

Charting Peaceful Relations Between Taiwan and Mainland China: From Integration to Intra-National Commonwealth*

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As the world enters into the 21st Century, Northeast Asia still remains as one of the most crisis-prone regions of the world. According to most experts of international strategic studies, the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait are two of the areas having the highest potential for military confrontation in the world today.

Despite the fact that the Republic of China (henceforth the ROC) and the Republic of Korea have rather different international relations and security concerns, the two states still share similar problems when they come to the issue of inter-system relations and national unification. It is the purpose of this paper to analyze the problems of cross-Taiwan-relations with an eye on the possible implication of the process of inter-system interactions in the Chinese case to the situation of the Korean case.

1. Cross-Taiwan Relations: A state of Stalemate

By all accounts, the relations between the Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (henceforth the PRC) on the Chinese mainland is a in state of stalemate. Despite continuous trade, tourism, and other types of people-to-people exchanges between the two sides of Taiwan Strait, political relations between Taipei and Beijing is still far from being congenial toward each other. The newest example of mutual resistance and distrust is found in Taipei's recent attempt to join the World Health Organization as an observer which was vehemently rebuked and firmly blocked by Beijing as an attempt to break the "One China" principle.

As with all the divided nations, the issues between the ROC and the PRC involves not only the concrete contest over power and resources but also on the definition of the nature of the nation or state that they both share. In the case of cross-Taiwan-Strait relations, one of the major reasons for the current deadlock between Taipei and Beijing has been the problem of the "One China" issue. For leaders in Beijing, whether the ROC agrees to "One China" or "two Chinas," or "One China, one

Taiwan,” or “an independent Taiwan” is of crucial importance in deciding their future policy toward the Island. For the government in Taipei, however, “One China” is both an issue in domestic politics and cross-Strait relations.

In terms of domestic politics, the ruling party in Taiwan, the People’s Progressive Party (DPP) sets “Taiwan’s independence” as the eventual goal of the Party in its Charter, although its chairman Hsieh Chang-ting argues that “One China” may be defined according to the Constitution of the ROC. The two main opposition parties in Taiwan, the Kuomintang and the People First Party basically adhere to the “One China” principle, yet they define the content of “One China” somewhat differently from that of Beijing authorities.

As a result, Taipei to this day has not reassured Beijing that it adheres to the “One-China” principle, which is the pre-condition set up by Mainland China for the resumption of cross-Strait talks. In order to demonstrate that he is not totally against the “One China” principle, President Chen Shui-bian indicated that he was willing to accept “One China” as one of the agenda in the next cross-Strait dialogue. The PRC, however, insisted that the ROC must accept the “One China” principle as a pre-requisite to cross-Strait talks. The result is a stalemate that may last for quite some time.

One may take consolation that with the enhanced US concern and support for the security of Taiwan, the leaders and people of the ROC do not have to worry about cross-Strait relations in foreseeable future. Others concur and argue that since Mainland China will be hosting the Olympic game in Beijing in 2008, it most likely would not take military actions against Taiwan by that time. Yet with the continuing increment of both economic power and military capacity of the PRC, leaders in Taipei cannot completely rule out the emergence of a military situation in the Taiwan Strait before 2008. A worsening of the relations between Beijing and Washington, a deterioration of economic situation on the Chinese Mainland, and a rising voice for separation from China among certain sector of the population in Taiwan will heighten the possibility of military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait.

With the above perspectives in mind, the author of this paper believes that if we want to have a peaceful resolution of cross-Taiwan-Strait relations, we must actively look for a set of basic concepts, formulas, and

framework that can serve as vehicles for non-military interactions between Mainland China and Taiwan. Furthermore, efforts should also be made to map out the framework with which we may link the different political systems within a divided nation both for the purpose of functional integration and for possible political reunification in the future.

2. “Multi-system Nations” and “Linkage Communities”: Conceptual Efforts Toward Peaceful settlement for Inter-system Disputes in the Divided Nations.

