


# Polity

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## Racial Attitudes and the Wallace Vote: A Study of the 1968 Election in Memphis\*

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This is a study of voting behavior in the 1968 presidential election, with the vote for George C. Wallace of the American Independent Party as the focus of analysis. The setting is Memphis, Tennessee, and the method is multivariate contingency analysis of survey data. Several factors motivated the authors to conduct this research. First, the emergence of George Wallace and the American Independent Party as an important political force in the 1968 election aroused much discussion and speculation. Second, although there have been a few studies conducted by social scientists of the Wallace movement, their analyses have been primarily based on aggregate data. Third, thus far analysis of Wallace support has been conducted only in northern cities and not in the South. Fourth, an understanding both of the nature and the scope of the Wallace phenomena should increase our understanding of the political climate of the United States and the rôle of third parties.

### I. The Setting

The city of Memphis, Tennessee, has a population of approximately 600,000, of which forty percent are Negroes and sixty percent are white. Although located in a peripheral southern state, Memphis is predominantly Southern in character.<sup>1</sup> Machine politics personified in the person of E. H. "Boss" Crump virtually controlled Memphis and Shelby County politics for more than forty years, 1910 to 1954.<sup>2</sup> Since Crump's death in 1954 Memphis politics seldom attracted national attention until April 4, 1968, when Martin Luther King came to the city to support the strike staged by the Negro sanitation workers, and was assassinated.

Memphis is the center of a cotton-producing area and one of the largest cotton-distribution centers in the world. Thus, local politics is

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<sup>1</sup>See William E. Wright, *Memphis Politics: A Study in Racial Bloc Voting* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962), pp. 2-3.

<sup>2</sup>For a recent biography of "Boss" Crump, see W. D. Miller, *Mr. Crump of Memphis* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1964).

generally oriented toward other cotton-producing states. The dominant southern environment of Memphis produces a type of Democrat and electorate which has been basically southern conservative. For instance in 1964 the state of Tennessee was carried by Johnson, but Goldwater was able to attract a sizable vote among Memphis voters.<sup>3</sup> *The New Deal, Fair Deal, and welfare statism* have not been generally accepted by influential southern whites who have feared the thrust of these programs as a threat to their status in both racial and economic terms. The migration of Negroes into Memphis from Mississippi, Arkansas, and other neighboring areas, was not without some impact on Memphis politics. Being poor, these Negroes frequently looked to the city for the provision of social services. Negro organizations and leaders began to emerge in the 1950's, with their first real show of strength appearing in the city municipal election of August 18, 1959.<sup>4</sup> Today, three Negroes sit on the City Council of thirteen members.

## II. The Method

In conducting research on the Wallace third party movement, the authors started with the basic hypothesis that racial attitude, rather than the socioeconomic status of the voter, was the key independent variable in Wallace support. We proposed to test this hypothesis against survey data collected in Memphis during the 1968 presidential election.

A questionnaire containing questions on several variables was developed. The independent variables were sex, age, education, racial origin, type of residence, religious affiliation, income, occupation, class identification, party affiliation, support for issues, residence, source of information on political candidates and issues, attitude toward open housing, and attitude toward integration. The dependent variables were voting intention and the actual vote. This questionnaire was used as the primary means of collecting data; residents in five selected areas within the city of Memphis were interviewed. These five areas were selected according to census tracts with the

<sup>3</sup>Election figures: Johnson, 112,306; Goldwater, 100,498. *Commercial Appeal*, Memphis, Tennessee (November 5, 1964), p. 14.

<sup>4</sup>A local Negro lawyer, Russell Sugarmon, ran second in a field of five for the office of Public Works Commissioner. The winner, William Farris, polled 58,951 votes to 35,237 for Mr. Sugarmon. A total of five Negroes ran on the city ballot. *Commercial Appeal*, Memphis, Tennessee, (August 21, 1959), p. 1.

racial make-up and the locations of the different areas as the criteria for selection. What the authors had in mind was to select these areas according to various compositions of Negroes and whites from different locations within the city.

A total of 359 respondents were chosen from the five selected areas and were interviewed two weeks before the election and two weeks after.<sup>5</sup> The purpose of interviewing the respondents twice was to detect changes in their voting behavior as well as their reaction to the outcome of the election. The data produced by this two-wave interview were coded on data cards and then analyzed by a multivariate contingency tabulation computer program developed by A. Sokol and H. Dempster of the University of British Columbia.<sup>6</sup>

### III. The Findings

The 1968 voter population in Memphis was made up of stable and consistent voters. According to our data, there was very little shifting between the voting intention indicated by the respondents during the interviews before the election and the actual vote they reported after the election. Among 359 respondents in the sample, 226 voted in the election. Of these 226 voters, only ten changed their voting intention.

