

Drs. Deutsch and Wei compare views on the 'Taiwan Experience'

"Historical evolution tends not to lead to a certain outcome, and everyone has his own option. You could get a very authoritarian system because of the Confucian tradition, but it is still not necessary to say that is your only option. Every people and history has its choices. What the Chinese people are doing in Singapore, Hongkong, and Taiwan is a meaningful option for Chinese culture and history."

The words are those of political/social scientist Dr. Karl W. Deutsch. They are taken from a four-hour, marathon, on-the-record discussion with ROC political scientist Dr. Wei Yung. The session ranged over subject areas as concrete as land reform experiences in various countries, and as theoretical as the adequacy of social-science methodology in analyzing problems concerned in the confrontation between Communist countries and the world at large.

The Free China Review presents for its readers segments of the conversation that focus, for the most part, on modernization in the Republic of China and in the world, an editorial selection process necessitated solely by limitations of space and format.

Wei: Dr. Deutsch, it seems to me that Western social scientists habitually or unwittingly use a linear model to analyze phenomena in mainland China, but use a contingency model to deal with the future of the Republic of China. Consequently, mainland China is assumed to exist perpetually, and the ROC on Taiwan is assumed to confront constant challenge, trouble, and change. And it seems it is normal for many social scientists to contemplate a non-Communist country being incorporated by the Communist camp and to foresee the expansion of Communism. Aren't they being too conservative in their methodology and too pessimistic in their outlook?

Deutsch: It is hard enough for a society to steer itself; it is infinitely harder for a society to steer other societies from the outside. The Russians can't

steer Poland very well, and their efforts to influence German elections have failed. The Russian (attempt to exert) influence on Western Europe and the United States over the last half century has never been a success. I think, however, United States' efforts to steer what was going on in Russia and mainland China did not work either. By the same token, you can't steer even a small country easily. Therefore, it will be extraordinarily difficult for anyone to overthrow Taiwan. Your children look well-looked-after, and your young people look cheerful, well dressed, and healthy. I think you will be around at least as long as mainland China.

I have an ignorant question. From 1949 to 1972, East and West Germany both said the other should be abolished. In 1972, West Germany still held the view that the East German Communist leadership was illegitimate and should be abolished, but it publicly declared it would not use force against East Germany. And East Germany made the same declaration. Informally, mainland China has told the United States they would not use force against you, although I am not sure whether that could be believed or not. You seem, informally, not to be expecting to invade mainland China either. Is there any consideration that someday you and mainland China might make the same declaration as the Germans did in 1972?

Wei: Although we shall not give up our national goal of eventual reunification, we have declared that we shall rely primarily on political means to achieve the purpose. Actually, President Chiang Ching-kuo has formally informed Western reporters that we would rely on non-military means to recover the mainland. But the Communist Chinese have never officially declared that they will rule out the use of force against us. I think this is a problem confronting the United States.

Deutsch: Politicians come and go; governments change positions. It took Germans 23 years to rule out the possi-

bility of using force against each other, so it may take another 20 or 30 years for you to do the same. My impression is that international-relations scholars should start to take the position of assuming the Republic of China will stay, that reunification can be achieved through political means.

Wei: I accept your opinion that we are going to stay, but the question is whether they are going to stay. The government and people of the ROC find it hard to accept the notion that our mainland compatriots are to remain under the rule of the Communists for another 30 years?

Deutsch: Even if you don't accept it, what can you do about it?

Wei: There are several ways we can make things change in mainland China.

First, we can do it by providing a development model to people in mainland China. We have gone through the so-called "Taiwan Experience," actually the ROC's governing process in Taiwan. Second, we can provide a humane way of deciding political issues which is a much better substitute for their class struggle process. Third, through our contacts with their students abroad—when they return to the mainland, they will bring back the "Taiwan Experience," which will put pressure on the Communists to change. Fourth, we still maintain an active underground intelligence operation on mainland China. The classified documents obtained by our agents help us understand what is really going on in the mainland. In short, there are clear signs of widespread disillusionment with the Communists, particularly among intellectuals.

Deutsch: The Western way of life is better than that of the Communist camp. The Russians understand this perfectly well (by means of) their intellectuals returned from the West, or the influences of Western broadcasting. However, none of this has really changed the Soviet regime in the last 60 years.

Wei: The problem is that the West has no intention of using force, but the Communists never hesitate to do so. If Western social scientists keep on assuming that the Communist world will perpetually exist, and the Communists keep

on trying to overrun non-Communist countries, then that will lead us to view the expansion of the Communist camp as a normal and fated trend.