In order to clarify the problems facing the divided nations, and to provide a scheme for peaceful resolution of conflict between different parts of these nations, this author coined in 1975 a new concept “multi-system nations” to illustrate more accurately the true nature of the so-called “divided nation,” i.e., the co-existence of more than one political systems within one nation and not the creation of two or more nations or states within the original nation. More recently, in order to further examine the interaction patterns between different parts of a multi-system nation, this author put forth another new concept “linkage communities” to serve as an analytical and operational concept to investigate the relationship between different political systems within a divided nation.¹

¹ For analysis on the broad conceptual problems surrounding the issues relating to community developing, nationalism, ethnicity, sovereignty, globalization, and inter-system conflict, see Marcia Pelly Effrat (ed.), *The community: approaches and applications* (New York : Free Press ; London : Collier Macmillan, [1974]); Dennis E Poplin, *Communities: a survey of theories and methods of research* (New York: Macmillan, c1979, 2nd ed); Benedict Anderson, *Imagine Community: Reflections on the Origins and the Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (London: Verse, 1991.); William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); John R. Campbell, and Alan Rew (eds.), *Identity and affect: experiences of identity in a globalising world* (London ; Sterling, Va. : Pluto Press, c1999); Cynthia H. Enloe, “Ethnicity, the State, and the New International Order,” in J. F. Stack, Jr. (ed.), *The Primordial Challenge: Ethnicity in the Contemporary World* (New York: Greenwood, 1986); Montserrat Guibernau, *Nationalisms: the nation-state and nationalism in the twentieth century* (Cambridge, MA : Polity Press, 1996); R. J. Holton, *Globalization and the nation-state* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire : Macmillan Press ; New York : St. Martin’s Press, c1998); Bill Jordan, *The state: authority and autonomy* (Oxford [Oxfordshire] : Blackwell, 1985); Andrew Levine, *The end of the state* (London : Verso, 1987); Herbert Kelman, “Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System: A Social-Psychological Analysis of Political Legitimacy,” in J. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1999); James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Martin Shaw, *Theory of the global state: globality as an unfinished revolution* (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Ole Waever, et al. *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993); Kaoru Yamaguchi (ed.), *Sustainable global communities in the information age: visions from futures studies* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997); Horng-luen Wang, “How ‘Transnational’ Are We? Some Speculations on the Nationalist Reality and World Society,”

A survey of relevant literature has led to the discovery that comparative study of political partitioning and the divided nations has been a late development in political science. Existing research on divided nations and societies reveals two basic problems.² First, there is the lack of a commonly accepted term or concept that is neutral and precise enough to serve as an effective instrument for empirical research on the “divided nations.” Second, there is a failure in differentiating two separate types of division and unification processes, i.e., those involving communist political systems and those not involving the confrontation between communist and non-communist systems such as the case in the Middle East and the India sub-continent.

The core of the new concept of “multi-system nations” rests on the emphasis that relations between different parts of a divided nation are not those between different peoples or cultures but are those between different political systems within a *single* nation. These competing systems try to deny international status of the other side despite the fact that both sides meet almost all the criteria of an independent state. By advancing the new concept of “multi-system nations,” I propose that we preserve the idea of “one nation” but face the reality of the co-existence of two or more mutually separated political systems within that nation.³

paper prepared for presentation at “New Cultural Formations in an Era of Transnational Globalization,” Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, October 6-7, 2001; and Chih-yu Shih, *Civilization Conflict and China* (Taipei: Wu-nan Publisher, 2000).

² Juan Diez Medrano, *Divided Nations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Jaushieh Joseph Wu, *Divided Nations: The Experience of Germany, Korea, and China* (Taipei, Taiwan, Rep. of China: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 1995); Gregory Henderson, *Divided Nations in a Divided World* (New York: D. McKay Co., 1974); Bruce R. Silvers, *The Divided Nations* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, 1966); Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965); Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, “The Integration Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community”, in *The Integration of Political Communities*, ed. Jacob, Philip E. and James V. Toscano (Philadelphia; J. B. Lippincott, 1964); Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1953); Joseph S. Nye, “Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement,” *International Organization* 22, no. 4 (Autumn, 1968): 855-80; Stuart A. Scheingold, *The Law in Political Integration* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1971), and Henry R. Nau, “From Integration to Interdependence: Gains, Losses, and Continuing Gaps,” *International Organization* 33, no. 1 (Winter, 1979): 119-47.

³ For further discussions by this author on the inception, development and policy impact of the concept of multi-system nations, see Wei Yung, “The Unification and Division of Multi-System Nations: A Comparative Analysis of Basic Concepts, Issues, and Approaches,” (Paper delivered at symposium on Functional Integration of Divided Nations, Seoul, Republic of Korea, October 6-7, 1980); later published in *Multi-System Nations and International Law: The International Status of Germany, Korea, and China*, edited by Hungdah Chiu and Robert Downon (Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland, 1981). Also see the author’s following papers: “Multi-System Nations Revisited: Interaction Between Theories and Realities” (Paper delivered at the International Conference on Unification of Multi-System Nations, Taipei, September 27-29, 1991). “Unification

The logical derivations from this concept would be: “one nation, two systems;” “one sovereignty, two jurisdictions;” “one country, two international personalities.”

