifications and jurisdictions, there have not been active interactions and contacts between the people on the two sides of the Korean Peninsula. In contrast, the authorities in Peking and Taipei have not yet arrived at a commonly accepted framework for reunification, and yet the flow of people and goods across the Taiwan Strait has been far more intensive and extensive than between the two Koreas.

A third example illustrating the importance of informal, functional, people-to-people contact is in the case of East and West Germany. What we have witnessed here has been a continuous flow of people, goods, and information across the boundary long before formal and legal arrangements for reunification were achieved.[15] In fact, the societies of the two Germanys had already entered into rather extensive economic, cultural, and information exchanges that the two sides of Germanys had become somewhat "integrated" before it was politically "unified."

From the above comparison among the Chinese, Korean, and German cases, it has become clear that formal-structural arrangements are

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[14]For various discussions on the idea of functional integration, see Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957); Ernest B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965); Ernest B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pre-theorizing", *International Organization*, XXIV, 4, Autumn 1970; Leon N. Lindberg, "Political Integration As A Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement", *International Organization*, XXIV, 4, Autumn 1970; Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integration Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community", in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, (eds.), *The Integration of Political Communities*, (Philadelphia; J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964); James A. Caporaso and Alan L. Pelowski, "Economic and Political Integration in Europe: A Time-Series Quasi-Experimental Analysis", *American Political Science Review*, 65, 2, (June, 1975); Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1953); and Joseph S. Nye, "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement", *International Organization*, XXII, 4, (Autumn, 1968); Henry R. Nau, "From Integration to Interdependence: Gains, Losses, and Continuing Gaps", *International Organization*, 33, 1, (Winter, 1979);

[15] Kindermann, *op. cit.*

not as effective as informal and inter-personal contracts and interactions. Yet regretfully more often than not, one finds that analyses on the issues of the divided states are often too obviously state-oriented, elite-oriented, law oriented, and structure oriented, thus losing sight of the impact of interaction between the people, culture, and communities of different parts of a multi-system nation.

With a view to further identifying and highlighting his process of informal but functional interactions between the people of different political systems within a multi-system nation, I propose a new term, "linkage communities", to illustrate the actual process of functional integration within either side of a divided state (see Figure 2). What I mean by "linkage communities" is the existence of a group of people who have had such extensive social, cultural, commercial, or other types of contacts with the people and society of the opposite system that they have developed an understanding, sensitivity, and empathy with the people and society across system boundaries. People who belong to this type of "linkage community" not only have higher contacts with individuals and groups across boundary lines, they also keep close contact with people of similar orientation and experience within their own political system.

The higher the percentage of people belonging to the "linkage Community" on each side of a partitioned society, or multi-system nation, the less likely the possibility of inter-system military confrontation and the more likely the achievement of functional integration which may eventually lead to peaceful political unification.

To put into more precise and empirical terms, one can identify and measure the size of "linkage communities" in either part of a partitioned society by examining the number and percentages of people who have traveled to the other side, have business contacts or establishment across the system boundaries, or maintain substantial social, cultural, as well as academic ties with individuals or groups in the opposite system.

Figure 2
The Concept of "Linkage Community":
A Heuristic Model

Community A

Community B

Trade and Investments

Tourism

Cultural Exchange

Scientific Exchange

Lingkage
Community to
Community B

Lingkage
Community to
Community A

*Developed and drawn by Yung Wei, May 1996.

Once we set our mind to the phenomenon of "linkage communities" in a multi-system nation, a new perspective in empirical research and new orientation for policy-making will emerge. Instead of focusing our attention on the role of the state, the problems of sovereignty, the decisions of the elite, the legal process, and the political structure, one shall turn his attention more to the orientation of the population, the development of shared values and norms between people of different systems, the direction of deliberation and debate in the representative bodies at the central and local levels, and the overall volume as well as intensity of actual interaction of individuals and groups between the two political systems within a partitioned society.

With the above perspectives in mind, I would like to advance the proposition that political integration will be made much easier if there are a sizable and substantive linkage communities already in existence on either side of a partitioned society. Otherwise, forced political amalgamation of two political systems with little or non-existent development of linkage groups will most likely lead to continuous conflicts and enduring tension among incongruent and divergent social and political forces.

By adopting a new perspective on the development of "linkage communities", we shall be able to uncover a new fertile ground in research, borrowing from various existing concepts and theories such as Karl W. Deutsch's "social communication," David Truman's "overlapping membership," Harold Guetzkow's "multiple loyalty," and James Rosenau's new construct of "value autonomy" and "interdependence" across system boundaries. [16]

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[16]See Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level*, *op. cit*.; K. W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication, An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality*, *op. cit*.; Amitai Etzioni, *Political Integration* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965); David B. Truman, *The Government Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951); Harold Gustzkow, *Multiple Loyalty* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Center for Research on World Political Institution, 1955); James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); J. N. Rosenau, " The New Global Order Underpinnings and Outcomes," (paper presented at the XVth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Buenos Aires, July 24, 1991) and J. N. Rosenau, "Constitution is a Turbulent World," (paper presented at International Conference on the Unification of Multi-System Nations, co-sponsored by Vanguard Institute for Policy Studies and American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Taipei, Republic of China, September 27-29, 1991).

As we are entering into a new "information society" and as people are enjoying more direct and swift access to information and communication beyond national boundaries, and as horizontal relations are replacing vertical power structures in social contacts and organizational frameworks, a new policy orientation is needed to tackle the problems of multi-system nations. Instead of allowing ourselves to get bagged down in the seemingly insoluble controversy over the issue of sovereignty, we should turn our attention to the development of a gradual but genuine process of functional integration of different systems wherein linkage groups[17] are quietly and persistently in the process of formation.

Rather than leaving our future to the judgment of the top leaders and the executive branches of government, we should pay more attention to the wishes of the people and their representatives at various levels of legislative bodies. Businessmen, scientists, technicians, artists, school teachers, professional associations, labor unions, Kinship associations, and religious groups should be allowed and encouraged to play a more important role in inter-system relations and functional integration.[18] The experience of Germany's reunification and the development of European Union provide ample evidence and support this line of policy thinking.