Deutsch: I agree with some of your points. But my observation is that there is more unity in the West than between Red China and Russia. The Communist countries split themselves. Empirically, the way I see the world is that the greater the Communist threat, the more the non-Communist countries will get closer to each other. The more we find mainland China threatens Taiwan, the more we find it is important (to concentrate on) defence of Taiwan. To me, the conspiracy between Russia and Communist China did not work. Or do you get the impression that there is a conspiracy? What do you see in that?

Wei: I never rule out a possible reconciliation between Russia and Red China. They have differences connected with obtaining leadership of the Communist camp and on boundary issues, but they share the same ideology. The actual situation is that a limited thaw between them has already started. Maybe that is why U.S. policy toward the mainland has become firmer. Mainland China now seems to be keeping an equal distance between Russia and the United States.

Deutsch: Of course, equal distance for mainland China means they want equal economic aid from the United States and Russia. But it also means equal difficulty in getting aid.

Governments change, groups change, and policies change—some can be reversed and some can't. Russia and mainland China are not the same as they were. Compared with (the periods of) Stalin's and Mao's massacres, the present mainland China and Russia are better. However, different policies of different dictatorships are like different diseases which people suffer. I think the most powerful and impressive thing is what you called the Taiwan Experience, not the agents you send to the mainland to get secret documents, nor the expectation of returned mainland Chinese students influencing the Communist regime. Your achievements on the island and how your people live are the most important.

Wei: Karl Wittfogel, in his theory of the so-called "oriental despotism," asserted that ancient "oriental" type societies such as China, developed a highly centralized almost despotic political system and as a result, the Chinese people were used to being ruled by authoritarian regimes. Wittfogel's theory has been cited frequently to support the existence of a Communist regime on mainland China. John King Fairbank basically concurred in this theory and believes that Chinese culture developed vertical relationships and a single value system, and that the intellectuals were always instruments of the emperors. What may have been implied is that Communism is merely an expansion of original Chinese culture, and the Chinese people may deserve a Communist regime. How do you react to a line of this kind?

Deutsch: Empirically speaking, historical evolution tends not to lead to a certain outcome. You could get a very authoritarian system because of the Confucian tradition, but it is still not necessary to say that is your only option. Every people and history has its choices. What the Chinese people are doing in Singapore, Hongkong, and Taiwan is a meaningful option for Chinese culture and history. In Taiwan you have parties, labor unions, and press to provide information to the government. Believe it or not, without correct and sufficient information, you don't get anywhere.

Wei: I couldn't agree with you more. It is crucial for any system to be aware of its options. The perception of limited range of options means limited decision making. If you fail to see all the options, you reduce your adaptability to a changing environment. No political system should allow anybody to have an overall say in what information should be en-

Dr. Wei, Yung was born May 5, 1937, in mainland China. He received his LL.B. from National Chengchi University, Republic of China, and his M.A. and Ph.D. at the University of Oregon, Eugene in 1963 and 1967. He has taught at both Chinese and American universities—the University of Nevada and Memphis State University in the U.S., and National Chengchi University and National Taiwan University in the Republic of China. He was a National Fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University in 1974-75, visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution in 1977, and deputy director of the Institute of International Relations in the Republic of China in 1975-76. Presently, he is the chairman of the Research, Development and Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan, Republic of China. Dr. Wei also teaches graduate course at National Taiwan University on a part-time basis. Dr. Wei is the author of *The Nature and Methods of Social Science; Science, Elite, and Modernization; Communist China: A System-Functional Reader*, and of many published articles.



tered into the decision making process. When the information input and the availability of options are blocked by some individuals, then the leader and the people are like someone watching closed circuit television—a very dangerous situation.

Deutsch: I don't know whether the Chinese put blinders over horses' eyes or not. In Europe, we put blinders over horses' eyes to prevent the horses from getting (confused) or disturbed, but we don't put blinders on the coachman. I think censorship is something like putting blinders on decision makers' eyes.

Wei: Exactly. Well, may we shift our subject of discussion to the process of modernization?

Deutsch: Sure.

Wei: Modernization is generally regarded as the transformation of an entire society—transition that involves social, political, cultural, and economic change.