Developments in various so-called “divided states” following the coinage of the concept of multi-system nations more or less have corresponded to the analysis and predictions of the theory of “multi-system nations.”⁴ The “common roof (Dachtheorie) theory” developed in Germany largely echoes the idea of multi-system nations. By asserting the notion of one German nation, East Germany and West Germany managed to separate the issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction. Sovereignty belongs to the abstract German nation while jurisdictions were clearly delineated between the Federal Republic of Germany and Democratic Republic of Germany. Consequently, both West and East Germany were able to be simultaneously recognized by other states as well as to join the international organizations including the United Nations without violating the “one German Nation” principle.⁵

In the case of the two Koreas, the application of “multi-system nations” theory has been more direct and encompassing.⁶ Some officials and scholars in the Republic of Korea openly described Korea as a “multi-system nation.”⁷ The December 1991 Communiqué between the representatives of North and South Korea almost completely adopted the concept of “multi-system nations” and clearly defined the situation in the

or Separation: Assessment of Relations between the Two Chinese Political Systems through the Concept of Multi-System Nations” (Paper delivered at the Conference on China’s Constitutional Systems: Convergence or Divergence, Columbia University, New York, 29 April 1994); “Conceptual Schemes for Multi-System Nations and Inter-System Developments” (Paper delivered at Panel on System Integration of Divided Nations, XVI World Congress, International Political Science Association (IPSA), Berlin, 21-25 August 1994); and “From Integration to ‘Intra-National Commonwealth’: Towards Peaceful Resolution of Problems Facing Divided States”, paper delivered at the panel on “Unification Issues in the 21st Century,” (Research Committee 42 on System Integration of Divided Nations, 18th IPSA World Congress, Quebec, Canada, August 1-5, 2000).

⁴ For an example of American international lawyers’ taking note of the concept of “Multi-System Nation,” see Gerhard Von Glahn, *Law Among Nations, An Introduction to Public International Law*, 7th ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996), suggested readings, pp. 64.

⁵ See Joyce Marie Mushaben, “A Search for Identity: The German Question in Atlantic Alliance Relations,” *World Politics*, 40 (April 1988), pp. 395-417; and Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, “The Unification of Germany’s Multi-System Nations: the Evolution of West Germany’s Strategies,” (paper delivered at International Conference on the Unification of Multi-System Nations co-sponsored by Vanguard Foundation and American Enterprise Institution, Taipei, Republic of China, September 27-29, 1991).

⁶ See John H. Herz, “Korea and Germany as Divided Nations: The Systemic Impact,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1975), pp. 957-970.

⁷ See Hakjoon Kim, “Korean Reunification: A Seoul Perspective on the Korean National Community Unification Formula as Seen Through the Various Concepts on the Unification on Multi-System Nations,” (Paper presented at International Conference on the Unification on Multi-System Nations, Taipei, September 27-29, 1991).

Korean peninsula as two political systems co-existing in one Korean nation. As a result, relations between the two Korean political systems are not international relations, but special relations to be regulated by specific agreements between the North and the South. Today both North and South Korea are members of the United Nations and enjoy dual recognitions in many capitals around the world.⁸ (For a comparison of the Chinese and Korean situation, see Table 1)

⁸ See Hong Nack Kim, "The 'Two Koreas' Enter into the United Nations and the Implications for Inter-Korean Relations," *Korea and World Affairs* (Fall, 1991), pp. 397-413.