5. "Linkage Communities" in the Chinese Case: A Pre-testing of Basic Hypotheses

By all accounts, cross-Taiwan-Straits relations have already entered into an era of linkage-community formation and functional integration. According to data released by the Custom Office and Bureau on Tourism, the percentage of export to the United States in the total export of the ROC has declined from 44.12% in 1987 to that of 23.47% in 2000. During the same period, the percentage of export to Japan decreased from

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[17]On the concept of "linkage group," see Karl W. Deutsch " External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States," in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, ILL.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 5-26; also see K. W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level* (New York: Random House, 1954); for an insightful discussion on the idea of the formation of communities and the interactions among them, see Talcott Parsons, " Order and Community in the International Social System," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, (New York: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 120-129.

[18]See Yung Wei, " Let the Concept of 'Linkage Communities' to Serve as a Vehicle to Breakthrough the Current Impasse in Cross-Taiwan-Strait Relations," <u>United Daily News</u> (June 19, 1996), p. 11.

13.01% to 11.19%, yet export to Hong Kong increased from 7.66% to 21.13%, mainly to Mainland China.   As for tourism, the percentage of Taiwanese tourists going to Japan decreases from 27.87% in 1987 to 10.99% in 1999; those to U.S.A., from 15.52% to 8.6%; yet the percentage of people of Taiwan traveling to Hong Kong increases from 18.47% in 1987 to 29.87% in 1999, again mainly to Mainland China.[19] (See Figure 3 and 4 as well as Table 2)

From the data in afore-mentioned figures and tables, one may compute the actual size of "linkage communities" both in Taiwan and on Mainland China.   If one use the number of Taiwanese-owned factories and companies on Mainland China as the basis of computation.   There are approximately 30,000 Taiwanese business operations on Mainland China.   If the average number of employees of these operations is twenty, then there are at least 600,000 employees of Taiwanese firms on Mainland China.   Furthermore, if we assume the average size of the families on Mainland China is four, then there are almost 2,400,000 people on Mainland China whose livelihood is linked with the economy and society of Taiwan, hence constituting a "linkage community" to Taiwan.

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[19] For further discussion on the increasing interactions between the Chinese political systems, see Yung Wei, "Toward a New Framework of External Relations for the ROC in the 21st Century: Between Oceanic and Continental Strategies," in Yung Wei, *Tu-Po* (*Breakthrough, Creating a Future of Broad Perspective)* (Taipei: Commercial Weekly Publishers, 1995), pp. 319-323; for a broader discussion on the interplay of internal and external factors in cross-Taiwan-Strait relations, see Yung Wei, "Democratization, Unification, and Elite Conflict," in *The Chinese and Their Future: Beijing,, Taipei and Hong Kong*, edited by Zhi-ling Lin and Thomas W. Robinson (Washington, DC: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1994).

Figure3 Percentage of Exports by Destination (1987~2000)

Source：*Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2001* (Taipei：Council for Economic Planning & Development)

Figure 4 Percentage of R.O.C. Tourists by Destination (1987~1999)

Source: Tourism Bureau, Ministry of Transportation and Communication,

Table 2   Extent of Trade Dependency on Mainland China

Unit: US$ million.

Year	Estimated Exports to Mainland China (1)	Mainland's Exports to Taiwan via Hong Kong (2)	Estimated Total Trade Between Mainland and Taiwan (3)=(1)+(2)	Taiwan's Total Exports (4)	Taiwan's Dependency on Cross-Strait Trade (5)=(3)/(4)
1981	384.8	75.2	460.0	43,810.8	1.05%
1982	194.5	84.0	278.5	41,092.7	0.68%
1983	201.4	88.9	290.3	45,409.8	0.64%
1984	425.5	127.8	553.3	52,415.5	1.06%
1985	986.8	115.9	1102.7	50,827.7	2.17%
1986	811.3	144.2	955.5	64,043.0	1.49%
1987	1,266.5	288.9	1,555.4	88,662.1	1.75%
1988	2,242.2	478.7	2,720.9	110,340.2	2.47%
1989	3,331.9	586.9	3,918.8	118,569.3	3.31%
1990	4,394.6	765.4	5,160.0	121,930.5	4.23%
1991	7,493.5	1,125.9	8,619.4	139,038.9	6.20%
1992	10,547.6	1,119.0	11,666.6	153,477.0	7.60%
1993	13,993.1	1,103.6	15,096.7	162,152.7	9.32%
1994	16,002.5	1,858.7	17,861.2	178,398.0	10.01%
1995	19,433.8	3,091.4	22,525.2	215,208.8	10.46%
1996	20,727.3	3,059.8	23,787.1	218,312.1	10.95%
1997	22,455.2	3,915.4	26,370.6	236,505.3	11.15%
1998	19,840.9	4,110.5	23,951.4	215,247.6	11.13%
1999	21,312.5	4,522.2	25,834.7	232,280.8	11.12%
2000	25,029.5	6,223.3	31,252.8	288,291.4	10.84%

Source: *Trade Statistics between Taiwan and Mainland China (2001,1)* by Mainland Affairs Council, R.O.C., 2001.

In contrast to the 1.2 billion people on Mainland China, 2.4 million may not be a big percentage. Yet since members of this linkage community are not eventually distributed throughout the whole China, but concentrated in the coasted areas and in a few major commercial and industrial centers, the percentage of population having ties with Taiwan can reach rather high portion. Other than Taiwanese enterprises on Mainland China, another measurement of the existence of "linkage communities" on both Taiwan and Mainland China can be measured by the number of people visiting to the other side of the Taiwan Strait. According to the estimated figure released by both Mainland China and Taiwan, there have been at least 3 million people who have visited Mainland China since the ban of travel there was lifted.   Multiplying this figure by four which is the average size of families in Taiwan, it reaches 12 million.   This is exactly the number of the total adult population of whole Taiwan.   That means, the whole Taiwan can be viewed as a "linkage community" to Mainland China!