I have three basic observations on modernization. First, I think modernization is an "umbrella" concept that embraces a variety of concepts such as democracy, pluralism, social change, political development, industrialization, etc. It is a very useful concept, but it is not necessarily an empirical one. Second, the relationships between democracy and modernization are time related. We all agree democracy is the best form of governing. But in the early stage of modernization, popular participatory systems may not be more efficient than an elite-centered decision making process in terms of mobilizing resources for rapid development. The Republic of China, the Republic of Singapore, and the Republic of Korea provide good examples. Third, modernization may not be a voluntary process. In my opinion, modernization has three dimensions

—materialistic, institutional, and behavioral. At the beginning, the non-Western world was forced to accept a portion of Western technology in order to preserve its original cultural system. This is the materialistic dimension. Then, the non-Western world became aware that in order to master materialistic dimensions, it needed to introduce institutional aspects—post, legal, communication, and school systems, etc.

And they found that was still not enough. They had to learn more from the West, and then entered the arenas of cultural and political and social aspects, which are behavioral dimensions. It is the most difficult stage, because it may induce a change in the nature of the system itself. Here we find the most resistance to Westernization in the non-Western world. In fact, how to preserve nations' own cultural heritage in the modernization process is the foremost challenge to the leaders of non-Western countries.

Deutsch: I have to confirm some of your points. Actually, the modernization of non-Western countries did not occur voluntarily, nor under conditions of Western democracy. When the industrial revolution started, England was an oligarchy in terms of social logic. The mass of workers had no right to vote until 1867—a hundred years after the industrial revolution. At that time, some thought it was a dangerous experiment.

Let us take one more example from Russian history. When Russia faced a serious food shortage, the potato was introduced, and then the peasants refused to eat them. They were ordered to plant potatoes, but they dug them out at night. So the Russian Tsar sent soldiers to guard the potatoes at night. Eventually, the peasants found the potatoes edible. There are many oligarchical or authoritarian features in European history during the modernization phases. It is not a specialty of non-Western countries. The success of modernization mainly depends on the displacement of the anti-modernization elites and on their replacement with pro-modernization ones. If you are lucky, although the landlord is against modernization, the son of the landlord will be for it. If you are less

lucky, both generations are against modernization. In Latin America, the sons of the landlords are not much better than their fathers. However, in northern Italy, in the time of Cavour, the 19th Century, a generation of improving landlords came onto the scene. So this is a historical question. Whether your elites are willing to modernize and improve your country, and whether they are good at it, are both very important. You spoke of many dimensions of modernization. I propose, for bookkeeping purposes, that there are six dimensions in political development and modernization:

The first is the need to accumulate capital, then to reproduce the capital stock as you develop and expand. If you behave in such a way and your machines are fewer each year, you are ruining yourselves. So that is tangible capital.

The second dimension goes for communication equipment. Both within the country and within the world, there is communication and transport. For example, what about your road system, airport system, radio and television, and all the rest of it? As stocks of such tangible material equipment decline, you will know less of the world than before.

The third tangible concern is preservation of your environment. I think if you have less industry, the sky of Taipei may be bluer. I have seen this in California and elsewhere. Sooner or later you will find you have only one natural environment. We have to do something to protect it. Chinese agriculture tradition is, incidentally, much more solicitous of environment than Indian culture. I have seen things in India, hillsides in ruin, which will never happen in China. This is a need, but not every culture and every country is equally aware of it. These are the three tangible things. Now we come to three immaterial things. They are not tangible, but they are real:

The first is human motivation. Are people culturally motivated to work, to achieve? Whether a country can be modernized depends on whether its people are highly motivated or not.

The second demand is solidarity. People are able to link up some large groups to look after them for whatever they need. In social science, we distin-



Dr. Karl W. Deutsch was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, July 21, 1912. He came to the United States in 1938 and was naturalized in 1948. He earned his doctorate in law and political science from Charles University at Prague in 1938, and his Ph.D. in government from Harvard University in 1951. He has taught at M.I.T. and Yale, and is currently teaching at Harvard. He is a director of the International Institution for Comparative Social Research, Science Center in West Berlin, a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a member of the National Academy of Sciences, the American Political Science Association and the International Political Science Association. Dr. Deutsch is the sole author of nine books and a co-writer of ten others. Among his publications, *The Nerve of Government*, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, and *The Analysis of International Relations* are most noted. Currently Dr. Deutsch is working on his "World Modeling" project, which is aimed at generating projective models of social, economic, and political trends at the global level.

guish between specific institutions—a dentist fixes your teeth but may not tell you how to cope with your child doing badly in school—and diffuse organizations, which are generally competent for everything. On the small group level, this is the family. No matter what is wrong, you can ask your wife or your relatives. At the large scale level, there is the nation. You go to the nation for a school system, for drawing unemployment compensation, social security... everything from your nation. Solidarity means an individual doesn't feel he is left over, left alone to perish.