Table 1

**The Separation and the Projection of Unification of China and Korea:
A Comparative Paradigm***

made by Yung Wei

Nov. 15, 1997

	Chinese Case	Korean Case
Nature and Origin of Separation	Prolonged internecine warfare	International and inter-system military conflicts and negotiation
Original Position on National Reunification	Before 1980s, complete rejection of the legitimacy of the opposing system; unification through replacement	Before 1973, complete rejection of the legitimacy of the opposing system; unification through replacement
Revised position on National Reunification	After 1980s, de facto acceptance of opposing regime, peaceful unification by stages for the ROC; PRC prefers peaceful unification but use of forces not ruled out.	After 1980s, gradual acceptance of each other's existence, leading to formal agreement on co-existence in Dec., 1991; conditional acceptance of the idea of confederation by North and South Korea in July, 2000.
Position toward International Recognition	The ROC side tolerates dual recognition since late 1980s; the PRC opposes all kinds of dual recognition	Dual and separate recognition, but still adhere to one-Korean-nation and community notion
Attitude toward International Organizations	The ROC side is for dual memberships in international organizations; the PRC is against it	Dual and separate memberships for all international organizations, including UN
Actual Interaction through trade, cultural exchanges and tourism	Extensive exchange of goods, people, and ideas occurred, with the ROC somewhat on the defensive side	Minimal trade and cross-boarder contacts; occasional reunion of families in the North and South since August, 2000.
Prospect of Peaceful Transition and Unification	Uncertain; acute crisis have subsided; but renew of para-military confrontation is possible if peaceful exchanges failed	Uncertain; large scale military confrontation still possible; ROK side seems to have the upper hand in long-term peaceful reunification

*This table was first published in Yung Wei, "Multi-System Nations', 'Linkage Communities' and 'Intra-National Commonwealth': General Concepts on the Unification of Divided States and Their Application to the Chinese as well as Korean Cases," New Asia Vol. 4, No. 4(Seoul, Korea: Winter, 1997), revised and updated by the author on May 18, 2002.

As for the Chinese situation, leaders of the People's Republic of China (PRC) put forth the notion of "one country, two systems" some time around 1983, shortly after the concept of "multi-system nations" gained international recognition and caused debates in Taiwan. Despite repeated denials by the Beijing authorities, many scholars are of the opinion that before 1983, PRC leaders already were aware of the concept and its implication to the cross-Strait relation and to the diplomatic efforts of the ROC. Thus they have borrowed the idea but have skillfully adjusted the content of "multi-system nations" to suit their own political framework and purposes, i.e., the two *systems* in the "One Country Two System" scheme were merely socio-economic institutions without international personalities. Unquestionably, Beijing had both Hong Kong and Taiwan in mind when it put forth the "one-country-two-system" scheme.

In regard to the Republic of China, the inner circle of the ROC government basically concurred the concept of "multi-system nations" and actually called high-level meetings to discuss the implications of the concept to the cross-Strait situation as well as possible positive usage of the concept.⁹ The Guideline for National Unification, for instance, advocates the concept of "one China" but allows the co-existence of two "political entities" within one China. The White Paper on Cross-Strait Relations released by the Mainland Affairs Council went further to formally declare that "one China" is a "historical, geographic, and cultural Chinese nation."¹⁰ Within this nation, the two Chinese political entities are not foreign countries to each other; rather they are intra-national political systems whose relations are to be regulated by agreements signed by both sides of the Taiwan Strait. In their relations with other countries, however both the ROC and the PRC are full-fledged international personalities. Hence, the idea "one China, two entities" embedded in the Guideline for National Unification corresponds completely to the ideas of "multi-system nations" as defined by official ROC government policy.¹¹

While the concept of "multi-system nations" has been applied in

⁹ For an insider's account of the deliberation process within the ROC Government of the possible application of the concept of multi-system nations, see Yung Wei, "Two Koreas and Multi-System Nations," *History Monthly* (Sept. 2000), forthcoming.

¹⁰ *Policy Paper on Cross-Taiwan-Strait Relations* (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 1994), p. 30.

¹¹ For an official view of the ROC position on the issue of national reunification, see Lien Chan, "A Pragmatic Strategy for China's Peaceful Reunification," *American Asian Review*, 14, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 97-107.

one way or another to the situations of all “divided nations” with varying degrees of success, it has become clear that agreement on the “One nation, two systems” alone cannot lead to integration of the various political systems within a divided nation. In the case of Korea, for instance, the formal agreements signed between North and South Korea has not automatically led to the emergence of an integrated civil society on the Korea Peninsula.

Consequently, one finds two different kinds of inter-system relations. In the case of Korea, despite official agreement on principle of unifications and jurisdictions, there have not been active interactions and contacts between the people on the two sides of the Korean Peninsula. In contrast, the authorities in Peking and Taipei have not yet arrived at a commonly accepted framework for reunification, and yet the flow of people and goods across the Taiwan Strait has been far more intensive and extensive than between the two Koreas.

A third example illustrating the importance of informal, functional, people-to-people contact is in the case of East and West Germany. What we have witnessed here has been a continuous flow of people, goods, and information across the boundary long before formal and legal arrangements for reunification were achieved.¹² In fact, the societies of the two Germanys had already entered into rather extensive economic, cultural, and information exchanges that the two sides of Germanys had become somewhat “integrated” before it was politically “unified.”