### IV. The 1968 Presidential Election in Memphis: An Issue-Oriented Election

This stability of voters in the 1968 election can be partially explained by their overwhelming concern for issues as opposed to party affiliation and the personal appeal of the candidates. Of 359 respondents, 230, or 64.1 percent, selected "issues" as the most important factor determining their voting intention, 13.1 percent selected party as the factor, only 7.2 percent picked out the "personal appeal" of the presidential candidates.

Among respondents indicating a preference for various candidates, the Wallace supporters showed the highest concern for issues; 86.2 percent of the Wallace supporters indicated that they supported Wallace because of the positions he had advocated on various issues. As

<sup>5</sup>In identifying the respondents in each selected area, the methods developed by Charles H. Backstrom and Gerald D. Hursh were applied. See Charles H. Backstrom and Gerald D. Hursh, *Survey Research* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 23-63.

<sup>6</sup>A. Sokol and H. Dempster, *Multivariate Contingency Tabulations* (Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia, 1963). (Mimeograph)

for the Humphrey and Nixon supporters, less than 72 percent of them chose issues as the factor for support. (See Table I)

TABLE I  
*Candidate Preference and Factors for Support*

CANDIDATE PREFERENCE	PERSONAL			TOTAL	
	APPEAL	ISSUES	PARTY	%	(N)
Humphrey	9.9	71.0	19.1	100	(131)
Nixon	6.1	72.0	21.9	100	(82)
Wallace	9.2	86.2	4.6	100	(87)
					<u>(300)</u>

$$X^2 = 12.54 \quad P < .05$$

If issues played an important role in determining the support for a candidate in the 1968 presidential election, we may ask, "What were these issues?" According to the responses in our survey, the most important issue in the election was the war in Vietnam; the second most important issue was "law and order"; and the third was civil rights. When asked in an open-ended question, "What do you think is the single most important issue in the present presidential campaign?" 43.7 percent of the respondents singled out the war in Vietnam; 22.8 percent referred to "law and order"; and 13.9 percent pointed out civil rights.

When we correlated issue orientation with candidate preference, the respondents most concerned with "law and order" tended to vote for either Wallace or Nixon. As for those who were most concerned with the war in Vietnam, more than half voted for Nixon. Of the people who are most concerned with the civil rights issue 86.7 percent supported Humphrey. Given the position of the Democratic Party on civil rights issues, this is hardly surprising.

One of the major concerns of observers of the 1968 election was: Which party would be hurt more by the Wallace vote? Data collected in our survey clearly demonstrated that the Wallace movement hurt the Democrats more than the Republicans. Of all respondents who had indicated their party affiliation as Democrats, 20.9 percent voted for Wallace. In contrast, only 13.7 percent of the Republicans did so.

The damage inflicted by the Wallace movement on the strength of the Democratic Party became more obvious when we related party affiliation with actual vote, controlling the variable of race. As shown by Table II, among eighty-four white voters who had identified with the Democratic party, 44.1 percent voted for Wallace, 33.3 percent for Nixon, and only 22.6 percent for Humphrey. In contrast to the

Democrats, only 17.4 percent of the people who had identified with the Republican party shifted their vote to Wallace. Hence, we may conclude that although the Wallace vote cut into the support for both major parties in Memphis, it hurt the Democratic party more.

TABLE II  
*Party Affiliation and the Actual Vote Among Whites*

PARTY AFFILIATION	HUMPHREY	NIXON	WALLACE	TOTAL	
				%	(N)
Democrat	22.6	33.3	44.1	100	(84)
Republican	—	82.6	17.4	100	(35)
American Independent	3.0	30.3	66.7	100	(33)
					(152)
	$\chi^2 = 38.27$		$P < .001$		

#### V. Race and Voting Preference: Polarization Between the Whites and the Negroes

In the 1968 presidential election, Shelby County (which includes the city of Memphis) was captured by Humphrey with 82,330 votes; Wallace ranked second with 76,669 votes, and Nixon third with 72,902.<sup>7</sup> The local newspaper, *The Commercial Appeal*, speculated that "the formula for the local Humphrey victory is simple: Precincts with large numbers of Negro voters balloted heavily for the Vice-President while he was picking up only light support from white voters throughout the county. Nixon and Wallace closely divided the majority of the white votes."<sup>8</sup> This interpretation is generally supported by our data.