When I was listening to your very able, very interesting, and very inspiring Minister of Economics, I had the feeling that he knew very much about capital stock, communication equipment, and motivation, but he may underestimate the importance of the solidarity dimension. As your country develops, the individual should not feel more helpless, more endangered, but he should feel safer. Roosevelt understood the security dimension, so he introduced the Social Security Act in the 1930s. And I think Confucius had pretty good ideas about it.

Now here is the last one, a dimension which people complain about in Western Europe. Is there room for spontaneity, for an individual? Do the parents still tell a child what he is supposed to do for his future? Is there room for new small groups where you can develop your own personality, like the Green Party in Germany? The typical opposition party now in West Europe is composed of: 3—environmental preservation, 5—solidarity, and 6—spontaneity; and the typical old-line labor parties stress: 1—capital accumulation, 4—motivation and 5—solidarity. You can use large scale survey data to check this out. Different combinations of these dimensions give differing profiles to our European political parties. I think you mentioned multi-dimension development; let me see, what phase of development must be stressed?

Wei: Here in Taiwan, we might have emphasized materialistic aspects too much, while the human side of our modernization may not have received enough attention. Presently, we have entered the stage in which the pressures on the government come basically from the people who no longer are satisfied with materialistic aspects of modernization. Although their parents still would like to have one more air conditioner or a new car, the children have different values. They're more concerned over spontaneity, social welfare, environment, and cultural aspects.

To go back to your original point, I

think that the elite-oriented oligarchical system might have been the kind of system under which modernization more frequently occurred. The more I read various writings on modernization, the more I am aware that the basic modes of the scholars doing the writing are normative, not empirical. They express what should have happened rather than what actually happened.

I think that the process of modernization is a phased one. First, the elites decide to modernize their society. If they are wise and lucky enough, they get things moving. After they have changed the economic conditions of the people, raised the level of education, and improved the social structure, then they are confronted with the problem of democracy—whether they are willing to share power with the new emerging elites, who are competent and want to have a say in future directions, and at the same time whether the rising new social class has patience, so as not to make extreme demands that the government finds difficult to respond to. Both are critical to the success of modernization in a society.

One side of modernization is the increase of a society's capabilities, and the other side is the sharing of the fruits of modernization, including political power. If the power sharing expands too fast, it may create the problem of "over assimilation," a phenomenon discussed by Karl Mannheim, which may, in turn, destroy the growing process. Therefore, modernization requires the governing elites to be willing to share the decision making process with the intellectuals on the one hand; it also requires that the intellectuals be patient in entering the process.

I can give you a concrete example. In 1951, the total of college graduates in the Republic of China on Taiwan was about 86,000, and most of them either worked for the government or taught at the universities. Now, among the 18 million people on Taiwan, we have 1,080,000 college graduates. Yet only about half of the 400,000 government employees are college graduates. That means 850,000 of the college graduates are in the private sector. Therefore, every time a public servant with a college degree says one thing, he may be criticized by four-and-a-half equally qualified college graduates in the private sector. The situation makes some of my colleagues in the government somewhat uneasy. Thirty years ago, no one challenged what we said or our policies. Now we must listen to the public both in policy-making and policy implementations. This is a new phenomenon created by the success, not failure, on our modernization process.

How to cope with the results of modernization is a real problem. Can the ruling elites who used to play the roles of the "teachers" and "preachers" of

modernization listen to people who are younger and better educated? And have the new intellectuals the patience to enter the decision making process in a modest way?

Deutsch: I quite agree. There is a difference between the traditional aristocratic ruler and the role of teacher. The ruler is somebody who by descent or by Confucian scholarship is supposed to be permanently superior to those whom he rules. The relationship between teachers and students is that, if you are a really good teacher, your students will know more than you do in the future. In politics, they have the same relationship, also reversible. The once-ruled become more intelligent than the once-ruling.

Now again, let us go back to European history. In 1821, the Prussian government sent officials to Berlin to discuss with local businessmen whether there should be a customs union for all of Germany. When they came and talked to them, they were appalled. The businessmen were uneducated, knew very little, but the bureaucrats had been to university and studied economics. They knew much more. But by the end of the century, in the 20th Century, there were more people outside the government who know as much or more than the bureaucrats, than there were people inside the government. That is to say, the balance of knowledge between the government and society had been reversed. You must do something about the distribution of power.