From the above comparison among the Chinese, Korean, and German cases, it has become clear that formal-structural arrangements are not as effective as informal and inter-personal contracts and interactions. Yet regrettably, more often than not, one finds that analyses on the issues of the divided states are often too obviously state-oriented, elite-oriented, law-oriented, and structure oriented, thus losing sight of the impact of interaction between the people, culture, and communities of different parts of a multi-system nation.

With a view to further identifying and highlighting his process of informal but functional interactions between the people of different political systems within a multi-system nation, I propose a new term, “linkage communities”, to illustrate the actual process of functional integration within either side of a divided state (see Figure 1). What I

¹² Kindermann, *op. cit.*

mean by “linkage communities” is the existence of a group of people who have had such extensive social, cultural, commercial, or other types of contacts with the people and society of the opposite system that they have developed an understanding, sensitivity, and empathy with the people and society across system boundaries. People who belong to this type of “linkage community” not only have higher contacts with individuals and groups across boundary lines, they also keep close contact with people of similar orientation and experience within their own political system. The higher the percentage of people belonging to the “linkage Community” on each side of a partitioned society, or multi-system nation, the less likely the possibility of inter-system military confrontation and the more likely the achievement of functional integration which may eventually lead to peaceful political unification. To put into more precise and empirical terms, one can identify and measure the size of “linkage communities” in either part of a partitioned society by examining the number and percentages of people who have traveled to the other side, have business contacts or establishment across the system boundaries, or maintain substantial social, cultural, as well as academic ties with individuals or groups in the opposite system.

Figure 1
The Concept of “Linkage Community”:
A Heuristic Model




*Developed and drawn by Yung Wei, May 1996.

By all accounts, cross-Taiwan-Straits relations have already entered into an era of linkage-community formation and functional integration. According to data released by the Custom Office and Bureau on Tourism, the percentage of export to the United States in the total export of the ROC has declined from 44.12% in 1987 to that of 23.47% in 2000. During the same period, the percentage of export to Japan decreased from 13.01% to 11.19%, yet export to Hong Kong increased from 7.66% to 21.13%, mainly to Mainland China. As for tourism, the percentage of Taiwanese tourists going to Japan decreases from 27.87% in 1987 to 10.99% in 1999; those to U.S.A., from 15.52% to 8.6%; yet the percentage of people of Taiwan traveling to Hong Kong increases from 18.47% in 1987 to 29.87% in 1999, again mainly to Mainland China.¹³ (See Figure 2 and 3 as well as Table 2)

From the data in afore-mentioned figures and tables, one may compute the actual size of “linkage communities” both in Taiwan and on Mainland China. We may use the number of Taiwanese-owned factories and companies on Mainland China as the basis of computing the size of the “linkage community.” There are approximately 30,000 Taiwanese business operations on Mainland China. If the average number of employees of these operations is twenty, then there are at least 600,000 employees of Taiwanese firms on Mainland China. Furthermore, if we assume the average size of the families on Mainland China is four, then there are almost 2,400,000 people on Mainland China whose livelihood is linked with the economy and society of Taiwan, hence constituting a “linkage community” to Taiwan.


¹³ For further discussion on the increasing interactions between the Chinese political systems, see Yung Wei, “Toward a New Framework of External Relations for the ROC in the 21st Century: Between Oceanic and Continental Strategies,” in Yung Wei, *Tu-Po (Breakthrough, Creating a Future of Broad Perspective)* (Taipei: Commercial Weekly Publishers, 1995), pp. 319-323; for a broader discussion on the interplay of internal and external factors in cross-Taiwan-Strait relations, see Yung Wei, “Democratization, Unification, and Elite Conflict,” in *The Chinese and Their Future: Beijing, Taipei and Hong Kong*, edited by Zhi-ling Lin and Thomas W. Robinson (Washington, DC: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1994).

Figure 2 Percentage of Exports by Destination (1987~2000)



Source : Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2001 (Taipei : Council for Economic Planning & Development)

Figure 3 Percentage of R.O.C. Tourists by Destination (1987~1999)



Source: Tourism Bureau, Ministry of Transportation and Communication,

Table 2 Extent of Trade Dependency on Mainland China

Unit: US\$ million.