Looking from the Mainland-China side, according to data released by ROC's Mainland Affair Council, up to April 2001, a total of 608,841 mainlanders have visited Taiwan.   Taking 608,841 as the basis of calculation and again multiply that by four, we arrive at 2,435,364 mainlanders who either have visited Taiwan themselves or are members of families which have at least one members who have visited Taiwan. Since both cross-Strait trade and tourism are on the rise, one may safely predict that the size of the linkage communities will grow larger over time, thus paving the way for a gradual and peaceful integration of the two Chinese societies on either side of the Taiwan Strait.

In order to further test the hypotheses of Linkage Community, this author decided to go beyond analysis of aggregate data on cross-Taiwan-Strait relations.   In mid-November, 2001, an island-wide opinion survey was conducted in Taiwan; using direct telephone interview, and employing an questionnaire designed by this author, a total 1,070 adult individuals of 20 years old or older were interviewed.   The results strongly support the hypothesis that the more an individual have cross-Strait interaction, the more he or she will have positive attitude toward inter-system integration and unification.

As data in Table 3 clearly demonstrate the more frequently a person travels to Mainland China, the better impression he will have of Mainland China. This is especially true for the Taiwanese population who has been to Mainland China for more than seven times. Frequency of Mainland China by residents of Taiwan also led to more positive assessment to the likelihood of social and economic integration between Taiwan and Mainland China. More than 78% of the people of Taiwan who have traveled to Mainland believe that there will be social integration between Taiwan and Mainland China (see Table 4), whereas 87% of the same group believe there will be economic integration between the two in the future. (see Table 5)

A final test on the impact of cross-Taiwan Strait interaction on inter-system relations is to be found on the relationship between cross-Strait travel and attitude of the Taiwanese population toward political unification. Data in Table 6 clearly demonstrate that the more an individual travels to Mainland China, the more likely he will have a positive attitude toward national reunification. This is especially true among those who have traveled to Mainland China more than 7 times.

One of the sensitive questions in Taiwan is whether the people in Taiwan still identify themselves as Chinese. Previous surveys on Taiwan have shown that there has been a gradual trend toward a lower rate of Taiwanese identifying as "Chinese." Yet this author has always suspected that this may have been due to erroneous survey methods that had been employed. Instead of asking the question "Are you 'Chinese.' 'Taiwanese,' or 'both Taiwanese and Chinese?' in a single question, this author chose to ask the question separately. The respondents were first asked the question: "Are you Taiwanese?" and then in a separate question, he is asked: "Are you Chinese?" By cross-tabulating the answers to these two questions, we have obtained a quite different result in Table 7. As data in Table 6 demonstrate, 71.5% of the Taiwanese people believe that they are both Taiwanese and Chinese; 24%, Taiwanese and not Chinese; 4.3%, Chinese and not Taiwanese; 0.2%, neither Taiwanese nor Chinese.

After cross-tabulating with age, education, and provincial origin, our data clearly shows that: (1) the younger a person is, the more he or

she will identify as being Chinese; (2) the higher a person's educational level is, the more he or she will regard himself or herself as Chinese; (3) the Min-nan group and Hakka group have lower identification as "Chinese," yet even the Min-nan group has 67.1% identifying themselves as "Chinese." (see Table 8, 9, 10, 11)

It must be pointed out however, that despite the fact that there is a general tendency toward a more positive attitude on integration as well as unification with Mainland among the more frequent travelers from Taiwan to the Mainland and that the majority of the people in Taiwan still identifying themselves as "Chinese", there has always been a very small percent of the Taiwanese population who would accept the "one country, two systems" formula offered by Beijing to Taipei as the model for unification. Hence it may be concluded that it is one thing for the Taiwanese people to have positive feeling toward Mainland China through the linkage community building process, yet it is quite a different matter for them to accept the political formula offered by Mainland China – a fact that deserves sober policy thinking ad reflection among leaders in Beijing.

6. Multi-System Nations, Linkage Communities, and Findings on Cross-Taiwan Strait Interactions: Implications for Other Divided Nations and Societies

Findings on the investigation of the cross-Taiwan-Strait situation by analyzing aggregate and survey data have rich implications for other divided nations, partitioned societies and dislocated peoples. What we have founded here is a concrete example of how an original unified nation was divided partially by civil war and partially by great power politics. As a result, the people in the political systems having different political ideologies as well as socio-economic systems have been compelled in one way or another the migration of certain portion of the original population to move to another area in the opposing system, thus creating both the problem of minorities and refugees.

The domestic politics in the Republic of China on Taiwan reflects the nature of a divided nation wherein one finds a migrant group, the mainlanders who migrated to Taiwan in 1949 after the Communist

takeover the Mainland, entered into competition with earlier immigrants, the local "Taiwanese," in the political arena. This situation is rather similar to Northern Koreans in South Korea and Northern Vietnamese in South Vietnam prior to reunification.

Furthermore, despite increasing socio-economic interaction between two sides of the Taiwan Strait, political integration thus far is made impossible not only by political authorities in Taipei and Beijing, but also by big power polities in the Western Pacific. Both Germany and Korea at one time or another face similar situation. Finally, the Chinese people on both side of Taiwan Strait share similar problem in the dichotomy of "the nation" vs. "the state." Whereas people on both sides still regard themselves as belong to the same "nation," they do not necessarily identify with the same "State."

Table 3

Frequency of Travel to Mainland China and Impression of Mainland China

Frequency of Travel to Mainland China	Impression of Mainland China								Total (N)	%
	Very good	Good	All right	A bit no good	Not good	Very bad	Hard to say	Refuse answer		
Reside both on Mainland and Taiwan	0%	12.5%	25%	0%	25%	37.5%	0%	0%	8	100%
15 times	17.4%	13%	21.7%	4.3%	21.7%	8.7%	13%	0%	23	100%
7 to 14	4.8%	19%	52.4%	0%	4.8%	14.3%	4.8%	0%	21	100%
4 to 6	1.8%	21.8%	43.6%	12.7%	10.9%	5.5%	3.6%	0%	55	100%
3 times	1.8%	14.5%	47.3%	5.5%	14.5%	7.3%	9.1%	0%	55	100%
2 times	1.4%	16.2%	51.4%	13.5%	8.1%	6.8%	2.7%	0%	74	100%
Once	2.7%	8%	43.4%	8%	15%	9.7%	12.4%	0.9%	113	100%
Never to Mainland	1.3%	6.6%	47%	10.3%	11.6%	7.9%	14.5%	0.8%	709	100%
Can't remember	8.3%	0%	41.7%	8.3%	16.7%	0%	25%	0%	12	100%