Wei: Yes, that is a very correct point. How to cope with this is a challenge for us. We have responded to the problems by upgrading the quality of our bureaucrats. Premier Sun and others are all for bringing new blood into the government. However, no matter how hard we try, there is no way we can regenerate the 1951 situation, when the public sector was much superior to the private sector. In the present social and economic structure, there are always more intellectuals in private business than in the government. So what are we going to do? We have to solve the problem by letting good people run for available positions. We have many positions that can be dedicated to bringing new people into the government.

Deutsch: The elections....Do you have a senior list of candidates, so the problem is really who gets nominated? Or do you have several candidates running against each other? How do you do that?

Wei: In general, there are always several candidates running for one position. Very few candidates run for positions unopposed. At present, the ruling party usually gets more than 70 percent of the vote, but the independents are getting more influential. In other words, if you are good, particularly at the local

level, your chance of getting the position is pretty good.

Deutsch: Can you run against party nominees?

Wei: Yes, you can.

Deutsch: And you can get elected?

Wei: Yes.

Deutsch: How many independents are elected?

Wei: The vote obtained by independents has been running about thirty percent; the seats vary in different types of elections. For instance, for the 22 cities and counties, the independents won six mayor and magistrate positions.

In addition to elections, debates in our legislative bodies and breakfasts chaired by the Premier, in which the businessmen and industrialists are invited to participate, are other channels for political communications and participation. The ruling party also hosts many kinds of meetings in which intellectuals, journalists, and businessmen participate. All these efforts aim at providing sufficient processed and opportunities for two-way communication between the government and the elites or the general public outside of the government.

Deutsch: Now you have another problem that, at least, was typical for Europe. The independents there are often the people we used to call, in Europe, the notables—local elites. They have education and some money. They can afford to run as independents and sometimes win the government party nominations. But not all highly gifted babies in the country are born in the families of notables. There are some very bright young men whose parents are farmers or workers. They usually can not run as independents because they have no money. They can only get into the decision making process if they have an organization behind them. Is there any possibility for them here?

Wei: We have a growing number of voluntary associations on Taiwan, but we have no formal, legalized lobby process. Since the land reform, the social structure has changed; the family dominated election you mention is gone. Floating voters increasingly affect the local elections. This is particularly true in newly urbanized areas. The new political groups are trying to obtain these voters. Thus if anyone is interested in running for a public position, there is always something for him to do about it.

Running for a political position is costly on the island. You need money, and consequently many candidates are connected with big organizations. This government is trying very hard to reduce the impact of money on the elections.

Deutsch: You have the same problem as in the United States.

Wei: I view this as a transitional problem. In a mature society, people generally are sarcastic and cynical about

their politicians, and they are not very interested in politics. But in a transitional society, people are wealthy enough to become interested in politics, yet are not experienced enough to understand that the politicians do not always deliver what they promise during the campaigns. The political process sometimes gets very heated. In a big city like Taipei, if you stand in the street and make a speech, not many people will listen to you—they are too busy. But in a small town in Taiwan, if you make a speech on a street corner, people will gather and listen to you. My opinion is that, given constant and stable development toward modernization, the heat for politics will go down and the sophistication will increase, and that will be good for our political system. If the heat doesn't go down, and more money is dumped into the election process, that will be a big problem.

Deutsch: Right. The groups put more money in; they have concrete and short-term interests which are not necessarily in accord with national interests. This is where Confucius comes in again. By the way let me make a remark here. You just referred to the curve relationship of political zeal and experience.

“

...you are maintaining options not only for yourself, but also for the people on the mainland.

”

Could this by any chance be applied to world politics? When people have little knowledge of world politics, they don't care about the rest of the world. In the time of jet planes, coming from everywhere in a few hours, and of radio, broadcasting world news everyday, you get tremendous amounts of zeal. The Communist countries wanted the whole world to become Communist; the Communists wanted to promote great changes in Communizing countries. Everybody thinks that very great change can be brought about.

It is conceivable that after 30 or 40 years, people might say: "Well, something can be done, only it will take more time."

In the Communist case, the changes led to a worse situation. At the moment, the zeal for politics on the curve is still very high, and we may be on the peak of the curve. When Stalin's empire and Mao launching the cultural revolution were both at the peak of the change curve, they thought they could change the world very much.