Year	Estimated Exports to Mainland China (1)	Mainland's Exports to Taiwan via Hong Kong (2)	Estimated Total Trade Between Mainland and Taiwan (3)=(1)+(2)	Taiwan's Total Exports (4)	Taiwan's Dependency on Cross-Strait Trade (5)=(3)/(4)
1981	384.8	75.2	460.0	43,810.8	1.05%
1982	194.5	84.0	278.5	41,092.7	0.68%
1983	201.4	88.9	290.3	45,409.8	0.64%
1984	425.5	127.8	553.3	52,415.5	1.06%
1985	986.8	115.9	1102.7	50,827.7	2.17%
1986	811.3	144.2	955.5	64,043.0	1.49%
1987	1,266.5	288.9	1,555.4	88,662.1	1.75%
1988	2,242.2	478.7	2,720.9	110,340.2	2.47%
1989	3,331.9	586.9	3,918.8	118,569.3	3.31%
1990	4,394.6	765.4	5,160.0	121,930.5	4.23%
1991	7,493.5	1,125.9	8,619.4	139,038.9	6.20%
1992	10,547.6	1,119.0	11,666.6	153,477.0	7.60%
1993	13,993.1	1,103.6	15,096.7	162,152.7	9.32%
1994	16,002.5	1,858.7	17,861.2	178,398.0	10.01%
1995	19,433.8	3,091.4	22,525.2	215,208.8	10.46%
1996	20,727.3	3,059.8	23,787.1	218,312.1	10.95%
1997	22,455.2	3,915.4	26,370.6	236,505.3	11.15%
1998	19,840.9	4,110.5	23,951.4	215,247.6	11.13%
1999	21,312.5	4,522.2	25,834.7	232,280.8	11.12%
2000	25,029.5	6,223.3	31,252.8	288,291.4	10.84%

Source: *Trade Statistics between Taiwan and Mainland China (2001,1)* by Mainland Affairs Council, R.O.C., 2001.

In order to further test the hypotheses of Linkage Community, this author decided to go beyond the mere analysis of aggregate data on cross-Taiwan-Strait relations. In mid-November, 2001, with a grant from the National Science Council of the ROC, an island-wide opinion survey was conducted in Taiwan. Using direct telephone interview and employing a questionnaire designed by this author, a total 1,070 adult individuals of 20 years old or older were interviewed. The results strongly support the hypothesis that the more an individual has had cross-Strait interactions, the more likely he or she will have positive attitude toward inter-system integration and unification. (see Table 3, 4, 5)

Table 3
Frequency of Travel to Mainland China
and Impression of Mainland China

Frequency of Travel to Mainland China	Impression of Mainland China								Total (N)	%
	Very good	Good	All right	A bit no good	Not good	Very bad	Hard to say	Refuse answer		
Reside both on Mainland and Taiwan	0%	12.5%	25%	0%	25%	37.5%	0%	0%	8	100%
15 times	17.4%	13%	21.7%	4.3%	21.7%	8.7%	13%	0%	23	100%
7 to 14	4.8%	19%	52.4%	0%	4.8%	14.3%	4.8%	0%	21	100%
4 to 6	1.8%	21.8%	43.6%	12.7%	10.9%	5.5%	3.6%	0%	55	100%
3 times	1.8%	14.5%	47.3%	5.5%	14.5%	7.3%	9.1%	0%	55	100%
2 times	1.4%	16.2%	51.4%	13.5%	8.1%	6.8%	2.7%	0%	74	100%
Once	2.7%	8%	43.4%	8%	15%	9.7%	12.4%	0.9%	113	100%
Never to Mainland	1.3%	6.6%	47%	10.3%	11.6%	7.9%	14.5%	0.8%	709	100%
Can't remember	8.3%	0%	41.7%	8.3%	16.7%	0%	25%	0%	12	100%

Source: Data from survey conducted by Yung Wei, on November 16-18, 2001, National Science Council Research Project (No: NSC 89-2414-H-009-001) on "Testing the Theoretical Model of 'Linkage Communities': A Comparative Examination of the Integrating Process of the Divided States with Emphasis on the Chinese Case," sponsored by National Science Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China.