TABLE III  
*Race and Voting Intentions*

RACIAL GROUP	HUMPHREY	NIXON	WALLACE	TOTAL	
				%	(N)
White	11.8	46.2	42.0	100	(186)
Negro	94.3	5.7	—	100	(122)
					(308)
	$\chi^2 = 203.74$		$P < .001$		

<sup>7</sup>According to election figures released by *The Commercial Appeal*, Memphis, Tennessee, (November 10, 1968), Section 6, p. 2.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

As data in Table III reveal, 88.2 percent of the white voters voted either for Nixon or for Wallace; only 11.8 percent of them cast their vote for Humphrey. The Negro voters, on the other hand, voted overwhelmingly for Humphrey, 94.3 percent. Only 5.7 percent of the Negro voters cast their vote for Nixon; and *none* voted for Wallace. In a study of the 1959 municipal election of Memphis, William E. Wright reported the emergence of racial bloc voting in the city by examining aggregate data of the election.<sup>9</sup> Our data further demonstrated that racial blocs not only played an important role in the municipal election, they also had a decisive impact upon the local presidential balloting.

Other than having an effect upon voting preference, the race identification of a voter also had an impact on his choice of the important issues involved in the campaign. Although both white and Negro voters most frequently selected the war in Vietnam as the most important issue (38.5 percent for the whites, 40.8 percent for the Negroes), the choice between "law and order" and "civil rights" sharply divided the two racial groups. Thus, 33.3 percent of the whites selected "law and order" as the most important issue, in contrast to 13.2 percent of the Negroes. On the other hand, 21 percent of the Negroes selected "civil rights", with only 2.8 percent of the whites choosing that as the most important issue.

#### VI. Socioeconomic Variables and the Wallace Vote—No Clear-Cut Explanation

The Wallace support has often been explained in terms of the socioeconomic structure of the American society. Diversified and even contradictory interpretations have been offered by reporters and columnists using socioeconomic factors as the basis of their analysis. Some, noticing the populist content of the Wallace campaign, have asserted that groups such as the working class, lower and lower-middle income people, small businessmen, the lower and medium educated people have tended to support Wallace more than other segments of the society. Others who have detected the conservative sentiment of the Wallace movement have claimed that the Wallace support comes from medium or high income regions, from the middle or upper-middle classes, from the more educated people, and from the professional or managerial groups.

A few empirical studies have been conducted to investigate the socioeconomic status of the Wallace supporters. The results, however, are far from conclusive. For instance, Michael Rogin, using

<sup>9</sup>See Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-31.

TABLE IV Socio-Economic Variables and Voting Preference Among Whites

SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES	HUMPHREY	NIXON	WALLACE	TOTAL	
				%	(N)
Education					
Post Graduate	—	50.0%	50.0%	100	(16)
College graduate	20.4	67.0	12.6	100	(24)
Some college	15.6	50.0	34.4	100	(32)
High School	11.5	40.3	48.2	100	(67)
Elementary	33.3	22.2	44.5	100	(9)
					<u>(148)</u>
		$(X^2 = 15.88^*$	$P < .01)$		
Income					
Higher income	4.2%	55.0%	40.8%	100	(47)
Middle income	12.5	46.4	41.1	100	(56)
Lower income	24.0	30.4	45.6	100	(46)
					<u>(149)</u>
		$(X^2 = 0.3138^*$	$P > .80)$		
Class Identification					
Upper	—	40.0%	60.0%	100	(5)
Upper-Middle	4.4	66.7	28.9	100	(45)
Middle	23.4	39.2	37.4	100	(101)



Lower-Middle	22.7	36.4	40.9	100	(22)
Lower Class	—	16.7	83.3	100	(6)
		( $X^2 = 8.278^*$ )	( $P < .10$ )		(179)
Self-Classification of Job					
White Collar	8.3%	60.4%	31.3%	100	(96)
Blue Collar	20.0	22.2	57.8	100	(45)
		( $X^2 = 9.005^*$ )	( $P < .01$ )		(141)
Occupation					
Professional	—	80.0%	20.0%	100	(10)
Business	8.7	52.1	39.2	100	(23)
Elem. & High School Teachers	28.6	57.1	14.3	100	(7)
Military	—	33.3	66.7	100	(3)
White Collar	5.7	54.3	40.0	100	(35)
Skilled Blue Collar	13.8	20.7	65.5	100	(29)
Unskilled Blue Collar	21.4	21.4	57.2	100	(14)
Housewife	15.2	54.5	30.3	100	(33)
		( $X^2 = 14.81^*$ )	( $P < .05$ )		(154)