Wei: I have studied the level of satisfaction of Chinese students in the United States and of those who have returned to

Taiwan. And I found a "U" curve phenomenon. It begins with a high level of satisfaction among the new arrivals, then curves down to dissolution in one or two years; and then the satisfaction level rises again, and after that comes fluctuation, a plateau. The plateau represents maturity; a mature society, like a mature individual, does not have drastic ups and downs, but always adjusts to the situation.

Deutsch: That is very good. I like that. What is your next one.

Wei: I am curious—asking how you would evaluate the process of modernization in Taiwan?

Deutsch: I think you have a viable society here, one that is functioning. You are doing much better than other transitional countries. The first thing that strikes me deeply is how well looked-after your children look...all over. If social inequality is very bad in a society, you see undernourished children, very badly clad. In Taipei, Tainan, and in the neighborhoods, your children look well looked-after. A society that looks after most of its children must do something right. It is most important to me. I also have seen it in the behavior of the parents to their children and children to each other. In Japan, I have only seen children carried by mothers, but in this country, again and again, fathers carry their children. I don't know whether Confucius foresaw this, or if it is an innovation of the Republic of China on the island. It says something about your society.

One day I saw two children crossing a street; the bigger one put two arms around his little brother. I haven't seen this in other countries. I wish somebody could have taken a quick photograph of it. That would be a picture showing something about your culture: One small child protecting another small child is what I call the solidarity dimension. The solidarity at least works for the children, if it doesn't work in your housing. Your housing is very unequally distributed, and you have too few parks. I understand you cannot do all at once. After all, my impression is that you have a culture that works and offers a viable passage for development—that means you are maintaining options not only for yourself, but also for the people on the mainland.

I know that people can use their arms to put around each other, or use elbows. Sometimes, you have problems here too—there are some who want to be an elbow country. You can become a joined-hand society or an elbow society. You have presented an option that many countries can go after. I think you ought to invite lots of Latin American delegations to come here; they can learn from you.

The other thing that strikes me is a kind of political miracle. When an elite is

displaced by a big political event like a revolution, mostly, he spends the rest of his life in exile complaining about someone else's faults and repeating that everything he did was right. Kerensky, under whom the old Russia was destroyed, kept explaining to me that he had done everything right. Here your government seems to have learned from the past. I have visited many countries, but rarely any country that, like you, puts people of ability at the top rather than those people who do the same thing over again. I have talked to three ministers of your government; they are very intelligent.

What you do here is news in world politics, in terms of comparative politics.

The other thing is that when you retreated from the mainland, you brought a tremendous amount of talented people to the island. It is usually to be expected that only such conservative, original per-

sons would rule the island. But apparently your political leaders are willing to reform. That has not frequently happened in history. Hungary and Austria both have become small countries from a big empire, and their ruling elites have learned nothing from their pasts. But you have learned quite a lot, coming from ruling a big country to a small place. It is unusual, but it is lucky for the country.

The last point on this elite business: If I understood your Premier correctly, you have a radically new idea of what peasant needs are and what land reform is. In most countries in the world, people have imagined that land reform consists in giving the peasant a lot of land from a landlord and then letting the peasant lose it. Your government understood that when you let the peasant have his land, the first thing he needed was credit and better seeds—then, the county agent's

information. You have incorporated the American county agent system and the credit cooperative system of Western Europe. Your agriculture association ought to translate it all into Spanish and introduce it to Latin Americans. This is well done and unique, and it seems to work—you have produced more rice than you ever did.

Wei: You have said a great many nice things about us. Would you like to make some suggestions?

Deutsch: Your environment looks as bad as Los Angeles, in the United States. People can leave L.A. for the national parks, but here it is not so easy. The second thing is solidarity. Is everybody insured against illness?

Wei: Not everyone. Workers and government employees are insured.

Deutsch: Western Europe sees only little disability, because health insurance has become universal. The United States

at least has health insurance for everyone over 65. That is one part of solidarity. You probably can find a passage from Confucius speaking about the responsibility of the ruler for the ruled. Medical insurance will increase your social stability.

The third thing is spontaneity for the young—so they can have their say even if you don't agree with them. When an European professor teaches in the United States, he is usually surprised by the frequent interruptions of American students. In Europe that doesn't happen. But you have much more give-and-take between professors and students. Participation means letting the young person feel he is a partner and his opinion will be heard. That is spontaneity in the process of modernization.... —**Reported by Lew Wei-liang**