Table 4
Frequency of Travel to Mainland China
and Attitude toward Social Integration with Mainland China

Frequency of Travel to Mainland China	Attitude toward social integration							Total (N)	%
	Integration together	Getting closer over time	Maintain status quo	Moving apart over time	Separate completely	Don't know	Refuse answer		
Reside both on Mainland and Taiwan	0%	37.5%	25%	12.5%	0%	12.5%	12.5%	8	100%
15 times	26.1%	52.2%	0%	0%	0%	21.7%	0%	23	100%
7 to 14	38.1%	28.6%	14.3%	4.8%	0%	9.5%	4.8%	21	100%
4 to 6	12.7%	45.5%	18.2%	7.3%	7.3%	9.1%	0%	55	100%
3 times	14.5%	36.4%	25.5%	7.3%	3.6%	12.7%	0%	55	100%
2 times	12.2%	41.9%	27%	4.1%	1.4%	13.5%	0%	74	100%
Once	16.8%	44.2%	10.6%	4.4%	3.5%	20.4%	0%	113	100%
Never to Mainland	11.7%	40.9%	19%	8.6%	2.8%	16.1%	0.8%	709	100%
Can't remember	25%	41.7%	8.3%	8.3%	0%	8.3%	8.3%	12	100%

Source: Data from survey conducted by Yung Wei, on November 16-18, 2001, National Science Council Research Project (No: NSC 89-2414-H-009-001) on "Testing the Theoretical Model of 'Linkage Communities': A Comparative Examination of the Integrating Process of the Divided States with Emphasis on the Chinese Case," sponsored by National Science Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China.

Table 5
Frequency of Travel to Mainland China
and Attitude toward Economic Integration with Mainland China

Frequency of Travel to Mainland China	Attitude toward economic integration							Total	
	Integration together	Getting closer over time	Maintain status quo	Moving apart over time	Separate completely	Don't know	Refuse answer	(N)	%
Reside both on Mainland and Taiwan	12.5%	25%	37.5%	0%	0%	25%	0%	8	100%
15 times	34.8%	52.2%	4.3%	4.3%	0%	4.3%	0%	23	100%
7 to 14	33.3%	47.6%	4.8%	9.5%	0%	4.8%	0%	21	100%
4 to 6	20%	36.4%	18.2%	3.6%	10.9%	10.9%	0%	55	100%
3 times	14.5%	49.1%	10.9%	9.1%	0%	14.5%	1.8%	55	100%
2 times	13.5%	50%	10.8%	6.8%	0%	17.6%	1.4%	74	100%
Once	23%	40.7%	10.6%	2.7%	1.8%	20.4%	0.9%	113	100%
Never to Mainland	15.7%	43%	12.4%	7.9%	3%	17.2%	0.8%	709	100%
Can't remember	8.3%	66.7%	0%	16.7%	0%	8.3%	0%	12	100%

Source: Data from survey conducted by Yung Wei, on November 16-18, 2001, National Science Council Research Project (No: NSC 89-2414-H-009-001) on "Testing the Theoretical Model of 'Linkage Communities': A Comparative Examination of the Integrating Process of the Divided States with Emphasis on the Chinese Case," sponsored by National Science Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China.

3. “Intra-National Commonwealth”: A East Asian Alternative to Sovereignty-oriented Solutions to Multi-system relations.

Having examined the concepts of “multi-system nation” and “linkage communities” as well as on their possible application to the Chinese and Korean situation, we may move onto the contemplation of political framework for future integration of the divided nations. As previously pointed out in this paper, relations between different parts of the divided nations often have been hampered by conventional international law which stresses the concepts of “nation-state” and “sovereignty.” The failure of conventional international law to provide a new category of international personality to accommodate the various political systems within a multi-system nation has been a major short-coming that demands innovative thinking and pragmatic solutions.¹⁴

An examination of the history of China and Korea led to the discovery that in both Nations, division and unification have been a repetitive and almost cyclical process. The more than three-thousand-year history of China has witnessed 25 dynasties of which many were periods of division. Likewise, Korea as a nation of long history and rich culture also has experienced periods of unity and divisions. Both China and Korea, for instance, had the so-called “Three Kingdoms,” though of different time periods.




If one compute the percentage of all the years wherein China was in the period of division, it would come up with 37.2% of the 3122 years of the continuously recorded Chinese history. (see table 6) No wonder there is the saying in China: “In terms of the state of the Tien-hsia (under the Heaven or empire), division will eventually lead to unification ; and unification, to division.” Another noticeable feature of the Chinese unification-division process has been the repetitive patterns of geographical demarcation of various political systems in China. (see maps 1, 2, 3) After a thorough examination of the dynastical changes in the Chinese history, this author was able to develop a flow chart to illustrate and predict the rise and downfall of political systems in the Chinese setting. (see Figure 4)

¹⁴ For an effort in thus regard, see Yung Wei, “Recognition of Divided States: Implication and Application of Concepts of ‘Multi-System nations,’ ‘Political Entities,’ and ‘Intra-National Commonwealth,’” *International Lawyer*, Volume. 34, Number 3 (Fall 2000).