Table 4

Frequency of Travel to Mainland China
and Attitude toward Social Integration with Mainland China

Frequency of Travel to Mainland China	Attitude toward social integration								
	Integration together	Getting closer over time	Maintain status quo	Moving apart over time	Separate completely	Don't know	Refuse answer	Total (N)	%
Reside both on Mainland and Taiwan	0%	37.5%	25%	12.5%	0%	12.5%	12.5%	8	100%
15 times	26.1%	52.2%	0%	0%	0%	21.7%	0%	23	100%
7 to 14	38.1%	28.6%	14.3%	4.8%	0%	9.5%	4.8%	21	100%
4 to 6	12.7%	45.5%	18.2%	7.3%	7.3%	9.1%	0%	55	100%
3 times	14.5%	36.4%	25.5%	7.3%	3.6%	12.7%	0%	55	100%
2 times	12.2%	41.9%	27%	4.1%	1.4%	13.5%	0%	74	100%
Once	16.8%	44.2%	10.6%	4.4%	3.5%	20.4%	0%	113	100%
Never to Mainland	11.7%	40.9%	19%	8.6%	2.8%	16.1%	0.8%	709	100%
Can't remember	25%	41.7%	8.3%	8.3%	0%	8.3%	8.3%	12	100%

Table 5

Frequency of Travel to Mainland China and Attitude toward Economic Integration with Mainland China

Frequency of Travel to Mainland China	**Attitude toward economic integration**							Total (N)	%
	Integration together	Getting closer over time	Maintain status quo	Moving apart over time	Separate completely	Don't know	Refuse answer		
Reside both on Mainland and Taiwan	12.5%	25%	37.5%	0%	0%	25%	0%	8	100%
15 times	34.8%	52.2%	4.3%	4.3%	0%	4.3%	0%	23	100%
7 to 14	33.3%	47.6%	4.8%	9.5%	0%	4.8%	0%	21	100%
4 to 6	20%	36.4%	18.2%	3.6%	10.9%	10.9%	0%	55	100%
3 times	14.5%	49.1%	10.9%	9.1%	0%	14.5%	1.8%	55	100%
2 times	13.5%	50%	10.8%	6.8%	0%	17.6%	1.4%	74	100%
Once	23%	40.7%	10.6%	2.7%	1.8%	20.4%	0.9%	113	100%
Never to Mainland	15.7%	43%	12.4%	7.9%	3%	17.2%	0.8%	709	100%
Can't remember	8.3%	66.7%	0%	16.7%	0%	8.3%	0%	12	100%

Table 6

Frequency of Travel to Mainland China
and Attitude toward Unification

Frequency of Travel to Mainland China	**Attitude toward Unification**								
	The sooner The better	Status quo and then unification	Status quo	Status quo and then separation	Separation forever	Don't know	Refuse answer	Total (N)	%
Reside both on Mainland and Taiwan	25%	25%	12.5%	12.5%	12.5%	12.5%	0%	8	100%
15 times	21.7%	47.8%	17.4%	4.3%	0%	8.7%	0%	23	100%
7 to 14	14.3%	47.6%	28.6%	4.8%	0%	4.8%	0%	21	100%
4 to 6	7.3%	45.5%	23.6%	9.1%	5.5%	9.1%	0%	55	100%
3 times	3.6%	38.2%	40%	3.6%	5.5%	9.1%	0%	55	100%
2 times	6.8%	47.3%	20.3%	9.5%	4.1%	9.5%	2.7%	74	100%
Once	5.3%	42.5%	27.4%	8%	5.3%	10.6%	0.9%	113	100%
Never to Mainland	3.2%	35.5%	30.5%	9.2%	6.1%	14.5%	1%	709	100%
Can't remember	16.7%	8.3%	25%	16.7%	0%	25%	8.3%	12	100%

Table 7

The Cross-Tabulation of Taiwanese Electorate's Identity of being "Taiwanese" or "Chinese"

Taiwanese or not	Chinese or not		Total
	Yes	No	% (N)
Yes	705 71.9%	237 24%	100% (942)
No	42 4.3%	2 0.1%	100% (44)

Table 8

Age and National Identification

| | **Are You Chinese?** | | | | |
Age	Yes	No	Refuse	Answer (n)	Total Response %
20-24	77.2%	18.4%	4.4%	114	100.0%
25-29	73.0%	20.5%	6.6%	122	100.0%
30-39	73.4%	21.2%	5.4%	278	100.0%
40-49	67.8%	24.8%	7.4%	230	100.0%
50-59	66.7%	28.1%	5.2%	153	100.0%
60-69	67.0%	26.1%	6.8%	88	100.0%
70	75.8%	12.9%	11.3%	62	100.0%
Total	70.7%	22.4%	6.9%	1070	100.0%

Table 9

Education and National Identification

| | **Are You Chinese?** | | | | |
Education	Yes	No	Refuse	Answer (n)	Total Response %
Grad. School and above	75.0%	17.3%	7.7%	52	100.0%
University	76.5%	21.9%	1.6%	187	100.0%
Junior college	76.8%	18.8%	4.3%	207	100.0%
Senior high	73.0%	21.6%	5.4%	315	100.0%
Junior high	68.8%	24.2%	7.0%	128	100.0%
Elementary	55.7%	33.0%	11.4%	88	100.0%
Elementary below and illiteracy	61.0%	25.4%	13.6%	59	100.0%
Total	70.7%	22.4%	6.9%	1070	100.0%

Table 10

Provincial Origins and National Identification

| | **Are You Chinese?** | | | | |
Provincial Origin	Yes	No	Refuse	Answer (n)	Total Response %
Taiwanese Min-nan	67.1%	26.1%	6.8%	762	100.0%
Taiwanese Hakka	75.2%	22.1%	2.7%	113	100.0%
Mainlander	94.8%	4.4%	0.7%	135	100.0%
Aborigines	94.1%	5.9%	0.0%	17	100.0%
Refuse	37.2%	20.9%	41.9%	43	100.0%
Total（n）%	70.7%	22.4%	6.9%	1070	100.0%