\*When computing chi-squares for this table, both Nixon and Humphrey supporters are combined into one category.

aggregate election data from the 1964 Democratic primary, discovered in his research in Wisconsin that the Wallace supporters tended to come from high income, higher education, and suburban groups.<sup>10</sup> Rogin also found that Wallace ran better in the Republican areas than the Democratic regions of Wisconsin.<sup>11</sup> In another comparative study of the aggregate election data on the 1964 primaries in Maryland, Indiana, and Wisconsin, M. Margaret Conway obtained inconsistent results concerning the relationship between votes for Wallace and socioeconomic variables.<sup>12</sup> She found a negative correlation between income and voting for Wallace in Maryland, yet a positive correlation between these two variables in Indiana and Wisconsin. She also reported a negative correlation between the percentage of white collar workers in a county and the Wallace support in Maryland, but a small positive correlation between the two variables in Indiana and Wisconsin.<sup>13</sup>

In conducting the present research, we started with the hypothesis that because of the city's southern environment, the Wallace vote would come from all socioeconomic strata and that socioeconomic variables would not show significant relationships.

In testing this hypothesis, we controlled for race and correlated the socioeconomic data of white respondents and their vote. The socioeconomic variables are education, income, class identification, self-identification of job types, and occupational roles. Findings of this study reveal a complex situation. With the exception of income, as shown in Table IV the other variables have, to a greater or lesser extent, significant contingent relationships with the Wallace vote. Judging from the chi-square tests and percentages, education and self-classification of jobs have the most significant relationship with the Wallace vote. Generally speaking, less-educated people, blue-collar workers, and lower as well as lower-middle classes tend to support Wallace more than better-educated, white-collar workers, and self-identified upper-middle classes. But it also should be pointed out that Wallace did receive substantial support from the upper class, businessmen, white-collar, higher-income groups, as well as from those who have received postgraduate education. Thus, Wallace managed to obtain sizable support from people of most socioeconomic

<sup>10</sup>Michael Rogin, "Wallace and the Middle Class: The White Backlash in Wisconsin," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, xxx (Spring, 1966), pp. 98-108.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 104.

<sup>12</sup>M. Margaret Conway, "The White Backlash Re-examined: Wallace and the 1964 Primaries," *Social Science Quarterly*, xlix (December, 1968), pp. 710-719.

<sup>13</sup>Conway, *op. cit.*, p. 713.

brackets, and consequently his support cannot be explained solely in socioeconomic terms.

Although there is no clear-cut relationship between socioeconomic variables and the vote for Wallace, the highly significant contingent association between education and occupation and Wallace support calls for some explanation. Our interpretation is that education and occupation are the variables that have the greatest effect on a person's socialization process. The level and kind of education a person receives more or less determines his breadth of knowledge, social attitudes, and political orientation. Self-perceived occupational roles generally help an individual identify his role in the society and his relationship with other individuals and groups in it.

These observations on the role of education and occupation as agents of socialization led the authors to suspect that the Wallace vote might be related to social issues. The recognizable, though often denied, antim minority themes of the Wallace campaign further reinforced our suspicion. We, therefore, decided to investigate the relationship between racial attitude and the Wallace vote.

## VII. Racial Attitudes and the Wallace Vote—The Key Variables

In order to identify the racial attitudes of the voters in Memphis, we chose attitude toward school integration, attitude toward open housing, and attitude toward integration-segregation in general as three inter-related indicators.<sup>14</sup> Responses to these three items have been correlated with voting preference, and the results strongly support our hypothesis that voting for Wallace was related to a person's racial attitudes.

Data in Table v strongly demonstrate that the more strongly a person was against school integration and open housing, the more likely it was that he would support Wallace, and also that the more strongly he was for segregation in general, the more strongly he tended to vote for the third party candidate. Data in the same table also demonstrate that the more strongly a person was for school integration, open housing, and integration in general, the greater his tendency would be to vote for Humphrey.