Table 6
A Chronological Table on the Unification and Division of
China (1122 B.C. to 2002 A.D.)


Period of Unification	Period of Division
Chou (Western Chou) (1122-771 B.C.)	Eastern Chou (770-249 B.C.) The Epoch of Spring and Autumn (722-481 B.C.) Warring States (403-221B.C.)
Chin (221-202 B.C.)	
Han (Western Han) (202 B.C.-9 A.D.)	
Han (Eastern Han) (9-220 A.D.)	Three Kingdoms (220-280 A.D.)
Tsin (Western Tsin) (280 or 265-317 A.D.)	Eastern Tsin (317-420 A.D.) North and South Dynasties (420-590 A.D.)
Sui (590-618 A.D.)	
Tang (618-906 A.D.)	Five Dynasties (907-960 A.D.)
Sung (Northern Sung) (960-1126 A.D.)	Southern Sung (1127-1279 A.D.)
Yuan (1260-1368 A.D.)	
Ming (1368-1644 A.D.)	
Ch'ing (1644-1912 A.D.)	Republic of China (1912 A.D.-) People's Republic of China (1949 A.D.-)
Years of Unification: 1963 years 62.8% of total years	Years of Division: 1159 years 37.2%

Drawn by Yung Wei in March 20, 1974 and updated in May 17, 2002, according to data in Dun Li, *The Ageless Chinese, A History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons , 1965), pp. 562-568.



Source: Yung Wei, "The Division and Unification of Chinese Political Systems,"
Asian Forum (Taipei, 1974).

Figure 4
Unification and Division of China:
A Flow-Chart Illustration



Source: Yung Wei, "The Divisions and unification of Chinese Political Systems," *Asian Forum*, (Taipei, 1974)

Several outstanding findings have been resulted from the above investigation. First, while China had long ago developed an international system of its own, it did not employ either the concept of “nation state” nor the idea “of sovereignty” in handling inter-“state (system)” relations among the political systems within China. The term “Kuo” actually meant not the “sovereign state” in the western sense but a political and territorial unit within the Chinese cultural sphere.

I would like to strongly recommend that we learn from the past history of both China and Korea and try to employ separate approaches to deal with inter-system relations on the one hand and those with other states on the other. In terms of the Korean peninsula, the practice of the two opposing political systems have come rather close to my recommendations. As for relation between the ROC and PRC, I would like to make the following prescriptions and recommendations:

1. The situation between the ROC and PRC is not the separation of China into two states in the Western sense, but is a part of the repetitive patterns of divisions and unifications of traditional China.
2. Since the Cross-Taiwan Strait situation is a new phase of the above-mentioned process, the relations between the ROC and the PRC are not the relations between two sovereignty states, but between two Chinese political systems in which delineation of sovereignty has never been an issue.
3. Since sovereignty belong to the original nation (state)—China—, both the ROC and the PRC have *de facto* and temporarily separated jurisdictions under one *shared* sovereignty.
4. Relations between the ROC and PRC should not be handled by international law, but by special agreements between the two sides; relations of the two Chinese systems with other states, however, employ international law.
5. “One-China” does not refer either to the ROC or to the PRC but to the “historical, cultural, and geographical China” that has been in existence for thousands of years.

The above suggestions may be viewed as too optimistic and idealistic to be practiced. Yet if these developments following the introduction of the “multi-system nation” is any guide, one has reasons not to be too pessimistic to their possible application and impact in the future. Despite the ups and downs of cross-Taiwan-Strait relations, the leaders of both the ROC and the PRC have made considerable readjustments of their positions to accommodate the other system ranging from the definition of

“One China”, the establishment of interaction mechanisms, and the conduction of a series of cross-strait dialogues. (see Figure 5) It is thus the duty and mission of the leaders and scholars of the multi-system nations to learn from their own historical experience on division and unification, to seriously re-examine the utility of existing international law in dealing with inter-system relations, and to bravely and innovatively develop new concepts and principles to handle relations with the other political system in the same nation of shared history, geography, and cultural heritage.

-END-

Figure 5

**Multi-System Nations, Linkage Communities, and Intra-National Commonwealth:
A Paradigm and Flowchart on the Interaction between Conceptual Thinking and policies**

Conceived and drawn by Yung Wei

November 15, 1997