Table 11

Frequency of Travel to Mainland China and Attitude toward Unification Among Min-nan Group

Frequency of Travel to Mainland China	**Attitude toward Unification Among Min-nan Group**								
	The sooner The better	Status quo and then unification	Status quo	Status quo and then separation	Separation forever	Don't know	Refuse answer	Total (N)	%
Reside both on Mainland and Taiwan	0%	0%	50%	50%	0%	0%	0%	2	100%
15 times	14.3%	50%	28.6%	7.1%	0%	0%	0%	14	100%
7 to 14	14.3%	64.3%	14.3%	7.1%	0%	0%	0%	14	100%
4 to 6	3.3%	43.3%	23.3%	13.3%	6.7%	10%	0%	30	100%
3 times	0%	38.7%	38.7%	3.2%	9.7%	9.7%	0%	31	100%
2 times	4.4%	40%	24.4%	13.3%	6.7%	8.9%	2.2%	45	100%
Once	2.5%	39.2%	29.1%	10.1%	6.3%	11.4%	1.3%	79	100%
Never to Mainland	2.8%	35%	31.7%	10.2%	7.4%	12.6%	0.4%	540	100%
Can't remember	14.3%	0%	28.6%	28.6%	0%	28.6%	0%	7	100%

Looking to the future, several probable projections on cross-strait relations can be made. First, as long as the PRC refrains from further use of force against Taiwan and continues to promote economic as well as cultural ties with Taiwan, there will be ample room for gradual social and economic integration leading to the development of "linkage communities" on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, which may pave the way for eventual political integration with or without the framework of a loose confederation.

On the ROC side, as long as its leaders adhere to the "one China" principle and avoid a legal separation of Taiwan from China, there will always be the possibility of developing some conceptual frameworks under which the question of national unification and international recognition may be resolved.[20] Despite the seeming incongruence between the ROC's "one nation, two entities" concept and the PRC's "one country, two systems" policy, there indeed exist certain common features which can be further explored for mutual accommodation. The "eight-point" statement issued by PRC President Jiang Zemin and the "six-point" response from President Lee testify to the gradual expansion of elasticity between the two sides.

Furthermore, the PRC may eventually come to the conclusion that depriving the ROC of all its diplomatic ties may not be in Beijing's interest, since this strategy may lead to a complete isolation of the Taiwan region, which will only add fuel to the appeal of the Independence Movement on the island of Taiwan. The best that can happen, therefore, is for the PRC and ROC to reach a tacit or overt understanding that improvement of cross-strait relations and expansion of external relations of the two political systems in China are not "zero-sum" games (See Figure 5). If Beijing can tolerate Taipei's external relations to a limited extent, Taipei will have more confidence in dealing with Beijing, which

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[20] For a proposal in redefining the foreign policy goal of the ROC, see Yung Wei, "Needed: A Forward-Looking Perspective and Pragmatic External Policy for the Republic of China" (paper delivered at the Conference on the Republic of China and the United Nations, Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, New York, 25-26 October 1993). Also see Yung Wei, "A New World Perspective for the Republic of China," *Issues and Studies* 28:7 (July 1992); also see Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, eds., *Taiwan in world Affairs* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). For suggestions to strike a balance between cross-Strait relations and expansion of international relations, see an interview of this author in "Time to Clarify the One China Principle," *Free China Review*, (March, 1996), pp. 21-26.

may eventually lead to the formation of loose confederation by the two Chinese political systems across the Taiwan Strait in a "multi-system nations" framework along with the formation of various linkage groups and communities in each other's territories.

In the opinion of this author, unless both sides of the Taiwan Straits are unified by force, "multi-system nations" and "linkage communities" are probably the only workable concepts which still preserve the notion of "one Chinese nation" on the one hand, yet allow either side to gain international recognition without violating the principle and goal of eventual national reunification on the other.[21] Under this situation, the concept of "multi-system nations" and "linkage communities" may serve both as theoretical constructs to help explain the existing reality and as an intellectual tool projecting and prescribing possible policy options.

7. International Personalities and the Problems of Recognition: New Realities and Outdated Norms

Despite gradual dissemination of the idea of "multi-system nations" and the tacit acceptance by international community of the practice of multiple recognition and dual representation of the divided nations, the problem of the international status of the multi-system nation is far from being resolved. In addition, certain political systems within the divided nation, such as the Republic of China in Taiwan, still faces serious of diplomatic recognition. Other political systems that were caught in the process of partitioning in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia faced similar problems at one point or another. Still other systems that are still in the stage of non state-nation, such as the PLO in Palestine, are still striving for both independence and autonomy. All these should be the concern of the international lawyers.

An examination of the current content of conventional international law leads to the discovery that the current types of international personalities provided by conventional international law simply are

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[21] For a projection of Taiwan's future onto the 21st century, see Yung Wei, "The Interplay between Taiwan's Internal and External Environments to 2020: A Contingency Analysis," in Paul H. B. Godwin and Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., *Development in Taiwan to 2020: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations and U.S. Policy*, edited by Karen M. Sutter, (Washington D.C.: The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1996).

grossly out of date so far as the recognition of the various kinds of political systems that are actually in existence in the international community is concerned.   A review of the major treatise on international law or laws of nations reveal three major categories of international personalities: state, belligerents, and insurgents.[22]   Here one finds that opinion of international jurists deems that " a state proper is in existence when a people is settled in a country under its own sovereign government."[23]   As for insurgents and belligerents, these are the terms that are used to refer to the parties in the internal conflict of a state that have reached a certain degree of continuity as well as to the situation wherein the contending party has already reached a certain proportion in terms of territorial occupation.   If the party is in the initial stage of its organized efforts in contending the central authority and the impact is of limited nature then it may be recognized as an "insurgent."   If, however, the contending party has "attained sufficient stature"[24] and the conflict becomes of a sustained nature, then that party can be recognized as a "belligerent."   In the opinion of one of the leading international jurists, "The principle consequence of recognition of insurgenty is to protect the insurgent from having their warlike activities, especially on the high seas, from being regarded as lawless acts of violence which, in the absence of recognition, might subject them to treatment as pirates."[25]