Having clearly established the fact that there was a significant correlation between racial attitudes and the Wallace vote, we wanted to

<sup>14</sup>Selection of indicators of racial attitudes was partly based upon the article by Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "Southern Racial Attitudes: Conflicts, Awareness, and Political Change," *Annals*, cccxliii (November, 1962), pp. 108-121.

see whether there were independent relationships between these two sets of variables after controlling for the socioeconomic variables. To find this out, we selected attitude toward integration and segregation in general as the major independent variable and related it to the actual vote while, at the same time, controlling education, income, class identification, and types of jobs individually in turn. (Since no Negro had cast his vote for Wallace, we isolated the white voters before running the correlations.) The results are presented in Tables v, vi, vii, and viii.

Data in the above-mentioned tables clearly illustrate that irrespective of one's education, income, class identification, and type of job, the more deeply he was for segregation, the more likely it was that he would vote for Wallace. Of all these relationships, the most interesting is the one between racial attitude and the Wallace vote controlled for income. As we demonstrated in Table iv, there is no significant relationship between income and the Wallace vote. Yet in Table vii, after income is controlled, a significant contingency relationship is revealed between the two variables.<sup>15</sup> This helps explain why income alone fails to account for the Wallace vote.

Conway has reported that there were significant correlations between the percentage of Negroes in a county and the extent of the Wallace vote.<sup>16</sup> Rogin also has tried to explain the Wallace support by the strength of anti-Negro sentiment among the urban middle class.<sup>17</sup> Our findings, to a greater or lesser extent, support the discovery and explanation of these two researchers. We have shown, however, that racial attitude was a determining independent variable on the Wallace support, not only in the middle class, but also among all educational, income, class and occupational groups as well.

### VIII Summary

By multivariate analysis of survey data on the 1968 presidential election in Memphis, Tennessee, we obtained findings which basically support our hypothesis that the Wallace vote was not merely based on socioeconomic structure, but was heavily influenced by the racial

<sup>15</sup>Because of the extremely small number of entries in the tables concerning lower-educated, lower-income, and lower-class, the chi-square test is somewhat less significant. For a discussion of this, see Sidney Siegel, *Non-parametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 109-110, 200-201.

<sup>16</sup>Conway, *op. cit.*, pp. 713, 717-719.

<sup>17</sup>Rogin, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-108.

TABLE V  
*Racial Attitude and Voting Preference Among Whites*

RACIAL ATTITUDES	HUMPHREY	NIXON	WALLACE	%	TOTAL
Attitude toward School Integration					
Strongly for it	30.0	40.0	30.0	100	(10)
For it	24.14	55.17	20.69	100	(58)
Undecided	10.34	51.72	37.94	100	(29)
Against it	2.40	47.60	50.00	100	(42)
Strongly against it	3.03	21.21	75.76	100	(33)
			( $X^2 = 35.24$ )	( $P < .001$ )	(172)
Attitude toward Open Housing					
Agree	37.83	35.13	27.04	100	(37)
Hard to Say	4.26	45.74	50.00	100	(94)
Opposed	—	60.71	39.29	100	(28)
			( $X^2 = 42.15$ )	( $P < .001$ )	(159)
Attitude toward Integration					
More Integration	31.42	40.00	28.58	100	(35)
Like present situation	10.90	63.63	25.47	100	(55)
More Segregation	4.00	36.00	60.00	100	(75)
			( $X^2 = 33.47$ )	( $P < .001$ )	(165)

TABLE VI  
*Relationship Between Attitude Toward Integration and Voting Behavior  
 With Education Controlled*

EDUCATION INTEGRATION- SEGREGATION	NON-WALLACE		WALLACE		TOTAL	
					%	(N)
Higher Education						
More integration	81.8		18.2		100	(11)
Status quo	81.2		18.8		100	(16)
More segregation	36.4		63.6		100	(11)
	$(X^2 = 7.36$		$P < .05)$			
Medium Education						
More integration	77.8		22.2		100	(18)
Status quo	68.5		31.5		100	(35)
More segregation	47.5		52.5		100	(40)
	$(X^2 = 6.05$		$P < .05)$			
Lower Education						
More integration	100.0		—		100	(2)*
Status quo	—		100.0		100	(1)
More segregation	25.0		75.0		100	(4)
	$(X^2 = 3.94$		$P < .20)$			

\*The small numbers resulted from low turn-out rate of the lower-educated respondents.