If such a considerate and generous criterion can be applied to the recognition of the divided nation, then almost all the political systems in any of the multi-system nation could all have been considered "international personalities" and have attained recognition by other states. Other than states, belligerents, and insurgents, conventional international law also recognizes several other exotic "international personalities," including the Holy See (City of Vatican) and the "Sovereign Military Order of the Knights of Malta."[26]   The reasons provided by international jurists to treat these two entities as subjects of international law are not

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[22]   L. Oppenheim, *International Law, A Treatise*, 7th ed. (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1948), Chapter I; Philip C. Jersup, *A Modern Law of Nations, An Introduction* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948), Chapter III; J. L. Brierly, *The Law of Nations- An Introduction to the International Law of Peace*, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949), Chapter IV; Herbert W. Briggs (ed.) *The Law of Nations, Cases Documents and Notes*, 2nd ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1953), Chapter II, Section I, pp. 99-132.

[23]   Oppenheim, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

[24]   Jersup, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

[25]   *Ibid*, p. 53.

[26]   Von Glahn, *Law Among Nations, An Introduction to Public International Law*, *op. cit*, pp. 59, 60.

based upon general criteria of statehoods but of convention and customary practice.

A basic problem in regard to the identification of subject of international law as well as in granting recognition to various types of international personalities lies in the fact that the current principles of extending diplomatic recognition were developed from the experience of western European states before the 19th Century. At that time, transition of a nation from unification to division, or vice versa, usually were rather rapid. As a result, the pioneers of conventional international law simply failed to foresee the continuous existence of parallel political systems within an original nation or state for an extended period of time as what have happened in China, Germany, and Korea after the Second World War.

In this article, in the minds of the founding fathers of international law, besides the *state*, which naturally was assumed to exist for quite some time, other two types of international personalities under conventional international law, the "*belligerents*" and "*insurgents*," simply were not assumed to be to last for any length of time. Thus recognizing these two categories of "international personalities" was meant purely for the matter of convenience, not for any enduring long-term purposes. Consequently, international law, as it exists today, is grossly inadequate in dealing with the international status of the multi-system nations, particularly in the Chinese case.

Arguments have made to make the non-recognized part of a divided nation, an "entity *sui generis*."[27] Notwithstanding the archaic nature of its nomenclature, "entity *sui generis*" really carries a rather blurred and uncertain connotation so far as the legal status of unrecognized political system of a multi-system nation is concerned. It should be noted that although the political systems within a divided nation may be somewhat less than a full-fledged state or government, they are definitely of a higher legal stature than those of "belligerents" and "insurgents."

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[27] See Louis Henkin, Richard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter and Hans Smit, *International Law, Cases and Materials*, 2nd ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1987); also see Philip Yang, "Taiwan's Legal Status: Going Beyond the Unification-Division Dichotomy." (paper delivered at the CSIS Seminar on Cross-Strait Relations at the Turn of the Century, September 21-23, 1999).

The major problem facing the international jurists has been that not only there have not been sufficient and up-to-date categories of "international personalities" for other state to choose in regard to recognition, but also that big nations often use recognition or non-recognition as a political instrument to achieve purposes in the name of national interest. Hence the government of the United States had refused to recognize both the Soviet Union and Mainland China decades after their establishment. On the contrary, the US recognized the State of Israel within hour of its declaration on May 14, 1948. At that time, no assurance could be ascertained as the survivability of the newly established state.[28]

By the same token, it has been chiefly due to the firm support of the United States that the Republic of China on Taiwan, Republic of Korea (South Korea), and Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) were able to prevent and deny recognition to Mainland China, North Korea, and East Germany before 1970s. After 1970s, especially after the end of the Vietnam War, the non-communist part of the divided nations, started facing diminishing support from the United States against recognizing the Communist part of the divided nations and were forced to make practical adjustments. Unfortunately, in the case of the Republic of China on Taiwan, it has become a primary example of being a victim to non-recognition as a result of the increasing influence and stature of the PRC in international community.

8. Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and the Recognition of Multi-System Nations

It must be pointed out that the categorization of the international personalities into merely "states," "belligerents," and "insurgents," by the pioneers of international law were not as naïve as it seemed, for they assumed that the belligerents and insurgents were supposed to exist only for a short period of time. Hence recognition of these "subjects" of international law were only to avoid the legal vacuum to which the existing states and governments might be exposed to. It was anticipated that a successful "insurgent" would quickly become a formidable "belligerent," and a succeeding as well as expanding "belligerent" would

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[28] Von Glahn, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-70.

soon become the legitimate government or a new state. In neither case, there would be any serious problem of granting international recognition.[29]

It seldom occurred to these international jurists that they might be compelled to deal with a situation that there could be six categories of situations that international law must deal with, of which only the first three conventional international offers ready solution; these could include: (1) single recognition of a unified nation (state); (2) dual recognition of a legitimate government challenged by a forceful belligerent; (3) dual recognition of a legitimate government challenged by a emerging insurgent group; (4) non-recognition of an existing yet considered not legitimate state or government; (5) non-recognition of multi-system nations; and (6) non-recognition of an insurgent group which is considered too destabilizing for the international community to recognize. (see Table 12)

Other than the failure in perceiving the full range of the problem of international recognition under different situations, another problem hindering international recognition of the multi-system-nation has been the idea of state sovereignty. As a key concept defining nation state, sovereignty is defined as the supreme power enjoyed by a state to have absolute and indivisible authority to rule at home and the sole representative to exercise state power abroad; the former is often called "internal sovereignty," and the latter, "external sovereignty."[30]

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[29] For example, see H. Lauterpacht, (ed.), *Oppenheim's International Law*, 7th ed. (London: Longmans, 1963), pp.121-146.

[30] See, for example, Jessup, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-42; Brierly. *op. cit.*, pp. 46-50; and Lauterpecht, *op. cit.*, pp.116-120.