TABLE VII  
*Attitudes Toward Integration and Voting Behavior  
 With Income Controlled*

INCOME	ATTITUDE TOWARD INTEGRATION	NON-WALLACE	WALLACE	%	TOTAL (N)
Higher Income	More Integration	75.0	25.0	100	(8)
	Status quo	80.4	19.6	100	(21)
	More segregation	33.3	66.7	100	(12)
		( $X^2 = 8.07$ )	P < .02)		
Medium Income	More integration	91.6	8.4	100	(12)
	Status quo	70.6	29.4	100	(17)
	More segregation	40.0	60.0	100	(20)
		( $X^2 = 9.21$ )	P < .01)		
Lower Income	More integration	50.0	50.0	100	(6)
	Status quo	100.0	—	100	(2)
	More segregation	37.5	62.5	100	(8)
	( $X^2 = 2.5$ )	P < .30)			

TABLE VIII  
*Attitude Toward Integration and Vote  
 With Class Identification Controlled*

CLASS IDENTIFICATION ATTITUDE TOWARD INTEGRATION	VOTING PREFERENCE		WALLACE	%	TOTAL (N)
	NON-WALLACE	WALLACE			
Higher Class					
More integration	100.0	—		100	(5)
Status quo	83.3	16.7		100	(18)
More segregation	50.0	50.0		100	(14)
	$(X^2 = 6.58$		$P < .05)$		
Middle Class					
More integration	83.3	16.7		100	(18)
Status quo	67.9	32.1		100	(28)
More segregation	40.0	60.0		100	(30)
	$(X^2 = 9.84$		$P < .01)$		
Lower Class					
More integration	40.0	60.0		100	(5)
Status quo	80.0	20.0		100	(5)
More segregation	33.3	66.7		100	(6)
	$(X^2 = 2.67$		$P < .30)$		



TABLE IX  
*Attitude Toward Integration and Voting Behavior  
 With Types of Jobs Controlled*

TYPES OF JOBS ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION	VOTING PREFERENCE		WALLACE	%	TOTAL (N)
	NON-WALLACE	WALLACE			
White Collar					
More integration	83.3	16.7		100	(18)
Status quo	79.4	20.6		100	(34)
More segregation	54.2	45.8		100	(24)
	$(X^2 = 5.93)$		$P < .10$		
Blue Collar					
More integration	66.7	33.3		100	(6)
Status quo	66.7	33.3		100	(9)
More segregation	10.6	89.4		100	(19)
	$(X^2 = 11.57)$		$P < .01$		

attitudes of the electorate. The major findings of this research therefore are:

1. There was little change between voting intention as reported two weeks before the presidential election and the actual vote cast.
2. The Wallace movement hurt the Democratic party more than it damaged the Republican party.
3. The 1968 presidential election was highly issued-oriented. Among supporters of various presidential candidates, the Wallace supporters were most issue-oriented.
4. Wallace and Nixon supporters were more concerned with "law and order," while Humphrey supporters were more concerned about civil rights.
5. Negro respondents voted overwhelmingly for Humphrey; white respondents were about evenly divided between Wallace and Nixon, with Wallace receiving a slightly higher percentage of support.
6. Wallace received sizable support from all socioeconomic groups. But he received the strongest support from the lower-educated, blue-collar workers, and lower as well as lower-middle classes.
7. There are very significant relationships between racial attitudes and the Wallace vote. People for segregation and opposed to open housing and school integration supported Wallace.
8. The relationships between racial attitude and the Wallace vote persist even after education, income, class identification, and occupation are held constant. In other words, an independent relationship exists between racial attitude and the Wallace vote irrespective of the above mentioned socioeconomic variables.

After summarizing the major findings of the present study, some reflections on the implications of these findings are in order. From what has been revealed by this paper, the Wallace movement was clearly supported by the segregationist sentiment of the local white voters.

In other words, as far as the city of Memphis is concerned, the Wallace vote was clearly caused by a white backlash.

In an article on southern racial attitudes, Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro pointed out that "in the 'peripheral' South, the greater awareness by whites of Negro discontent, the existence of a significant minority of white moderates, and the growing number of Negro voters make the accommodation of racial conflict politically possible."<sup>18</sup> This was not the case in the 1968 election in Memphis. What actually happened was a polarization between the Negroes and whites along the line of voting-for-the-Democratic-party and not-voting-for-the-Democratic-party, with the candidate of the third party capitalizing on segregationist sentiment of white voters.

<sup>18</sup>Matthews and Prothro, *op. cit.*, p. 108, pp. 120-121.