Table 12

Relation between the Situation in a Nation (State) and the Issue of Recognition

International Recognition	Situation in a nation (state)		
	Unified nation (state) with a single government	Almost equally competing political systems	One legitimate government challenged by an insurgent group
Yes	Single recognition of a unified nation (state)	One legitimate recognized government with another recognized belligerent	One legitimate recognized government with another recognized insurgent group
No	Pariah state (South Africa before 1980s)	Non-recognized Multi-System Nations	A recognized government with an non recognized insurgent group (PLO before 1970s, Muslim rebels in the Philippines

Conceived by Yung Wei, drawn by Lynn Wei

The idea of a supreme, indivisible, and non-shareable sovereignty has been challenged both by actual practice in internal and international situations as well as by scholarly opinion among political scientists and international lawyers.[31]   The fact is: even the most powerful state in the world has to yield its sovereignty in a variety of cases including the operation of international organizations, implementation of world health as well as environmental regulations, operation of foreign legations, and the activities of transnational organizations as well as multi-national companies. International intervention into the internal affairs of a state in the name of humanitarian concerns is another controversial yet often practiced intrusion and infringement of the so-called sovereignty of a state.

Whether the sovereignty of a state is supreme or notis not the primary concern of our discussion here, what does concern us here is the idea of indivisibility of the sovereignty of a state which has been used time again to deny recognition to some of the political systems of a divided nation.

Concomitant to the idea of sovereignty is the concept of "jurisdiction."   While sovereignty is defined in more abstract terms, "jurisdiction" is customarily defined in a much more concrete fashion. Generally speaking, jurisdiction is related to three central ideas, "governing authority," "territories of effective control," and "the people" to whom political as well as legal power is exercised.[32]   If one can accept the idea that sovereignty can be shared by different *de facto* political systems within a formally united nation or state, then whenever and wherever a political system exercises effective control of a territory and is

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[31] For examples, see Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty, Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); William L. Tung, *International Law in an Organizing World* (New York: Thomas & Crowell Co., 1968); Sohail H. Hashmin (ed.) *State Sovereignty, Change and Persistence in International Relations*, foreworded by Stanley Hoffmann (University Park, Penn.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977); Rosalyn Higgins, "Integrations of Authority and Control: Trends in the Literature of International Law and International Relations," in W. Michael Rersman and Burns H. Weston, *Toward World Order and Human Dignity, Essays in Honor of Myres S. McDougal* (New York: The Frer Press, 1976), pp. 79-94; and Roda MushKat, *One Country, Two International Legal Personalities, The Case of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997).

[32] See Lauterpecht, *op. cit.*, pp. 293-302; Brierly, *op. cit.*, pp. 150, 168, 109, 112, 180; William L. Tung, *International Law in an Organizing World* (New York: Thomas & Crowell Co., 1968), pp. 32, 124, 126.

the ruling authority of a group of people constitutes the legitimate ground for *de facto* international recognition of that system.   Here one finds two crucial preconditions for resolving the problems of recognition of the multi-system nations are: first, separation of the ideas of sovereignty and jurisdiction; second, sharing of an abstract common sovereignty by different parts of divided nation having *de facto* jurisdiction in their occupied territories.   One may go even further by asserting that sovereignty belongs to the original nation or state while concrete jurisdictions under that shared sovereignty is shared by the various political systems with temporarily delineated jurisdictions that in term provide the foundation for international recognition.

9. Solving the problem of "One Nation, Two Realities": Agenda for Action among the International Jurists

Having examined the concepts of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and the problems facing the divided nations or multi-system nations in connection with recognition under international law, we may now move onto a more concrete and systematic examination of the various problems confronting the multi-system nations.

Here one finds the overlapping claims of both sovereignty and jurisdiction by various parts of different divided states.   What they have been trying to do is to win recognition, from other governments and states, of them only not as the government of the territories they actually controls but also as the government of the territories which they do not control.   As a result, international recognition of the different parts of a divided nation often evolves into a "zero-sum" game wherein other states and governments often become the victims of having to make difficult choices among various parts of a divided nation.

In short, what has been confronting the multi-system nations can be found in the contradiction regarding the preferred ideal state of affairs on the one hand and the political situation in the reality on the other.   Thus one finds that while more often than not the leaders and people of the divided nations prefer to believe that there is "one nation," "one state," "one sovereignty," and "one people," there are actually "two political systems" co-existing in one nation, "two governments" within one state,

"two jurisdictions" within one sovereignty, and consequently the emergence of the need to have "dual representation" of the unfortunate people who happen to live on two sides of an original nation or state. Indeed, as an American scholar so aptly dubbed it, this situation was an "organized hypocrisy" and calls for "Alternative Structures."[33] (see Table 13)

In order to resolve the discrepancies between the normative preferences and the objective realities, a new chapter or at least a section, should be added to the text of international law, i.e., the recognition and representation of "divided nations," or "multi-system nations." The paramount principle in dealing with this subject matter should be the respect of human rights and the effective handling of political realities. To sum up, the added new principles of international law should include:

1. International law should be a stabilizing, not a destabilizing, factor in international relations.

2. To be recognized is a part of human right; international law should not be used as an instrument to deprive the rights of the unfortunate individuals who happen to live in a unrecognized "Multi-System Nation."

3. Recognition and representation of the various part of a "multi-system nations," or the "divided nations" should not be a zero-sum game, i.e., other states should not be forced to recognize only *one* of the systems in a divided nation and accept its claim over *all* the territories of a nation, including those which it does not control.

4. Recognition of the different political systems within a multi-system nation does not have done with the separation of the sovereignty of the original nation or state. It can be done on the basis of *de facto* separate jurisdictions.

5. The third state should recognize *all* systems in a multi-system nation without recognizing their claims beyond the territories under effective control yet without denying those claims either.

6. All third states should not take a position on the question of unification of the multi-system nations, neither forcing nor preventing the unification of the different parts of a divided nation into one single state.

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[33] Krasner, *op. cit.*

Table 13

Nation, State, Sovereignty, and International Representation：
Ideals and Realties in regard to multi- system Nations

	Nation	State	Sovereignty	International Representation
Ideals	One Nation	One State	One Sovereignty	One People
Realities and Adjustments	Two political systems (two separately governed region)	Two governments	Two jurisdiction	Two Representations (dual recognition and membership in International Organizations)

Conceived by Yung Wei, drawn by Lynn Wei

7. The principle of multiple recognitions of the multi-system nation should also extend to multiple representations of the different parties of the multi-system nations in the United Nations at least in specialized agencies.

Along with the advancement of the above principles, another new section should be added to the law of nation. This section should be devoted to the introduction of a new international personality, i.e., "political entities." By "political entities," we mean any *de facto* ruling authority that actually commands the loyalty of certain of people and is willing and able to fulfill international objections. There could be two types of political entities: the first one is "territorial political entities," meaning the existence of a political authorities not only with a group of people and effective administration but also a clearly delineated territory under its control. All the political systems in the multi-system nations today are qualified in this category.

Another type of political entities may be called "non-territorial political entities." These are the entities having an authority as well as a group of people showing allegiance to that authority yet is without a territory under their effective control. Before 1980s, PLO qualified for this category. Recognitions of this type of political entity, however, must be done with great caution, for it may involve conflict with existing state wherein there is serious territorial dispute.

The status of "political entities" should be lower than states and governments, but higher than belligerent in international law. They should be able to accept at least *de facto* recognition by other government and states, to establish representation office in foreign capitals, and become members or at least, observers to international organizations.

To be sure, the above mentioned are merely rudimentary suggestions. Along with their gradual acceptance, more specific rules must be further developed in regard to the actual functioning of the "multi-system nations" or "political entities" which may include a host of practical areas in regard to the operation of a political-legal authority. Among them are: territorial jurisdiction, extraterritoriality, jurisdiction

over of personal matters, diplomatic operation and immunity, participation in international organizations, international cooperation in the prevention of cross-national crimes, separation of international relation and inter-system relations between different political systems (entities) within a multi-system nation, the power and process of extradition, the maintenance of military force and the related inter-system as well as international obligations.

In making suggestions on the recognition of multi-system nations, this author is well aware of the basic conservative attitude among the international jurists in advancing changes in the existing codes of conventional international law. Yet as Rosalyn Higgins, one the leading international jurists and a former vice president of the American Society of International Law, so aptly pointed out: "rules do not change themselves."[34] "International law has its own inbuilt methods for change (treaty revision, progressive development through the International Law Commission, codification, custom). These methods, however, are slow. Hence, to rely merely on accumulated past decision (rules), where their text has changed and their content is unclear, is to encourage contempt among international relations scholars." [35] Other leading international-law scholars including Hans Kelsen, Morton Kaplan, and Harold D. Lasswell seemed to share similar Views.[36] It is based upon the spirit that laws must respond to changing human conditions and that international jurists should be able to develop rules that can contribute to the solution of real human problems that the above suggestions of mine are made.

10. Conclusions and Suggestions

This paper starts with the argument that current social science

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[34] Rosalyn Higgins, "Integrations of Authority and Control: Trends in the Literature of International Law and International Relations," in Reisman and Weston, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-94.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 83.

[36] See, for example, Hans Kelsen, *General Theory of Law and State* (New York: Russel & Russel, 1961); Morton A. Kaplan, *The Political Foundation of International Law* (New York: Wiley, 1961); and Harold D. Lasswell, "Introduction" to *Toward World Order and Human Dignity, Essays in Honor of Myres S. McDougal*, *op. cit.*, pp. xiii-xviii.

paradigm in general and those of political science in particular are inadequate in dealing with the problem of the divided nations, societies, and peoples. After presenting a model on the relations among political partitioning, migration, minorities, and non-state nations, I have discussed two concepts coined by the author of this paper, i.e., "multi-system nations:" and "linkage communities." Through analysis of aggregate data and results of survey research, I have been able to demonstrate that despite both political barriers imposed by the competing political systems and the failure of the international society to provide adequate rules to regulate cross-Taiwan Strait relations, the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have been able to carry on increasing socio-economic interchanges, so much so that a "linkage community" phenomenon is actually in the process of formation.

Yet despite this natural tendency for the people living both sides of divided societies to interact with each other, intervention by big powers and the inadequacy of international law have prevented a more harmonious relation between different parts of divided nations. This is precisely the reason why the author of this paper toward the end of this paper spent so much effort in enumerating the various problems of international in general and that of sovereignty in particular in connection with the situation of the divided nations.[37]

As for the role of big power politics, it would require another paper to fully discuss it; hence I will not go in detail here in this paper. Yet I would like to point out in no vague languages that both students of comparative politics and those of international relations have been too much immersed in the analysis of the domestic politics within a states as well as in the interactions among different states that they have not developed either effective theoretical paradigms to serve as the analytical tools to tackle the phenomena of the divided nations, nor have they produced enough empirical research focusing on the interactions between different parts of divided nations and societies. In addition, the essence of the problem facing the divided nations, that is, the constant struggling

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[37] For a fuller treatment of the problem of international law in regard to divided states, see Yung Wei, "Recognition of Divided States: Implication and Application of Concepts of 'Multi-System nations,' 'Political Entities,' and 'Intra-National Commonwealth,'" *International Lawyer*, Volume 34, Number 3 (Fall 2000).

for autonomy on the one hand and international recognition on the other have not been fully dealt with. Similarly, the interwoven nature of political partitioning, migration, minorities, and non-state nations have not received sufficient treatment in social science in general and political science in particular. This is indeed a problem that goes beyond the existing modes or approaches, be they neo-realists, institutionalists, structuralists, Maxists, deconstructionists, and merchatilists [38]. More endeavors therefore are needed toward building new conceptual framework that bridges comparative politics and international relations. Likewise, efforts should be made toward merging the knowledge of political science and other social as well as behavioral sciences so that a deeper understanding of the ever existing human experience of division and unification can be better understood.

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[38] For a review of these various approaches, see James A. Caporaro, "Global Political Economy," in Ada W. Finifter (ed.) Political Science, the Sate of the Discipline (Wash. D.C.: APSA, 1993), pp. 451-481.